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Abstract
This thesis seeks to contribute to the organisational trust literature by 
investigating the relevance of trust to organisations through executive self- 
reports, and exploring the potential congruities and incongruities of these self- 
reports with the existing trust literature. Further, the study allows for the 
participants to introduce unique conceptualisations of trust in organisations that 
may not appear in the literature but might be worthy of further consideration and 
research. The results of this study begin to fill an existing gap in the trust 
literature by considering the perceptions of the most senior executives in the 
corporate environment.
A trust typology is proposed (Chapter 5) which distinguishes between 
characteristics of genuine trust and surrogate trust. Definitions widely cited in the 
literature are analysed against the typology, and the executives’ definitions are 
compared to consider congruities and incongruities of definitions. The dynamics 
of trust are examined (Chapter 6), and an optimal trust path for transactions is 
proposed (Chapter 7). The possible economic impacts of trust in organisations 
are evaluated (Chapter 8) and new conceptualisations from executive reports are 
analysed. The extensive use of metaphors by the executives to convey trust is 
examined (Chapter 9). Alternative configurations of trust are examined (Chapter 
10) and a model for optimal trust transactions based on the literature and 
executive reports are presented.
The final chapter argues that future studies may benefit from the findings of this 
thesis, including key considerations in defining trust for research in organisations, 
recognising that executives may view trust as an asset that is strategically 
invested like any other corporate asset, expanding the scope of trust and its 
potential economic impacts on the organisation, and developing new models for 
building trust.
3
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Trust in organisations has received considerable attention in the business, 
sociology and economics literature during the past decade. The literature is 
replete with theories of trust ranging from those where trust is considered integral 
to the functioning of the organisation, to those where it is considered irrelevant. 
Few researchers, however, have studied the experiences and ideas of Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs) and other senior executives on the roles of trust in the 
businesses that they operate. This may be because it can be very difficult to get 
several hours of a CEO’s time to dedicate to an in-depth interview for research 
purposes. A widely accepted business maxim is that the most important assets a 
CEO has are leadership, vision and the time to execute that vision. It is therefore 
rare to gain access to an organisation’s most senior leader and spend hours 
discussing trust in the organisation. But this is exactly what was accomplished in 
this study.
The Roles of Trust
When trust is present in any relationship it is claimed that it simplifies every 
transaction, from knowing that the correct change will be given at the grocery 
store, to having confidence that an investment made in a corporation will be 
protected in good faith by the recipient. Economists refer to the costs associated 
with everyday life as transaction costs. In the business environment many
transaction costs result from the use of trust surrogates, as will be argued in
Chapter 5, which are those individuals, processes and technologies that are
substitutes for trust. Overly complex contracts may be considered trust
surrogates when their complexity is the result of the need to reduce
vulnerabilities in an uncertain relationship. The offer of free merchandise if a 
receipt is not given, for example, is a trust surrogate in that it safeguards against 
opportunistic behaviour by ensuring that the transaction has been put through the 
till.
Objective of the Thesis
The objective of this research thesis is to contribute to the organisational trust 
literature by investigating how senior executives conceptualise and report the 
relevance of trust to their organisations, and comparing the executive reports to 
the existing literature to find consistencies, inconsistencies, and novel 
conceptualisations.
Structure of the Thesis
After presenting the relevant literature, methodology and a description of the 
study participants, the remainder of this thesis is structured to provide a 
comprehensive treatment of the operational conceptualisations of trust in 
organisations as reported by corporate executives. As such, the transcribed 
dialogue is primarily presented in detail rather than in partial segments. This 
treatment is intended to allow the reader to understand key points in context and
provide a foundation for understanding the full relevance of the subsequent 
analysis. It is also intended to provide transparency so readers may judge for 
themselves the validity and accuracy of the researcher’s interpretation of content. 
Using grounded theory, the sections, chapters and subchapters emerged during 
coding of the transcribed interviews. The thesis is organised in chapters that 
build on one another.
The early chapters establish the methodological framework within which this 
study was conducted, and introduces the reader to the senior executives. Next, 
we build on this foundation by exploring the nature of trust as described in the 
literature and by the senior executives. This exploration is divided into three 
chapters: a trust typology chapter that distinguishes between the characteristics 
of widely cited definitions of trust and grounds this study in a hybrid trust that 
incorporates trust and trust surrogates; a chapter that describes the dynamics of 
trust by exploring how trust is gained and lost over time; and a chapter on optimal 
trust that takes the known dynamics of trust and proposes that there are optimal 
trust conditions for transactions. After exploring the more general nature of trust, 
we focus in on trust more sharply in the next chapter through a description of why 
executives think that trust is important by exploring the economic impact they 
think it can have on the organisation. We then conduct an analysis of the 
different ways the executives communicate their conceptualisations of trust by 
exploring their use of metaphors and the discourse of trust. The chapters are 
organised to tie together the senior executives’ perceptions of the nature of trust,
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why they think trust is important to their companies, and how they communicate 
that importance. The penultimate chapter proposes an optimal trust model that 
draws from the literature and executive reports. The final chapter examines the 
potential contributions of this thesis to the existing literature and posits new 
avenues for further research.
The central chapters that constitute the body of this thesis are generally 
organised as follows:
• Introduction
• Executive Reports
• Analysis of Reports
• Summary
The introductory sections at the beginning of each chapter are intended to 
provide the reader with a foundation for the topic to be explored. The executive 
reports are blended together with transitions and observations, but otherwise are 
transcribed directly from the interviews conducted for this thesis. The analysis 
sections address the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the executive reports 
with the literature, as well as novel conceptualisations that may not appear in the 
trust literature. Some of the content in these sections goes beneath the surface 
of the interviews to explore patterns and differences not immediately apparent in 
the interview text, contradictions and other relevant data that may naturally come
11
out in a semi-structured interview. The summary sections highlight the most 
important findings from the chapters and provide the source material for the final 
chapter of this thesis. The contributions of this thesis include key considerations 
in defining trust for research in organisations, recognising that executives may 
view trust as an asset that is strategically invested like any other corporate asset, 
expanding the scope of trust and its potential economic impacts on the 
organisation, and introducing a proposed model for building trust. Chapter 2 that 
follows provides a comprehensive review of the relevant literature and 
establishes the scholarly foundation and context for this study.
12
CHAPTER 2: Literature Review
Introduction
Social scientists have often drawn on personal experience as an inspiration for 
their research. This is true of Glazer and Strauss (1965) in their study of hospitals 
and the management of the terminally ill. Similarly, my personal experience as a 
young business owner led me to study executives’ experiences of trust in their 
organisations. After reviewing the literature, it became clear that there were 
many studies related to trust in the organisation, but there was a gap when it 
came to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and senior executive experiences of trust. 
Gaining an understanding of senior executives’ perceptions and experiences of 
trust in organisations is an important contribution to the research literature 
because the ideas promoted by elites can have a profound effect on companies, 
industries and economies (Desmond 2004). Their ideas are found to have more 
of an impact on the organisation than other personnel in that their directives 
usually trickle down the organisation and form perceptions at every level (Harvey 
2010). This study attempts to begin filling this gap in the literature by performing 
semi-structured interviews with thirteen senior executives from a variety of 
industries in the United States and United Kingdom and presenting their 
perceptions and experiences for consideration.
A high degree of trust among transacting parties requires less involvement from 
trust substitutes, such as contracts, resulting in reduced transaction costs 
(Barney and Hansen 1994), and may provide competitive advantages that go
beyond reduced transaction costs (Zaheer et al. 1998; Dyer and Chu 2003). 
Trust has been associated with performance (Colquitt, Scott, and LePine 2007), 
behaviour (Walumbwa, Luthans, Avey, and Oke 2011), success of human 
resource management (Graham and Tarbell 2006), outcomes of negotiations 
(Olekalns and Smith 2007), and employee satisfaction (Edwards and Cable 
2009). When there is a lack of trust, the role of costly trust surrogates becomes 
paramount, and key advantages of high trust relationships are not available to 
low trust exchange partners (Barney and Hansen 1994). Decisions are made 
every day responding to the lack or preponderance of trust present in 
organisations, and perceived trustworthiness can have multiple impacts on firms. 
Trustworthiness may affect an investor’s decision to purchase shares, a 
customer’s decision to purchase a product, or a supplier’s decision to provide 
goods and services to a buyer.
Whereas there are multiple definitions put forward (Zand 1972; Arrow 1974; Fox 
1974; Lewis and Weigert 1985; Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988; Bradach and 
Eccles 1989; Barney and Hansen 1994; Hosmer 1995; Mayer et al. 1995; Das 
and Teng 1998; Rousseau et al. 1998; Bachmann in Nooteboom 2003) and 
types and models of trust proposed (Barney and Hansen 1994; Lewicki and 
Bunker 1996; Sako 1998), there remains a gap in the literature when it comes to 
senior executives’ perceptions of trust. The objective of this research thesis is to 
contribute to the organisational trust literature by investigating how senior 
executives conceptualise and report the relevance of trust to their organisations,
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and comparing the executive reports to the existing literature to find 
consistencies, inconsistencies, and novel conceptualisations.
Trust Definitions
I review some of the important studies on trust definitions and typology below. 
Interested readers may refer to Arnott (2007) for an exhaustive compilation of 
trust related articles from the disparate fields in which trust has been explored 
(from psychology to sociology and information systems to marketing). Also, it is 
important to note that the literature on trust is ever increasing. Recent research 
in new areas of trust, such as affect, emotion, violation and repair, distrust, 
international and cross-cultural issues, and context-specific model are gaining 
importance (Schoorman et al. 2007).
Trust has been defined in many ways. Common characteristics in many 
definitions include positive perceptions of trustworthiness among actors, and a 
willingness to accept a vulnerable position in a transaction (Edwards and Cable 
2009; Van Dijke, De Cremer, and Mayer 2010). A few definitions focus solely on 
accepting a vulnerable position (Chua, Ingram, and Morris 2008; Gibson and 
Birkinshaw 2004) and on positive perceptions or confidence alone (Nielsen and 
Nielsen 2009; Menges, Walter, Vogel, and Bruch 2011). There have also been 
suggestions that trust operates differently at higher and lower levels of an 
organisation (Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, and Becerra 2010; Schaubroeck, Lam, and 
Peng 2011; Colquitt, LePine, Zapata, and Wild 2011), and when trust is 
associated with a leader (Simmons, Gooty, Nelson, and Little 2009).
Gambetta (1988: 217) defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents 
will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or 
independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in 
which it affects his own action”. For Gambetta, by trusting “we implicitly mean 
that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not 
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of 
cooperation with him” (Gambetta 1988: 217). In this sense, trust can be defined 
as a “type of expectation that alleviates the fear that one’s exchange partner will 
act opportunistically” (Bradach and Eccles 1989: 104). Contracts may be needed 
in order to reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour by the partners. 
However, it is rarely the case that all dimensions of a transaction can be 
contractually specified and enforced (Fehr and List 2004).
Mayer et al. (1995: 172) define trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trusted, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party”. Only when risk and uncertainty exist, is 
there a need to trust (Mayer et al. 1995). Thus vulnerability is a necessary 
condition for trust to exist. This emphasis on vulnerability (the willingness to take 
on risk) is consistent with the definition of trust proposed by Das and Teng 
(1998), where trust is considered relevant only in risky situations. Rousseau et al.
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(1998: 395) provided a cross-disciplinary conceptual definition of trust: “a 
psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. Therefore trust is 
an expectation or belief that one can rely upon another person's actions and 
words.
Some risk must always be present if trust is to be tested and validated (Dasgupta 
1988). Coping with risky situations is an important dimension in the definition of 
trust throughout the different approaches and disciplines; only when risk and 
uncertainty exist is there a need to trust (Mayer et al. 1995).
Costa and Bijlsma-Frankema (2007) examine the trust-control nexus in 
organisational relations. They remark that the relation between trust and control 
is complex and research into this relationship has led to various and 
contradictory interpretations on how trust and control relate. Specifically, two 
main perspectives can be distinguished: the substitution perspective and the 
complementary perspective. The substitution point of view posits that trust and 
control are inversely related. Thus low trust requires formal control and high trust 
allows for limited formal control. Trust and control are interlinked processes 
commonly seen as key to reach effectiveness in inter- and intraorganisational 
relations.
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Lewis and Weigert (1985) characterise trust as a leap of faith where trust fills in 
the gap created by opportunism. Zand (1972) refers to trust as the increasing of 
one’s vulnerabilities with an exchange partner in a situation where there is no 
control over the behaviour of the partner and the perceived costs of breaching 
trust are greater than the benefits of maintaining trust. For Hosmer (1995: 393), 
trust “is the reliance by one person, group, or firm upon a voluntarily accepted 
duty on the part of another person, group or firm to recognise and protect the 
rights and interests of all others engaged in a joint endeavour or economic 
exchange”. For many researchers, the most relevant definition of trust is one 
party’s confidence that their partner in the exchange relationship will not exploit 
its vulnerabilities (Ring and Van de Van 1992; Sabel 1993; Barney and Hansen 
1994; Zaheer et al. 1998; Dyer and Chu 2003). In all instances described above, 
the common threads of the definitions of trust involve the recognition of 
vulnerability to opportunism, and the willingness to assume risk where absolute 
control over opportunistic behaviour is not possible.
While vulnerability and willingness to accept risk are required for trust, trust can 
occur in different forms. For example, Adobor (2006) provides the following 
“forms of trust”:
a) Deterrence based trust - Actors act in a trustworthy manner because of the 
fear of the consequences of trust violation. The higher the penalty, the greater 
will be the probability that actors will be trustworthy.
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b) Knowledge based trust - Repeated interactions lead to building of trust. Actors 
can predict the trust behaviour of their exchange partner after repeated 
exchanges (Sako 1992).
c) Identification-based trust - This kind of trust emerges from group membership 
of some sort. According to this view, compared to within-group members, non­
group members will be less trusted. In this case, trust is conferred on the basis of 
group affiliation alone.
Dyadic trust - cognitive vs. affect based trust
Mayer et al. (1995) define dyadic trust as “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et al. 1995:172). There are two 
dimensions of dyadic or interpersonal trust. They are cognitive based trust and 
affect based trust (Lewis and Weigert 1985). As Costigan et al. (1998) explain, 
affect based trust involves deep emotional investment in a relationship. Cognitive 
based trust, in contrast, depends on observed actions based on which rational 
inferences can be made (Costigan et al. 1998).
Personal vs. Procedural trust
Gill and Butler (1996) explain the difference between personal and 
impersonal/procedural trust as follows. Personal trust is based upon the 
perceived reliability of the individuals to fulfill expectations. The development of
19
personal trust derives from the networks to which the various partners belong 
and the interactions stemming from those memberships. In contrast, impersonal 
or procedural trust is based upon the perceived reliability of formalised systems 
and computations for making reliable decisions. Procedural trust is therefore 
based upon a coherent set of well understood rules of operation.
Institutional trust
Fox (1974) explains institutional trust as the employees’ trust of the 
organisation’s CEO and top management. Institutional or top management trust 
is less dyadic and more impersonal, unless the organisation has a relatively 
small number of employees. As Costigan et al. (1998) explain, trust of the CEO 
and top management is based more on decision outcomes made by the top 
management. Thus trust is driven more by efficiency and fairness of the 
organisation-wide systems created than by personal characteristics and 
behaviour of the CEO (McCauley and Kuhnert 1992). Thus CEOs have an 
important role in building up trust between different stake holder groups. 
Ingenhoff and Sommer (2010) in fact view organisations and CEOs as a 
collective trustee.
Dynamics of Trust
There are scholars that hold the position that trust is a diffuse topic that has little 
relevance to the study of organisations (Williamson 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996). 
Others have worked to demonstrate the importance of trust and to highlight the
vital roles it plays in the operation of the firm (Gambetta 1988; Barney and
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Hansen 1994; Zaheer et al. 1998; Dyer and Chu 2003). It has been pointed out 
in the literature that trust is a temporal phenomenon because it builds upon the 
experiences, perceptions, and interactions of the trustee (Caldwell and Clapham 
2003). Lewicki et al. (2006) argue that most of the existing research on trust has 
taken a static, “snapshot” view; that is, it has approached trust as an 
independent, mediating, or dependent variable captured by measuring trust at a 
single point in time. Limited attention has been given to conceptualising and 
measuring trust development over time.
Simel (1964) makes the observation that there is no need to trust when an 
individual has total knowledge about the other party. Trust is also not a rational 
choice when an individual has no knowledge about another (Costigan et al. 
1998). Thus, the decision to trust is rational when it falls somewhere in between 
the two extremes: no knowledge to total knowledge.
The concept of building or diminishing trust based on the actions of the 
transactors appears frequently in the trust literature. Cases such as those cited 
above have prompted scholars to propose a variety of models illustrating the 
evolution of trust over time. We discuss some of the studies that examine how 
trust may be gained and lost in organisations.
Robinson (1996) found that an employee's initial trust or distrust in his or her 
employer was negatively associated with a perceived breach in the psychological
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employment contract eighteen months later (Costigan et al. 2004). In a 
longitudinal study, Mayer and Davis (1999) found that adoption of a new 
employee friendly performance-evaluation process yielded increased employee 
trust ratings for top management over a fourteen-month time frame (Costigan et 
al. 2004). These results imply that it is possible for a firm's top management to 
influence employee impressions of upper-level management over short time- 
periods.
According to Hardin (2006), a trustee would want to maintain the ongoing 
relationship with the trustor “because it is not merely the present fulfillment that 
matters but also all that might come from [their] long-run future interactions” 
(Hardin 2006: 19). What matters is that the trustee acts in favor of the trustor’s 
expectations.
Whitener (1997) found that increased trust is not contained to the dyadic 
supervisor-employee relationship, but it generalises into a deeper trust of and 
respect for the organisation as a whole (Costigan et al. 2004). It is also argued 
that trustworthy, competent decisions made by one's immediate supervisor may 
permeate upwards, leading to increased trust on the firm's upper-level 
management. The authors also make a valuable observation: “A core component 
of a leader’s credibility is the constituent’s perception of the leader’s honesty. 
When leaders practice what they preach, one is more likely to entrust them with 
his or her career.” (Costigan et al. 1998: 308)
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McCauley and Kuhnert (1992) found that when an employee sees evidence of 
the supervisor providing opportunities for the employee’s career growth/ 
professional development, it leads to higher level of trust between employee and 
the management.
Ingenhoff and Sommer (2010) examine how different dimensions of trust (i.e., 
ability, integrity, benevolence, and information quality) influence the degree of 
overall trust in a company and in CEOs. Interestingly, they note that the 
dimensions that influence trust in a CEO may be completely different to those 
influencing trust in companies. Trust in a company as a collective actor and in the 
CEO as a representative can be completely different. Their survey findings show 
that in Switzerland, companies are more trusted than CEOs. Also, the factors 
that influence overall trust differ between CEOs and companies. Social 
responsibility as a benevolence item is found to be important for both groups.
Also, since individuals seldom have direct, personal contact with a company and 
CEO, information from the media about the company or CEO is the basic source 
for building trust.
Other factors that seem to affect how trust is increased or decreased are i) 
frequency of interaction, and ii) reputation. Cognitive and affective based trust 
depends on frequency of interaction between the trustor and the trustee. When
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the trustor has no direct/previous experience with the trustee, reputation 
becomes an important factor. The trustor would assume that the trustee will act 
in a trustworthy manner to avoid losing his good reputation (Hardin 2006).
Trust Building and Diminishing Actions
A review of the literature supports the concept of trust as a dynamic process that 
ascends and descends through actions over time (Khazanchi and Masterson 
2011; Deery et al. 2006; Montes and Irving 2008; Restubog, Hornsey, Bordia, 
and Esposo 2008; Hill, Bartol, Tesluk, and Langa 2009; Tomlinson and Mayer 
2009; Giessner and Van Knippenberg 2008; Restubog et al. 2008). Further, the 
literature is replete with studies that characterise the actions that build and 
diminish trust (Johnson and Lord 2010; Dirks, Kim, Ferrin, and Cooper 2011; 
Grant and Sumanth 2009; Yakovleva, Reilly, and Werko 2010; Jap, Robertson, 
and Hamilton 2011). Multidisciplinary studies have identified social, 
psychological, economic, and structural determinants of trust (Desmet, De 
Cremer and Van Dijk 2011; Caldwell and Dixon 2010; Palanski and Yammarino 
2009; Kalshoven, Den Hartog, and De Hoogh 2011; Van Dierendonck 2011; 
Caldwell, Hayes, and Long 2010; Colquitt, LePine, Piccolo, Zapata, and Rich 
2012; Khazanchi and Masterson 2011; Li and Cropanzano 2009; Yang, 
Mossholder, and Peng 2009; Rubin, Bommer, and Bachrach 2010).
Prior research shows that trust emerges from repeated interactions between the 
actors (Powell 1996; Anderson and Narus 1990), through prior ties (Granovetter 
1985; Gulati 1995; Uzzi 1996), when incentives exist for trustworthy behaviour
(Axelrod 1984) or because of the presence of institutional structures at the 
national or sector level that promote trust behaviour (Browning et al. 1995). 
Furthermore, studies have shown that trust is higher when transactors have had 
positive previous experiences (Kerler and Killough, 2009), are culturally similar 
(Jiang, Chua, Kotabe, and Murray 2011), are family members (Davis, Allen, and 
Hayes 2010; Cruz et al. 2010), and when a leader has a positive impression of a 
subordinate (Sy, 2010).
Whitener et al. (1998) enumerate the antecedents of managers’ trust building 
behaviour which revolve around the organisational, relational, and individual 
factors. Applying principal agent theory to the manager-employee relationship, 
the manager can be considered to be the principal, and the employee to 
represent the agent. “The greater the amount of control and employee monitoring 
required by the organisational factors, the lesser the opportunity for managers to 
develop trustworthy behavior.” (Chan 2003: 49)
Trust is a key factor in CEO - board relationships (Berger 1991). Hospital CEOs 
who set long-term strategy and business goals, communicate openly and 
honestly with their boards and work in partnership with their medical staffs meet 
the key expectations of trustees. In contrast, CEOs who ignore business 
objectives, circumvent their boards or alienate hospital constituencies eventually 
lose the trust and confidence of their boards. Trust is destroyed, for example, if 
the CEO fails to disclose appropriate board-level information, minimises
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problems or has private 'understandings' with other hospital constituencies 
without involving the board.
Gill and Butler (1996) argue that there can be cycles of trust and distrust in joint 
ventures. They contend that performance of joint-ventures depends on 
contextual variables where trust acts as an intermediate variable. They present 
two cases to demonstrate that trust and distrust may occur in cycles. One of the 
case studies involves decay of trust into distrust, and the other case study 
involves the successful building up of trustworthy relations within a joint-venture. 
In doing so, the authors explain the role of personal trust and its interaction with 
procedural trust. In one case, the termination of the joint-venture with a company 
called Autocloth followed a breakdown in the personal contact between the chief 
executives of the two parent companies. This led to a consequent reduction in 
reliance upon personal trust, leaving only the procedural trust based upon the 
terms of the contract. In the other joint venture, Unimarine, initial suspicion 
eventually turned into a high degree of personal trust with an apparent disregard 
for the contract.
Chan (2003) examines how corporate espionage leads companies to take high
control security measures, which, in turn brings distrust in workplace. Managers
therefore face a conflict: they have to deter espionage activities and
simultaneously build trust in workplace. Fehr and List (2004) examine
experimentally how CEOs respond to incentives and how they provide incentives
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in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. Taking students as the control 
group, they compare the behaviour of CEOs. They find that CEOs are more 
trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students, thereby reaching higher 
levels of trust and efficiency. They also found that incentives based on explicit 
threats to penalise shirking tend to backfire by inducing less trustworthy 
behaviour. This is referred to as a cost of incentive. On the other hand, there are 
returns to incentives as well: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining 
from implementing the punishment, then the agent exhibits more trustworthiness 
than if the punishment threat is not available. In this sense, trust seems to 
reinforce trustworthy behaviour. Their experimental findings indicate that 
trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it 
is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Therefore their findings indicate that 
explicit threats to sanction shirking may be perceived as hostility and lead to 
distrust. As a response to this hostile behaviour by the principal, the agents 
would increase shirking. On the other hand, refraining from use of available 
explicit threat may be perceived as a trusting act. Therefore a deliberate nonuse 
of threat begets trust.
Weber et al. (2005) explain why trustors, contrary to the prescriptions of the 
(dominant) rational choice approach, often engage in large, seemingly irrational 
acts of trust and when and why these acts, despite being tremendously risky, can 
be crucial to trust development. They build up a new motivated attributions model 
of trust development. Their model builds on two simple insights: that the parties
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in a potentially trusting relationship are likely to view their interaction differently 
and that their attributions of each other’s behaviour will be self-servingly 
motivated. The model specifically focuses on the role of dependence in 
motivating attributions of trustworthiness, suggesting, for instance, that people 
ameliorate the anxiety associated with dependence by perceiving others as 
trustworthy.
Adobor (2006) argues that the nature and structure of exchange can affect trust. 
For example, how trust emerges in a joint venture may be different from how it 
emerges in an arms-length relationship. Uncertainty in an exchange situation will 
encourage partners to interact frequently as a way of reducing uncertainty, 
thereby creating the probability that trust will emerge.
Bstieler and Himmert (2007) develop and test a model of factors proposed to 
influence the formation of trust in R&D partnerships in the two different cultures 
of Austria and South Korea. Their findings indicate that that specific relational 
behaviours like communication quality, fairness, and unresolved conflicts impact 
trust formation and that national culture has a direct and a moderating effect on 
trust development. Specifically, communication quality and fairness have a 
positive effect and unresolved conflicts have a negative effect on the amount of 
trust developed. Overall, the impact of the three relational factors is much 
stronger than the direct and moderating influence of national culture in the R&D
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partnerships studied, indicating that the relational elements of trust formation 
might be more universal than country specific.
Ferrin et al. (2007) argue that extant research has not adequately distinguished 
between one’s own and the other’s trust, monitoring, and cooperation. They 
explain this using an abstract example: party A may cooperate with party B 
because: (a) A trusts B (A has confidence that B has integrity and hence will 
behave cooperatively), (b) B trusts A (A wishes to honour B’s trust by 
cooperating rather than competing), (c) A is monitoring B (therefore, A knows 
that B is behaving cooperatively), (d) B is monitoring A (therefore, A has little 
opportunity to benefit from competing), (e) A cooperated in the past (and A’s 
behaviour has become habituated), and (f) B cooperated in the past (and A is 
now reciprocating B’s behaviour). In this example, A’s cooperation can be 
predicted by own and other’s trust, own and other's monitoring, and own and 
other’s past cooperation. Thus the authors argue that a more explicit distinction 
between own and other’s trust, own and other’s monitoring, and own and other’s 
cooperation is critical for better understanding the relationships among trust, 
monitoring and cooperation.
Ferrin et al. (2008) argue that in dyadic trust, it takes two to tango. They examine 
the “spiraling” relationship of perceived trustworthiness and cooperation in 
interpersonal and intergroup relationships. In particular, they present three spiral 
reinforcement models that describe how mutual perceptions of trustworthiness
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and/or mutual cooperation may develop in dyadic interpersonal and intergroup 
relationships. They suggest that trust perceptions play a crucial mediating role in 
the development of cooperation in both interpersonal and intergroup interactions. 
Therefore it does take two to tango: the development of mutual trust and 
cooperation involves an intricate dance that spirals over time and is 
fundamentally affected by partners’ initial moves.
In an interesting study, Mizrachi et al. (2007) examine the practice of trust in a 
multinational organisation amidst political conflict. Drawing on ethnographic 
research at a multinational corporation operating in a politically charged 
environment, they explore trust relations between Israeli and Jordanian 
managers in an Israeli-Jordanian industrial site. They find that trust, always 
tenuous in multinational collaboration, poses formidable challenges to this fragile 
relationship between former enemies. They compare trust relations during 
normalisation and political unrest under a natural experiment setup. Their study 
leads to an understanding of how different forms of trust change in response to a 
transformed political environment. They show how Jordanians and Israelis apply 
different forms of trust alternately and interchangeably, transcending cultural 
dichotomies such as tradition and modernity and deviating from presupposed 
developmental paths. Their "trust repertoires" approach depicts actors as 
knowledgeable agents who select, compose, and apply different forms of trust as 
part of their cultural repertoires. By applying forms of trust, actors demarcate the
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boundaries of their social relationships. At the same time, actors’ strategies are 
inextricably intertwined with the power structure and political context.
Six and Sorge (2008) explore how organisational policies stimulate interpersonal 
trust building and eventually create high-trust organisations. They examine 
empirically how an organisation that deliberately enhances interpersonal trust to 
become a significant organisational phenomenon is different from a similar 
organisation without explicit trust enhancement policies. They use relational 
signaling theory, according to which trust is a function of consistently giving off 
signals that indicate credible concern to potential trustors. They studied two 
consulting organisations, with different trust policies but otherwise similar 
characteristics, focusing on the generation of trust and the handling of trouble 
when trust was threatened or destroyed. They find that a higher stage of trust 
can be reached by an inter-related set of policies: promoting a relationship- 
oriented culture, facilitation of unambiguous signaling, consistent induction 
training, creating opportunities for meeting informally, and the day-to-day 
management of competencies.
Optimal Trust
Optimal trust is a concept that has been explored by researchers for several
decades (Horsburgh 1961; Wicks et al. 1999; Parkhe and Miller 2000; Davies
and Rundall 2000; Jeffries and Reed 2000; Adler 2001; Malhotra and Murnighan
2003; Adobor 2006; Gargiulo and Ertug 2006). The first reference in the
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literature to the term “optimal trust” appears in the October 1961 volume of 
Ethics. Horsburgh (1961) proposes the existence of three levels of trust: 
minimal, optimal and optimific. Minimal trust refers to the minimal level of trust 
necessary for an objective to be achieved between agents. Optimal trust is the 
level that is most favourable or ideally justified for the objective to be met. 
According to Horsburgh’s classification, whereas optimal trust refers to a focus 
on a single objective, optimific trust refers to the full breadth of objectives of an 
entire network or group -  a macro set of objectives shared among many. He 
states that the optimal level of trust is rarely obvious, and that in defining it one 
must always correctly address the precise degree of trust necessary to fully 
realise the objective (Horsburgh 1961).
According to Wicks et al. (1999), “Optimal trust exists when one creates (and 
maintains) prudent economic relationships biased by a willingness to trust. That 
is, agents need to have stable and ongoing commitments to trust so that they 
share affect-based belief in moral character sufficient to make a leap of faith, but 
they should also exercise care in determining whom to trust, to what extent and 
in what capacity” (Wicks et al. 1999: 103). For Wicks et al., when trust and 
interdependence are equally matched (when there is a fit) then trust is at an 
optimal level for that relationship. Their notion of optimal trust is based on 
Aristotle’s “golden mean”, which describes the ideal point between excess and 
deficiency. Assuming the existence of an optimal level of trust, the authors also 
assert that it is possible to overinvest and underinvest in trust, which they
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describe as similar to excess and deficiency respectively. They point to Japan’s 
guarantee of lifetime employment and Indonesia’s crony capitalism practices as 
examples of overinvesting in trust. Overinvesting and underinvesting are 
activities that diminish the ability of transacting parties to reach optimal trust. In 
the case of Japan, a high level of investment in trust results in companies that 
are saddled with overwhelming long-term financial liabilities. The close trust 
networks in Indonesia block the creation of competing institutions that create 
strong viable economies. The authors also point to the problems of 
underinvesting in trust, where transacting parties unnecessarily create expensive 
safeguards against opportunism.
It is generally accepted that social structure assists or impedes economic 
performance. Uzzi (1996) examined the features, functions and sources of 
“embeddedness” using a data set on network ties among apparel firms in New 
York. He interviewed CEOs and management personnel involved in key aspects 
of business. The “embeddedness” argument offers a potential link between 
sociological and economic aspects of business behaviour. The moot point is that 
economic action is embedded in social relations. It refers to the process by which 
social relations shape economic actions. Uzzi’s findings indicate that an 
organisation’s network position, network structure, and embedded exchange 
relationship shape performance such that performance reaches a threshold as 
embeddedness increases. After the threshold, the positive effect of 
embeddedness reverses itself and may become negative. Uzzi explains this
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phenomenon by examining how firms link to their network partners. Firms that 
connect to their networks by embedded ties have a greater chance of survival 
than the firms that connect through arm’s length ties. He continues, “The second 
component concerns the kind of network to which a firm links itself. In this case, 
a paradox appears: Optimal networks are not composed of either all embedded 
ties or all arm’s length ties, but integrate the two” (Uzzi 1996: 694).
Ferrin et al. (2006) argue that within organisations, trust typically develops 
between individuals who are embedded in a complex web of existing and 
potential relationships. They identify three alternative ways in which a trustor and 
trustee may be linked to each other via third parties: network closure (linked via 
social interactions with third parties), trust transferability (linked via trusted third 
parties), and structural equivalence (linked via the similarity of their relationships 
with all potential third parties within the organisation). Each of these is argued to 
influence trust via a distinct social mechanism. If excessive trust is placed in the 
business partner, one may be taking too much risk. In this case, one of the 
partners might be acting naively such that the partner can take advantage. “If, on 
the other hand, there is little trust, but one still wishes to deal with the other party, 
there will be the need for more complete information about plans (what the other 
party intends to do), processes (how it is proposed to do it) and results (desired 
or unexpected ends obtained) coupled with appropriate sanctions for 
inappropriate behaviour” (Tomkins 2001: 166). Wicks et al. argue that there is an 
inverse relationship between the willingness to trust and the need for information.
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Tomkins (2001) contends that while information and trust must be alternatives, 
the relationship between them is far from being a simple inverse one. Following 
Wicks et al., trust is contextually dependent on cultural and personal variables. 
According to Tomkins (2001) the contextual influence not only involves national 
and organisational cultures and personal propensities to trust, but also the stage 
of progression of the relationship. He argues that the functional association 
between trust and information is more likely to be characterised over the life 
cycle of a relationship by an inverted U-shape (Tomkins 2001), as shown below, 
rather than a monotonic inverse association between trust and information.
inform?*'^ rseesod lor 'ootitror of the relationship
I level of Trust increasing over tiro
At an early stage of a relationship, commitments are usually less extensive and
so the risks attached to breach of that commitment are lower than at later stages
of the relationship. Hence, there will be a lower need for either trust or
35
information as an uncertainty absorbing mechanism. Moreover, it is posited that, 
as the relationship matures from the initial state of low level of trust, there will be 
a positive association between trust and information simply because trust itself 
cannot be increased without further information. So, once one takes a dynamic 
view of a relationship, one sees that there is likely to be a positive association 
between information and trust at earlier stages of relationship development. As 
trust intensity becomes established at higher levels in later stages of the 
relationship, it is likely that less information will be needed to sustain that 
relationship. Hence a negative association arises at later stages of building trust 
(Tomkins 2001).
Rather than focusing solely on interdependence of transacting parties, Henry 
Adobor (2006) considered the importance of optimising uncertainty and its 
relationship to trust. His study of 191 biotechnology industry senior managers 
demonstrated that a minimal amount of uncertainty is necessary for trust to 
emerge. Beyond a certain limit, however, increases in uncertainty resulted in 
reduced trust. Adobor proposed a midrange between these two extremes of 
uncertainty that may represent an optimal level of trust in transactions. He refers 
to this midrange as a zone of tolerance (Adobor 2006), where parties have 
sufficient comfort and justification to carry out a transaction. For Adobor, levels 
of uncertainty that are both too low and too high will impede trust creation. His 
study also suggests that actors should approach trust from a perspective of 
strategic thinking. There are costs to creating trust and, unless it is determined
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that trust is important (reasonable levels of uncertainty), actors should not invest 
in trust creation. At the same time, beyond a certain level of uncertainty, it will be 
prudent to think of other control measures to reduce opportunism in an exchange 
relationship.
When uncertainty rises beyond a certain level, “actors may be tested beyond 
their limits and trust may begin to decline for a number of reasons. First, when 
uncertainty becomes too high, actors may be unwilling to take the leap of faith 
required to build trust. Individual hesitance may evolve into mutual suspicion and 
an unwillingness to make commitments to the relationship” (Adobor 2006: 543). 
He continues, “partners may resort to monitoring the relationship excessively 
under very high uncertainty conditions. Some monitoring is good for trust 
building, but too much of it will be counterproductive to trust building because 
excessive monitoring can create the impression that one is not trusted. Finally, 
under very high uncertainty, the risks may simply become too large, and the 
hazards of opportunism too great for actors to tolerate. The probability that trust 
will collapse, or at the least decline, is much greater under high uncertainty than 
under low uncertainty conditions for the same reasons” (Adobor 2006: 543). 
Thus he makes the following observation:
“There is a curvilinear relationship between uncertainty and trust such that 
there is some optimal level beyond which higher uncertainty leads to lower 
levels of trust in an exchange.” (Adobor 2006: 543)
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According to Erdem (2003), trust within teams is a function of other team 
members’ perceived ability, integrity and benevolence and the members’ own 
propensity to trust. Also, trust is a required condition for teamwork. However, 
excessive trust can create risk for teams. As he explains, trust can lead to 
“groupthink” phenomenon. Under this phenomenon, the team members apply 
self-censorship of their own thoughts that may deviate from team consensus. 
Then the team may apply social pressure on team members who argue against 
the team’s shared beliefs. Alternative thinking and decisions are not adequately 
discussed and thus wrong or ineffective decisions may be taken. Thus, as Erdem 
(2003: 230) puts it, “excessive trust and solidarity should be avoided; the goal is 
to seek and maintain an optimal level of trust”. Over trust can lead to negative 
impact on behaviour and performance, particularly by inhibiting diversity of view 
and constructive dialogue. Thus for conditions where members work under 
extreme pressure (for example: military conditions) unconditional trust between 
members may be necessary. Such situations do not allow time for innovation and 
questioning, and team behaviour must follow prescribed patterns. However, for 
most teams, this constraint does not apply and this calls for optimal trust.
Optimal trust was also addressed by Gargiulo and Ertug (2006) in relation to 
what they term the dark side of trust. They propose an optimal level of trust that 
corresponds to certain benefits, where the benefits decline as trust becomes 
either insufficient or excessive. This is consistent with the trust paradox
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described in Chapter 5. Three negative consequences of excessive trust are 
explored, including blind faith, complacency and unnecessary obligations.
Implications of Optimal Trust
If there is an optimal level of trust then cost-benefit analysis may be used to 
attain the optimal level. As Tomkins (2001: 166) remarks, "... developing more 
reliable forms of trust and the cost of doing that is rarely considered in the cost- 
benefit analysis”. Also, the very notion of optimal trust does not recognise that 
trust can exist without a calculative frame of mind. Certainly, trust can exist 
without specific probabilistic calculation and at the extreme it can occur on 
impulse. The adoption of a calculative perspective may also seem to ignore 
differing personal propensities to trust which obviously exist. Hence, despite their 
call for optimal assessment, Wicks et al. (1999) also state that although a rational 
cost benefit analysis is an important foundation for trust, it provides an insufficient 
basis for a complete understanding of it.
One implication of having “optimal trust” is that one must examine what leads to 
trust failure. Also, there should be a limit to trust creation (Adobor 2006).This is 
important because building trust involves cost. If the returns to trust decline or 
level off after a certain point then one must refrain from over investing in trust. 
Adobor (2006: 549) makes an interesting observation: “If some uncertainty is 
required for trust to emerge, but too much uncertainty will lead to a reduction in 
trust, then perhaps transaction cost economics may begin where relational
39
theory, and trust in particular, ends. Thus, Williamson’s (1985) proposition that 
contracts as a form of self-protection ought to be the governance mechanism of 
choice under high uncertainty may be valid.”
Wicks et al. (1999) suggest that actors may over invest and under invest in trust. 
Since trust can be expensive in terms of time, resource input and unrequited 
trust, there is efficiency when people build trust to the extent that it is needed. 
They argue that “it is possible to both over and underinvest in trust, and neither is 
desirable from either a moral or strategic point of view. Firms that overinvest in 
trust -  trust too much or invest in trusting relationships that have little value for 
the firm - may be misallocating precious resources and/or taking unnecessary 
risks that could have a substantial negative effect on firm performance. At the 
same time, firms that underinvest in trust - trust too little or do not invest in 
creating trusting relationships that have substantial value for the firm - may miss 
out on opportunities to create cost savings or develop organisational capabilities 
vital for the realisation of firm objectives” (Wicks et al.1999: 99). According to 
them, overinvestment in trust such as trust without monitoring may lead to theft 
by opportunistic employees.
Economic Impacts of Trust
Several authors have highlighted the importance of trust (for example, Barney 
and Hansen 1994; Creed and Miles 1996; Gambetta 1988; Golembiewski and 
McConkie 1975; Hosmer 1995; Kramer 1999; McCauley and Kuhnert 1992;
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Michalos 1990; Reina and Reina 1999). Trust leads to incentives for cooperation, 
reduces uncertainty, and increases information exchange (Arrow 1974; 
Gambetta 1988; Gulati 1995; Powell 1996). Therefore, the higher the level of 
trust in relationships, the lower the costs of monitoring and other control 
mechanisms (Cummings and Bromiley 1996; Handy 1993). Trust and control are 
considered to be alternative routes for arriving at stable orders to which social 
actors can orient their behaviour (Gulati 1995). When trust is strong, less 
governance structures such as safeguards in transactions are needed to prevent 
opportunism, and, therefore, costs for the organisation decrease. Thus, trust 
leads to a competitive advantage (Barney and Hansen 1994; Sako 1998). On the 
other hand, there is also a significant literature examining distrust and the 
corresponding economic disadvantages developed from the works of Kramer 
(1998), Kramer (2002), Lewicki et al. (1998), and Sitkin and Roth (1993). This 
review considers literature that explores both the reported economic advantages 
of trust and the economic disadvantages of trust.
Trust promotes knowledge exchange (Golden and Raghuram 2010; Makela and 
Brewster 2009) and leads to improved feedback between leaders and employees 
(Hays and Williams 2011). Trust results in future cooperation (Rosanas 2008) 
and can lead to a willingness to make one-self vulnerable and assume risk when 
there is a sense of empowerment (Gao, Janssen, and Shi 2011). Economic 
benefits from trust are derived from increased organisational commitment 
(Farndale, Van Ruiten, Kelliher, and Hope-Hailey 2011), and fewer negative 
reactions by employees to change in the work environment (Oreg and Sverdlik
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2011; Sonpar et al. 2009). Trusted partners have improved outcomes in 
negotiations, even when they contribute fewer resources than less-trusted 
partners (Fairchild 2011), and trust among transacting parties increases the 
likelihood that agreement terms will be implemented (Mislin et al. 2011). Trust 
has been found to decrease turnover, increase employees’ positive identification 
with the company and increase general job satisfaction at all levels (Miner- 
Rubino and Reed 2010; Edwards and Cable 2009; Hansen, Dunford, Boss, 
Boss, and Angermeier 2011; Montes and Irving 2008; Lin 2010; Restubog et al. 
2008).
Just 25 years ago Zucker (1986) pointed out that, for all its importance, trust has 
received little empirical investigation. At around the same time Williamson (1985) 
questioned why direct measures of transaction costs are rarely attempted. Less 
than three decades later the literature is replete with empirical studies of the 
economic effects of trust on the organisation. Far from covering every study in 
this area, the studies that follow are representative of empirical investigations of 
trust where particular emphasis is placed on transaction cost reductions 
associated with contracting and negotiating, and the sharing of information and 
resources. Additional literature was reviewed on the negative economic effects 
of violations of trust and mishandling trust repair.
Dyer (1997) studied automotive transaction relationships in Japan and the USA 
and found that high asset specificity does not always result in higher transaction
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costs, contrary to a primary assertion in Transaction Cost Economics. In 
studying firms in the two countries, Dyer concluded that Japanese firms enjoy 
lower transaction costs than their US counterparts (even though asset specificity 
is higher) because of 1) higher transaction repetition with a limited number of 
trusted suppliers, 2) higher volumes of exchanges, 3) increased information 
sharing (resulting in a reduction of asymmetric information), 4) the extensive use 
of noncontractual safeguards (consistent with goodwill trust [Sako 1998] and 
strong-form trust [Barney and Hansen 1994]), where shared values reduce the 
threat of opportunism and result in a long-term view of the relationship 
unconstrained by the defined timescales of a contract, and 5) greater investment 
in ‘cospecialised’ assets. This is also consistent with the conclusions of Barney 
and Hansen (1994) where seeking out and trading with a small number of highly 
trusted (strong-form trust) exchange partners may reduce transaction costs. If 
strong-form trust is present, the firms will be apt to exchange more often, at 
higher volumes, with a greater variety of objects of exchange, with less-costly 
noncontractual safeguards and long-term shared objectives resulting in shared 
investment in assets associated with current and future exchanges. Dyer 
acknowledges that the set-up costs for building goodwill trust may be higher 
initially (Sako 1992), but suggests there may be lower maintenance costs 
resulting in a decline of transaction costs over time. This study demonstrates an 
inverse relationship between trust and transaction costs - as trust increases, 
transaction costs decrease, and as trust decreases, transaction costs increase. 
Dyer summarises his comparative findings as follows:
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“Japanese automotive transactors minimize transaction costs by 
minimizing search, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement costs over 
the long-term. They do this by controlling opportunism in the exchange 
relationships through self-enforcing safeguards rather than legal contracts. 
Conversely, U.S. automakers recontract with an ever-changing line-up of 
suppliers and thus continue to incur considerable search and contracting 
costs. While a legal contract may minimize transaction costs in the short 
run, the safeguards used in Japanese alliances result in lower transaction 
costs over the long run." (Dyer 1997)
Dyer presumes that each of five propositions above have distinct value, but 
states that to realise the full benefit of reduced transaction costs may require that 
these propositions be exercised in combination. This infers that the interrelations 
of the correlated and mutually reinforcing propositions result in a condition where 
the whole may be greater than the sum of the parts.
Although Dyer’s conclusions are promising, there is not enough attention paid to 
the costs of building trust and the role of reciprocal causality in the exchange 
relationships. Whereas trust may reduce transaction costs over the long term, it 
may be that the investment made to build trust will never pay-off. Among other 
measures, companies rely on return on investment (ROI) schedules to determine 
whether or not an investment makes good business sense. If the investment in
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building trust is too high, it could take too long to achieve a suitable ROI, thus 
building trust could be a bad investment. Similarly, there may be certain 
exchange relationships that benefit from constant turnover of exchange partners, 
that is, where the reductions associated with a regular bid process and supplier 
change is the most efficient strategy for reducing costs and building competitive 
advantage. Regarding increased information sharing and its potential benefits, 
Dyer fails to address the possibility of reciprocal causality. Does building trust 
result in increased information sharing, or does increased information sharing 
result in the building of trust? In principle, there could be a cyclical relationship 
between the two as well. Moreover, information could be shared under severe 
contractual terms fraught with penalties that might actually diminish trust over 
time and lead to more costly transactions.
Development of personal trust requires intensive social interaction and an 
organising 'set-up' cost may be involved (Gill and Butler 1996). Social exchange 
involves a long term process starting with minor exchanges whereby actors test 
each other before moving to bigger transactions (Shapiro 1988; Blau 1964). 
Clear communication between transacting parties is key to developing trust, 
where face-to-face interactions initially build a stronger trust compared to other 
forms of communication such as on-line interactions (Hill et al. 2009; Murrell, 
Blake-Beard, Porter, and Perkins-Williamson 2008). Studies have found the 
quality of communication (Stahl et al. 2011) and common courtesy during 
interactions (Gullett et al. 2009) increase trust as well. Other minor interactions
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and characteristics that have been found to build trust include making oneself 
accessible (Cameron and Webster 2011), engaging in small talk (Mislin, 
Campagna, and Bottom 2011), referencing one another’s points of view in 
conversation (Cameron and Webster 2011), gift exchange (Dolfsma, Van der 
Eijk, and Jolink 2009), and information sharing (Nguyen and Rose 2009). 
Transparent communication with employees promotes trust in executive 
leadership (Norman, Avolio, and Luthans 2010), as does displaying emotion 
when communicating (Gardner, Fischer, and Hunt 2009).
Zaheer et al. (1998) studied a sample of 107 buyer-supplier interfirm 
relationships and found that trust in interorganisational exchange has a 
significant direct effect on performance. Several key findings emerged from their 
research. First, the more a supplier representative is trusted by the buyer, the 
more the supplier’s organisation is trusted. There is a direct transference of trust 
in the individual to trust in the larger organisation, although the authors recognise 
that interpersonal trust is not necessarily a proxy for interorganisational trust in 
every instance. Presumably the opposite is true as well -  distrust in the 
individual will result in distrust of the organisation, although not in every case. 
Second, the researchers found that interorganisational trust is strongly 
associated with lower negotiation and conflict costs. This finding leads them to 
the conclusion that the effects of trust are different in the interorganisational and 
interpersonal contexts, yet when combined yield reduced transaction costs. The 
higher the interorganisational trust, the easier the negotiations and fewer the
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conflicts. They assert that organisations in exchange relationships may enjoy 
competitive advantages from relationships with high levels of organisational trust 
(Zaheer et al. 1998). In short, their findings support the notion that 
interorganisational trust acts to smooth negotiations and therefore reduces the 
costs of interorganisational exchange. Interpersonal trust also plays an important 
but secondary role in the reduction of negotiation costs. Interorganisational trust 
and interpersonal trust are inextricably linked, and take on crucial roles in 
exchange relationships that transcend formal governance structures such as 
contracts. Zaheer et al.’s (1998) suggestion for future research is the request for 
more in-depth case studies to enhance the understanding of how 
interorganisational trust builds over time.
In a related study on supplier-customer dyads, Bradford et al. (2009) find that 
developing strong trust-based relationships with customers is increasingly 
important in the business-to business marketplace. They examine how suppliers 
affect trust with their customers and find evidence that salesperson job 
satisfaction is related to customer-focused helping behaviour. Also, perceived 
customer importance interacts with salesperson job satisfaction to positively 
affect customer-focused helping behaviour, and ultimately customer-focused 
helping behaviour is related to customer trust in the supplier.
Robson et al. (2008) contend that elucidating the nature of a trust-performance 
link in international strategic alliances is challenging. Findings evident in existing
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alliance research raise concerns that inter-partner trust does not always enhance 
venture performance. The authors focus on the social and bureaucratic forces 
that are critical in international joint ventures. The results suggest that, while 
inter-partner trust is positively associated with alliance performance, this 
relationship becomes stronger when alliance size declines. They find that 
distributive fairness and partner similarity are central to the achievement of a 
trusting alliance partnership.
Dyer and Chu (2003) studied 344 supplier-automaker relationships in the United 
States, Japan and Korea to investigate the impact supplier trust in buyers has on 
transaction costs and information sharing. Specifically, they wanted to discover 
whether high levels of supplier trust in a buyer results in lower transaction costs, 
greater information sharing, and better performance. The study demonstrated a 
link between high trustworthiness and low transaction costs, and low transaction 
costs and improved performance (profitability), thereby suggesting that a 
reputation for trustworthiness improves performance. The researchers divided 
transaction activities and costs into ex-ante (search and contract related) and ex­
post (monitoring and enforcement related) activities. It was discovered that the 
least-trusted automaker spent more of its face-to-face interaction time with 
suppliers on contracting and haggling compared to the most trusted automaker. 
This study also found that procurement costs were five times higher for the least 
trusted automaker (Dyer and Chu 2003).
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In addition, the researchers found that trust was positively correlated with 
information sharing in that higher levels of information sharing led to higher levels 
of trust. The authors assert that this makes trust unique as a governance 
mechanism because the investments that trading partners make to build trust 
can simultaneously create economic value beyond lowering transactions costs in 
the exchange relationship (Dyer and Chu 2003). This finding is consistent with 
Zaheer et al. (1998) where it was demonstrated that the link between 
interorganisational trust and exchange performance is due in part to the mutual 
cooperative exploration of new information, technologies, opportunities, and 
product and process innovations. The authors were careful by limiting the 
relevance of their findings to industrial settings where transaction costs are high 
due to environmental uncertainty and high asset specificity, and where a 
premium is placed on information sharing due to the complex nature of the 
undertaking. They list industry examples such as aircraft manufacture, robotics, 
and supercomputers.
Uzzi (1996) found that “embedded” ties perform unique functions and have three 
features: a) trust, b) information transfer and c) joint problem solving. Trust acts 
as the governance mechanism of embedded relationships. It facilitates exchange 
of resources and information that are difficult to value and transfer via market 
ties. As one of the interviewees remarked, “Trust means he’s not going to find a 
way to take advantage of me. You are not selfish for your ownself. The company 
and partnership (between firms) comes first” (Uzzi 1996: 678). Trust facilitates
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exchanges and invites the receiving partner to reciprocate when a new situation 
arises. Trust increases an organisation’s access to resources and strengthens its 
ability to adapt to unforeseen problems. This would be rather difficult to achieve 
through arm’s length transactions that are impersonal and calculative.
Uzzi’s findings indicate that the economic relationship develops into ongoing 
embedded ties in stages. It begins with a stock of trust appropriated from a 
preexisting social relation. The stock of trust forms a basis of future 
commitments. Reciprocal exchanges eventually lead to concrete trust in the 
relationship. In contrast, the calculative arm’s length relationship fades and is 
replaced with a heuristic decision making process. Formation of trust also leads 
to fine-grained information transfer between the parties. This kind of exchange in 
information would be unlikely in the absence of trust since that might lead to 
opportunistic behaviour.
Dirks and Ferrin (2001) explore how trust leads to benefits for organisations. The 
model that has dominated the literature says that trust results in direct (main) 
effects: Higher levels of trust are expected to result in more positive attitudes, 
higher levels of cooperation (and other forms of workplace behaviour), and 
superior levels of performance. They develop an alternative model: Trust 
facilitates or hinders (i.e., moderates) the effects of other determinants on 
attitudinal, perceptual, behavioural and performance outcomes via two distinct 
perceptual processes.
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They examined the effect of interpersonal trust on individuals’ workplace-relevant 
attitudes and behaviour. The basic idea behind the main effect model is that 
higher level of trust in a work partner leads to direct effects. It increases the 
likelihood that one will take a risk with the partner (for example: cooperate, share 
information) and also increases the amount of risk that is assumed. In social 
units such as work groups, these behaviours (cooperation and information 
sharing) would lead to higher unit performance.
In contrast to the main effect, they provide a model of the “moderating effect” of 
trust. Since trust involves an individual’s understanding of a relationship, they 
argue that trust leads to two distinct processes through which it fosters or inhibits 
positive outcomes in the relationship. First, trust affects how one assesses the 
future behaviour of another party with whom one is interdependent. Second, trust 
also affects how one interprets the past (or present) actions of the other party, 
and the motives underlying the actions. Thus, in the moderating effect model, 
trust does not have a direct causal role on outcomes. Instead, trust moderates 
the effects of primary (causal) factors. For example, trust, instead of directly 
causing risk-taking behaviours, may influence the extent to which a motivation for 
engaging in risk-taking behaviours is likely to lead to risk-taking behaviours. 
Understanding how trust leads to organisational benefits can lead to better ways 
of using trust as a managerial intervention. Thus trust provides the conditions
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under which economic benefits such as improved cooperation, higher 
performance, positive attitudes and perceptions are likely to occur.
Distrust of a firm's CEO and top management could lead to loss of investor 
confidence, weaken employee confidence and undermine organisational 
performance, resulting in economic harm. Therefore trust on the top- 
management and organisational productivity is interrelated (Costigan et al. 
2004). As they rightly point out, since employee trust in the firm's top 
management is critical to the firm's performance, identifying its predictors should 
prove useful. Understanding the antecedents of employee trust in the CEO 
enables the firm to take appropriate measures in managing trust levels of the 
CEO and top management. This observation resonates with Chapter 5 of this 
thesis, where we found that CEOs put importance on the factors that increase or 
decrease trust in organisation.
Costigan et al. (1998) looks at workplace trust using a multidimensional 
approach. In particular, they examine trust from a horizontal perspective (i.e. trust 
among co-workers) as well as a vertical perspective (i.e. trust of both the 
supervisor and top management). They studied 35 full time employees to test 
several hypotheses related to trust among focal employees, their co-workers, 
supervisors and top management. Reciprocal measures of two types of trust 
were obtained for each of the dyads.
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Organisations often rely on self-managed teams. This bestowing of 
empowerment requires management to trust the work force. Conversely, 
employees express trust in managers and co-workers by accepting these 
additional work roles. Thus, “Team based organizations are anticipated to 
outperform from traditional bureaucratic structures when it comes to producing 
quantity and quality, making adaptive changes, and developing employees” 
(Costigan et al. 1998: 303).
Their findings indicate that high performance teams are characterised by high 
mutual trust among members. Trust in the organisation enables employees to 
surface their ideas and feelings, use each other as resources and learn together. 
In contrast, without trust, members in organisations tend to assume self- 
protective, defensive postures that may inhibit learning. The amount of trust has 
an effect on the performance of teams and on the economic performance of the 
organisation.
“For most employees, the decision to trust top management is based more on 
the outcomes of organizational decisions made by these top managers and less 
on direct personal experience of their character, words, and actions” (Costigan et 
al. 1998: 304).
Dyadic or interpersonal trust has both cognitive and affective components. 
Cognitive components refer to the rational decision to trust or withhold trust. This
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decision is based on reasoning, such as responsibility, dependability, 
competence, etc. and provides evidence of trustworthiness. The key to this 
reasoning is that it is based on measurable, objective criteria. For example: the 
worker completes the assignment on time. Clearly, the trustor can observe this 
and make rational inferences on trustworthiness of the trustee.
Both cognitive based trust and affect based trust are determinants of work place 
behaviour and work performance. Costigan et al. (1998) examine the effect of 
trust on different aspects of workplace behaviour by studying a) risk taking, b) 
motivation/willingness to perform and c) assertiveness. In general, the results 
seem to indicate that affect based trust may have a more powerful presence in 
organisations while cognitive based trust may have more of a superficial 
influence.
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) examine how partners in an 
interorganisational relationship can repair violated trust, and if that is impossible, 
how they can preserve the collaborative relationship. They propose that the 
effectiveness of legalistic and non-legalistic measures in response to a trust 
violation is a function of the hierarchical level at which the violation occurred 
(corporate vs. operating), the character of the violation (competence vs. 
integrity), the frequency and severity with which it occurred, the organisational 
context in which boundary spanners are embedded, and the degree of 
dependence between the partners. How violation of trust is dealt with at one
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hierarchical level might affect trust at the other level. Violations of trust can have 
a negative impact on employee performance and the economic performance of 
the firm. This study suggests a trickle down affect where the poor handling of a 
trust violation at the senior level can negatively impact trust levels throughout the 
organisation.
Gillespie and Dietz (2009) propose a systemic, multilevel framework for 
understanding trust repair at the organisational level. They explain how different 
components of an organisation’s system shape employees’ perceptions of the 
organisation’s trustworthiness and can contribute to failures and effective trust 
repair.
On a similar note, Kim et al. (2009) examine the repair of trust using a dynamic 
bilateral perspective and multicultural conceptualisation. They find that the 
cognitive and interpersonal processes are used by people to resolve differences 
in their interpersonal beliefs. The loss of trust resulting from malfunctioning 
products can be repaired when the consumers’ perception of corporate ability is 
high (Lin, Chen, Chiu, and Lee 2011) and a quick and appropriate response to 
failure is implemented (De Cremer, Tenbrunsel, and Van Dijke 2010). A strong 
perception of corporate social responsibility also increases stakeholders’ trust in 
organisations (Lin et al. 2011; Stanaland, Lwin, and Murphy 2011; Bhattacharya, 
Korschun, and Sen 2009; Castaldo, Perrini, Misani, and Tencati, 2009; Du, 
Bhattacharya, and Sen 2011), as does a commitment to workplace diversity
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(Stahl, Larsson, Kremershof, and Sitkin 2011), and a willingness to discuss 
ethical issues (Trapp 2011). Half-hearted attempts at corporate social 
responsibility initiatives decrease trust (Jahdi and Acikdilli 2009).
The empirical research conducted to date points to certain actions that are 
consistent with a trusting relationship, and the literature describes some 
proposed outcomes that have potential economic advantages for exchange 
partners. The literature also describes activities that diminish trust and have a 
negative impact on the economic functioning of the organisation. The studies 
above are representative of many empirical studies of trust where particular 
emphasis is placed on transaction cost reductions associated with contracting 
and negotiating, and the sharing of information and resources.
Metaphors and Trust
Metaphors provide deep insights into how we conceive, perceive and 
communicate complex ideas; they are not simply linguistic phenomena, but 
rather a conceptual and experiential process that structures our world (Su 2002). 
The use of metaphors is one of the most important linguistic devices that reflect 
cognitive vision, and we think increasingly by means of metaphors (Su 2002).
Metaphors have been a subject of inquiry for researchers for decades. Studies 
have been conducted looking into metaphors and organisational change (Palmer 
1996), cognition (Ricouer 1978), motivation (Sweetser 1992), intention
(McCloskey 1964; Harries 1978), comprehension (Shen 1992), meaning 
(Davidson 1978), teamwork (Gibson 2001), structures (Samples 1978), 
organisational turbulence (Polley 1997), categorisation (Shen 1992), decision 
making (Meyer 1984), economics (Wyatt 2004), psychology (Swanson 1978), 
beliefs (Sandor 1986), and social science (Rosenthal 1982).
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) found that the use of metaphors is common in 
everyday life. In fact, the very way that we think about the world around us is 
metaphorical in nature. Take, for example, some common phrases such as ‘Til 
jump right on that” or “I’ll run it right over”. Both terms are action metaphors 
intended to convey that there will be immediate attention given. In this case, the 
notion of covering a distance rapidly is employed to give the impression that 
something will be handled quickly and efficiently. In reality, of course, it is highly 
unlikely that the individual employing the metaphor intends to literally “jump right 
on” something, or that they intend to “run” to deliver a package. According to 
Lakoff and Johnson (2003), a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one 
thing in terms of another. Conveying and understanding rapidity of action by 
using terms such as “jump” and "run” allows for the experience of one thing in 
terms of another. “The maker of metaphors is this craftsman with verbal skill 
who, from an inconsistent utterance for a literal interpretation, draws a significant 
utterance for a new interpretation which deserves to be called metaphorical 
because it generates the metaphor not only as deviant but as acceptable. In 
other words, metaphorical meaning does not merely consist of a semantic clash
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but of the new predicative meaning which emerges from the collapse of the literal 
meaning, that is, from the collapse of the meaning which obtains if we rely only 
on the common or usual lexical values of our words. The metaphor is not the 
enigma but the solution of the enigma.” (Ricouer 1978:146)
For those that are interested in metaphor usage and categorisation, the “jump” 
and “run” examples would probably fall into a spatial category, as action and 
distance are being used to convey an idea. Shen (1992) conducted a study that 
examined the fields of metaphor usage and categorisation. According to Shen, 
metaphors don’t necessarily fit into common or stable categories as proposed by 
Aristotle, or even the prototypical categories described by Lakoff (2003). To 
properly categorise metaphors and their structure and comprehension, Shen 
suggests a less stable ad hoc category to expand the possibility of connection 
between and understanding of one thing in terms of another. This is necessary 
to allow for categorisation of more loosely associated metaphors. A 
characteristic of metaphors is some asymmetry exhibited by the comparisons 
with sufficient higher order causal relationships that provide an aptness to the 
comparison. An example is a psychiatrist is like a crutch. In literal terms, a 
human psychiatrist with a medical degree is nothing like a metal object with poles 
extending from the ground to the underarm. The asymmetry of the compared 
elements is well established at one categorical level, but there is also a sufficient 
higher order relevance to the comparison that makes it valid. At a higher level, a 
crutch is used for stability, and it can be inferred, that for some, the psychiatrist
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can provide stability (but not a cure) as well. In that sense, the asymmetry is 
complimented by a higher order relationship that results in an aptness of the 
metaphor and relevance to the understanding of a particular situation or 
condition. Carried further, the order in which the elements are presented also 
helps determine the aptness of the metaphor. Stating that a psychiatrist is like a 
crutch makes more sense than stating that a crutch is like a psychiatrist. 
According to Shen (1992), the second element in the comparison therefore 
needs to be a prototypical or common member that grounds the metaphor. This 
makes the metaphor easier to comprehend and prevents the metaphor from 
being reduced to absurdity (Rosenthal 1982).
Researchers often see the process of narrative as an essential feature of human 
interaction, placing emphasis on the development of meaning rather than judging 
truth through the interview process (Bailey and Tilley 2002; Dexter 1970).
In her studies on Nobel laureates, Zuckerman (1972) found that technical 
language was avoided by the interviewees. This was particularly true in the early 
phase of most interviews where the laureates were trying to avoid language that 
the interviewer might not understand.
In the current study, executives used metaphors throughout their interviews to 
convey meaning that otherwise might not have been properly understood or 
easily comprehended. As presented herein, I am adhering to the assertion that a
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metaphor is likely to convey complex meaning best comprehended alongside a 
rich understanding of the context (Gibson 2001). Therefore, like many 
researchers exploring metaphor usage and categorisation, the metaphors are 
presented within context in the Appendix so they may be comprehended with a 
richer understanding.
Given the reported importance of metaphors to understanding how we think 
about complex subjects (Su 2002), a part of this thesis is dedicated to presenting 
the metaphors used by the executives to discuss trust, exploring the potential 
significance and meaning underlying their use, and perhaps providing a novel 
approach to gaining a better understanding of how these senior executives think 
about trust.
Chapter 3 that follows describes the study methodology and provides the 
rationale for using grounded theory to analyse the semi-structures interviews in 
this study.
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CHAPTER 3: Study Methodology
Grounded Theory
What is grounded theory?
This study reports on data gleaned from thirteen semi-structured interviews with 
senior executives of corporations. Grounded theory was used to analyse data 
gathered from two rounds of executive interviews. According to Willig (2008: 35), 
“grounded theory is both the process of category identification and integration (as 
method) and its product (as theory).” Grounded theorists do not begin with a 
theory and then attempt to prove it through collecting data. Instead, the 
researcher starts with an area of study and allows the theory to emerge from the 
data.
Traditional grounded theory analysis steps were followed, including the 
structured categorisation of content called coding. According to Flick (2009: 435- 
436), these steps require the researcher to start with open coding followed by a 
more structured and selective coding, which forms the categories and 
subcategories. Coding is the process whereby data is categorised to assist in 
analysis. If the coding process raises additional questions that can only be 
addressed with new categories, it may be necessary to return to open coding. 
Coding ends at a point of theoretical saturation where additional coding does not 
lead to additional insights. The practice of research using grounded theory
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integrates all these steps until the researcher can explain the phenomena in 
which (s)he is interested.
Why Grounded Theory is appropriate for this study
Grounded theory was employed to analyse the data because it provided 
sufficient freedom to allow for new theories to emerge from the semi-structured 
interviews. This is an appropriate approach particularly because,
The aim of grounded theory analysis is to produce theories that are truly 
grounded in the data; that is, theories that do not depend on external 
concepts that are brought to the data by the researcher. Grounded theory 
has a realist orientation. The type of knowledge grounded theory aims to 
produce is knowledge of processes that reside in the data and can emerge 
from the data (with a little help from the researcher). Categorizing and 
theorizing are simply ways in which these processes are systematically 
presented to the readership by the researcher (Willig 2008: 48).
The full version of grounded theory analysis was used instead of the abbreviated 
version (Willig 2008: 39) as it allows the researcher to collect data, explore the 
data through open coding, establish initial linkages between categories, and then 
return to the field to collect additional data. This is compared to the abbreviated 
version of grounded theory where researchers limit their analysis to the original 
data set and cannot return to the field for additional data gathering. As such, the 
abbreviated version of grounded theory was not appropriate for this study. In the 
full version, the researcher may triangulate -  or draw on different data sources 
and use different methods of data collection. “The full version allows the
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researcher to push outwards, to seek out manifestations of categories, negative 
cases and opposites, until category development is dense, detailed and 
differentiated. This gives the researcher confidence that theoretical saturation is 
being approached” (Willig 2008: 39). In the case of the first round of interviews in 
the present study, theoretical saturation was approached when the executive 
responses from later interviews added little new information to the data gleaned 
from the earlier interviews. After analysing the data and reflecting on the 
findings, it became clear that saturation had been reached with some concepts, 
but not with others, and that it would be necessary to conduct a second round of 
interviews to gain a better understanding of all key concepts. This is consistent 
with the tradition of grounded theory in that, unlike most other research methods, 
it merges the processes of data collection and analysis. The researcher moves 
back and forth between the two in an attempt to ground the analysis in the data 
(Willig 2008: 37).
Limitations of Grounded Theory
Of course, grounded theory is not without its critics. My contribution here is not a 
new methodology, but it is appropriate to acknowledge some of the shortcomings 
of grounded theory described in the literature. Some grounded theorists argue 
that a literature review should not be conducted until after the research has been 
completed because it may ‘contaminate’ the researcher’s perceptions. However, 
according to Willig (2008: 41), a systematic review of the literature is unlikely to 
contaminate grounded theory research, and may actually help formulate useful
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research questions that have not been asked before in the same way. This was 
the case with my research experience -  finding the senior executive trust 
perception gap and formulating the research topic only came after an initial 
review of the literature.
Additional criticism of grounded theory has been posited by Melia (1996: 376 in 
Willig 2008: 44).He argues that the coding procedures and general rigidity 
associated with the grounded theory method are not sufficiently flexible to allow 
for an open expression of and response to data. As he puts it, “I always have a 
nagging doubt that the procedures are getting in the way; the technical tail is 
beginning to wag the theoretical dog” (Melia 1996: 376 in Willig 2008: 44). 
Another concern is that grounded theory, being based on induction, does not 
adequately address questions of reflexivity. Following grounded theory, the 
codes for the present study were extracted inductively from the data. According 
to Willig (2006:46), “One of the problems associated with induction is that it pays 
insufficient attention to the role of the researcher. It is assumed that the data 
speaks for itself. Critics of positivism have argued that all observations are made 
from a particular perspective. Whatever emerges from a field through 
observation depends on the observer’s position within it. In the same way, 
whatever emerges from the analysis of a set of data is theoretically informed 
because all analysis is necessarily guided by the questions asked by the 
researcher.” An attempt has been made to address these criticisms and 
concerns throughout the research process by taking the advice of Pidgeon and
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Henwood (1997) and acknowledging here and throughout this thesis the ways in 
which the researcher’s own experience, assumptions and values may have 
shaped the research.
How grounded theory was employed in this study
Semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions were chosen because, 
as Berry (2002: 682) puts it, “for projects where depth, context, or the historical 
record is at the heart of data collection, elite interviewing using broad, open- 
ended questioning might be the best choice.” Thirteen corporate executives 
were selected for of interviews. They were asked to answer questions during a 
semi-structured interview, and a significant number of probing questions were 
asked to clarify statements. The number of interviews was not predetermined as 
it was unclear at the outset how many additional interviews would be necessary 
to reach theoretical saturation. This is one of the tenets of grounded theory -  
one cannot go in with preconceived notions of the outcome -  the theory will 
emerge, grounded in the data. Finally, although the senior executives represent 
corporations from different industry classifications and operate in diverse 
locations, all the corporations are headquartered in the United Kingdom or United 
States of America.
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Methodology: Elite Interviewing
Elite interviewing is a specialised case in the social sciences that is recognised 
as unique from other interview formats (Marshall and Rossman 1995). At the 
same time, elite interviewing is a widely used research tool that can provide 
valuable information from the individuals responsible for leading organisations. 
Interviews have been done on corporate (Kincaid and Bright 1957), political 
(Peabody et al. 1990) and professional elites (for example: Nobel Laureates in 
science by Zuckerman 1972). Given the special nature of elite interviewing, it is 
appropriate to review the methodological implications of interviewing elites.
In conducting and analysing the interviews, it was not assumed that executive 
perceptions were always right. David Silverman (2001) points out that what the 
interviewee thinks is important may not be the most interesting data to come from 
the interviews. Silverman provides the following guidance for conducting 
qualitative research, providing insight that was important for this study:
avoid the assumption that research is only worthy if it reveals what is 
hidden or secret;
recognise that what is sometimes of most interest is what is considered 
unremarkable to participants;
avoid comparing what people say and what we (think we) know about 
what they do; and
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understand that experience is not more or less authentic but rather is 
narrated in ways that are open to further investigation.
Because the interview format stresses the interviewee’s self-reports the 
interviewee is encouraged to structure accounts and introduce his or her ideas of 
what is most important instead of relying on the interviewer’s perceptions of 
importance. Elite interviews are different in that the goal is to elicit subjective 
perceptions based on specialised knowledge that the interviewee possesses 
(Dexter 1970). Different interpretations are seen as valuable, and the process is 
more open-ended than focused interviews, allowing the interviewee to discuss 
his or her specific definitions, structures and perceptions of relevant data related 
to the topic (Odendahl and Shaw 2002). The assumption is that elite 
interviewees will probably have a different perspective to those held by a more 
general population, and it is important to glean their self-reports to better 
understand the dynamics of situations (Wax 1971; Whyte 1984). Marshall and 
Rossman (1995) point out that the elite interviewee has an overall view of the 
organisation and its relationship to other organisations, as well as a high degree 
of familiarity with the legal and financial structures, policies, history, and future 
plans of the organisation. They state,
“In working with elites, great demands are placed on the ability of the 
interviewer, who must establish competence by displaying a thorough 
knowledge of the topic or, lacking such knowledge, by projecting an
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accurate conceptualisation of the problem through shrewd questioning. 
The interviewer’s hard work usually pays off, however, in the quality of 
information obtained. Elites often contribute insight and meaning to the 
interview process because they are intelligent and quick-thinking people, 
at home in the realm of ideas, policies, and generalisations” (Marshall and 
Rossman 1995: 84).
Special consideration was given to access (time with business elites was often 
difficult to schedule), interview preparation (few notes and semi-structured 
interviews were most appropriate), and confidentiality where appropriate which is 
especially important to high-profile subjects (Odendahl and Shaw 2002). In the 
present study, the first set of executives approved the use of their names and 
organisations for the purposes of this study. The second set of executives was 
told that their names and companies would remain confidential.
Several important studies have been conducted using elite interviews. Some of 
those studies will be briefly discussed here with the aim of understanding the 
problems and benefits of using elite interviews.
Zuckerman (1972) interviewed 41 Nobel Laureates in the United States. The 
high percentage of responses is in contrast to the problem of access 
encountered when interviewing elites (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). While 
arranging for the interviews, she had specified her academic affiliation and
68
sponsorship from the National Science Foundation. In addition, she further 
legitimised the study and her credentials by including some of the names of the 
other laureates who had already been interviewed. This technique is called 
snowball/chain-referral sampling. This technique was used in the current study 
in that an initial respondent identified other respondents that eventually became 
participants in this study. Her experience suggests that, if pieces of information 
are included in the interview that are not widely known or are unique, it can lead 
to engaging discussion. Her study also points out that it may be important to 
vary the questions when interviewing elites. She found that laureates detected 
whether questions were standardised or tailored to their interest and histories. 
They resented being encased in the straightjacket of standardised questions. 
Moreover, since there was no intent to use the interviews as a source of 
quantitative analysis but rather qualitative research, Zuckerman used a semi­
structured interview technique that did not attempt to make interviews strictly 
comparable by always using the same questions. This aspect of elite 
interviewing guidance was taken into consideration while conducting the 
interviews for this thesis in that probing questions were used when appropriate to 
allow for a dynamic dialogue to evolve based on participant responses to the 
semi-structured interview questions.
Smigel (1958) interviewed Wall Street lawyers employed at large law firms. He 
wanted to determine the social structure of large firms and how their size and 
organisation affects the people employed there. Since the research was related
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to the elites’ viewpoints of their own organisation, this led at some points to a 
problem. Many lawyers were at first reluctant to talk about their own firms. They 
were either members (partners) of the firm and felt strongly about team 
responsibility or employees (associates) and were unsure of how much the firm 
wanted them to say and how their words might affect them. Smigel was able to 
win their confidence and assure them that their responses would not be 
disclosed to management. Similar precautions were taken in the present study. 
The first group of executives were satisfied that the research was being 
conducted for academic purposes only and they were comfortable that their 
names and backgrounds would be presented in the thesis. The second group of 
executives was told that their names would remain anonymous and that only 
vague descriptions of their organisations would be used. Even with anonymity, it 
is acknowledged that the participants may still have felt people might discover 
their identities and therefore they may have presented themselves in a way that 
they wanted to be perceived.
The ideas promoted by elite actors can have a profound effect on companies, 
industries and economies. Desmond (2004) studied a small sample of elites in 
Ireland who had influenced and shaped the country’s Technology Foresight 
Initiative that endorsed the public support of biotechnology research and 
development. The chosen group of elites advised on matters of regulation and 
policy while also advising the biotechnology industry. The group was made up of 
five individuals who contributed significantly to scientific policy and industrial
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development of the emerging biotechnology sector in Ireland. Like the group of 
executives studied here, because of their elite status, this group (although small) 
affected a great number of people through their decisions.
Several empirical works on policymaking in Washington have been carried out 
using elite interviews. Aberbach and Rockman (2002), for instance, studied 
bureaucratic elites. They examined the political thinking of American 
administrators and Members of the United States Congress. In particular, they 
studied elite attitudes, values, and beliefs. Their objective was to examine 
important parameters that guide elites’ definitions of problems and their 
responses to them. Elite interviews are generally conducted with open-ended 
questions that allow the respondents to engage in wide-ranging discussions 
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002). Typically, researchers use a semi-structured 
interview approach in which the open-ended questions give the participants 
sufficient latitude to fully respond to questions (Aberbach and Rockman 2002). 
The authors stress that semi-structured interviews require great attention from 
the interviewer since such an interview has a more conversational quality to it 
than the typical highly structured interview, and questions may be broached in a 
manner that does not follow the exact order of the original interview instrument. 
They also point out that using a semi-structured format has the advantages of 
conversational flow and depth of response that tend to outweigh the 
disadvantages of inconsistent ordering. However, closed ended questions may 
be preferred if there is a high degree of prior research on the subject. As
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Aberbach and Rockman (2002) point out, the more that is known, the easier it 
would be to use closed ended questions. Kincaid and Bright (1957) argue that 
problems critical to the organisation can be approached only through personal 
interviews with the business elite. They point to the example of the relationship 
between business expectations and decision-making. It is not suggested here 
that the role of trust in the organisation can only be approached through 
interviews with elites, but rather, adding their viewpoints to the wider discussion 
of trust through in-depth interviews might improve our understanding of trust in 
the organisation. In the present study, given the dearth of knowledge regarding 
CEO’s perceptions of organisational trust, a semi-structured interview with open 
ended questions was used.
Researchers often prefer using open-ended questions if they want to maximise 
response validity. “Open-ended questions provide a greater opportunity for 
respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks. This 
increases the validity of the responses and is best for the kind of exploratory and 
in-depth work we were doing, but it makes coding and then analysis more 
difficult.” (Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674)
There are certainly challenges associated with elite studies, and four in particular 
are highlighted by Aberbach and Rockman (2002). First, in the studies 
conducted by Aberbach and Rockman (2002), response rates were very high 
(over 90%) for career civil servants, but very low for Members of Congress. They
point out that response rate could be a significant problem for researchers willing 
to interview elites. It can be very difficult to secure interviews with elites who are 
widely sought after. Second, open ended questions can increase the difficulty in 
coding. Coding is an important task that is required to elicit subtle and rich 
information from the interview. Third, elite interviewing involves substantial costs 
in terms of time and effort in conducting the interviews, transcribing them, coding, 
and finally analysing them. And fourth, validity and reliability can always be 
questioned. Elite interviews are typically conducted using open ended questions. 
While this allows maximum flexibility in responses, open ended questions tend to 
exacerbate validity and reliability problems. Validity refers to the appropriateness 
of the measuring instrument to the task, and reliability refers to the consistency of 
the results when put under repeated testing with the measuring instrument. 
Researchers need to pay close attention to the field methodology. Problems 
could arise from poorly worded questions, unrevealing answers, and misleading 
statements (Berry 2002). Another problem with open ended questions, 
particularly with political elites is that of exaggeration (Berry 2002).
Several strategies were employed in an attempt to mitigate these potential 
problems. If researchers want to increase response rate in elite interviews, 
Aberbach and Rockman (2002) suggest mentioning prestigious organisational 
sponsors if one has any, and mentioning some past experience in studying the 
area of interest if possible. This was also practiced by Zuckerman (1972). 
Kincaid and Bright (1957) point out that affiliations and sponsorship and the
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nature of the appeal were vitally important in getting cooperation. Harvey (2010: 
199) came to the same conclusion when conducting his research in Boston 
where he “found that being a researcher from the University of Cambridge and a 
visiting scholar at Harvard enabled me to gain access to elite members,” and 
provided the opportunity to snowball other contacts. In the case of the present 
study, the researcher started with an individual CEO (Doug Richard) with whom 
the researcher had some knowledge given that one of the companies he led was 
based in Dallas, Texas near the researcher’s own business. Doug Richard was 
pleased to speak with the researcher as a fellow software executive. The 
researcher then asked Mr Richard to recommend other CEOs that might be 
willing to participate in this study. Utilising the goodwill and respect of his name 
and others created a cascade effect (consistent with snowball/chain-referral 
sampling) that allowed for access to the remaining participants.
As mentioned previously, it can be difficult to gain access to elites, especially 
large numbers of them. The researcher in the present study gained access to 
thirteen elite respondents and chose to go into great depth with each of them to 
understand their conceptualisations of trust in their organisations. The choice of 
depth over breadth is not uncommon. Several studies utilising small sample 
sizes have provided important contributions to the literature in their respective 
fields. For example, Davidson (1995) published a compelling study of a single 
prostitute that provided important insights into the power and control dynamics of 
the exchange relationship and introduced new complexities associated with that
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type of transaction. Watson (1993) studied three women working in a local 
labour market to make the argument that social and historical contexts should be 
included in analyses of economic processes. Bartholomew and Garey (2002) 
performed a qualitative study that investigated the career success of three elite 
women chefs, including the attributes that led to their success and the factors 
influencing their levels of success such as balancing work and family life. 
Bowen (2002) explored how ethical issues were addressed at the senior 
manager level by interviewing six elite executives and found that extensive prior 
training, intense analysis of the issues and taking a deontological (or rules- 
based) approach to decision-making resulted in favourable outcomes.
It should be clear that this study is not based on a representative sample -  none 
of the claims made in this thesis assume representativeness; in fact, several of 
the interviewees were chosen because of their very unusual experiences 
(Nicholas Baring, for example). Participants were not selected because they 
were typical cases, but rather some of the cases were selected because they 
had experienced significant breaches of trust that resulted in extreme business 
outcomes. One can learn as much from exploring extreme cases as typical 
cases. The approach is similar to best practices research, where studying the 
actions of high-performance outliers for the purpose of sharing their strategies 
may inform others that have not yet had similar experiences (Green 2006). A 
random sample was not taken and therefore did not allow for the possibility that 
any senior executive could have participated, and it can’t be assumed that
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another set of senior executives would provide similar responses. The purpose 
of this study is to get a sample of senior executive elites to discuss the role of 
trust in their business lives in great detail. The interest of the present study is to 
explore the processes of how CEOs talk about trust, not provide a description of 
a representative sample. The fact that the sample is not representative does not 
undermine the validity of the research. Given the choice between a much larger 
sample with less detailed data or the very detailed data analysis contained in this 
study, performing a more detailed analysis with a small sample was more 
appropriate in this case than having a more superficial analysis that could have 
been done with a quantitative approach. Harvey (2010: 193) points out that 
“many social science disciplines have skewed strongly towards quantitative 
research, thereby overlooking the experiences of elites who were not large 
enough in size to be included in sample surveys.” In the last few years there has 
been renewed attention on in-depth interviewing, case studies and participant 
observation, and elites have received a fair amount of attention (Harvey 2010). If 
one person states something interesting, or several for that matter, and it is 
something consistent or inconsistent with the literature, or missing from the 
literature, that in itself is interesting and fertile ground for thinking more broadly 
about the literature or adding to it. The identification of patterns or creating a 
representative sample is not central to what this study is trying to achieve. The 
focus is on the individual responses and how they might inform our 
understanding of trust from the CEO’s perspective.
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The problem of exaggeration and/or going to an unanticipated path may be 
mitigated by probing, a questioning strategy that was used throughout the 
interviews. After all, time with an elite subject is scarce (Berry, 2002) and 
therefore must be used efficiently. In a study on political participation of not-for- 
profit organisations, Berry (2002) used a base list of just eight questions. The 
present study used a list of twelve questions with the first group of senior 
executives and a list of seven questions with the second group of senior 
executives. Consistent with the guidance of Barry (2002), the interviewer played 
an active role and made decisions about what additional questions to ask as the 
interview progressed. If the participant went down an unanticipated path during 
the interview, it was quickly determined if this was a distracting digression and 
questioning was used to steer the interview back on track. However, it was also 
understood that digression can often lead to interesting revelations as well (Barry 
2002), which is a benefit of open ended questioning format.
Another concern is information loss which can be mitigated by tape-recording, 
subject to the approval of the interviewee which was the case with each of the 
participants in the present study. All of the interviews were recorded with no loss 
of information. Additionally, the data was not inter-rated. The study author was 
the only one evaluating the data and it is acknowledged that another researcher 
might evaluate it differently. To offset this, exact quotes were used in context 
where appropriate so that the reader could judge very transparently the quality of 
the qualitative analysis. The intent here is to allow the reader to be reassured of
the reasoning and justification through complete transparency even though they 
may have interpreted the data another way. There is not just one way to read 
the data.
As Aberbach and Rockman (2002) point out, when sharing questions with 
participants in advance of the interview, there may be some unknown effects of 
their familiarity with the project. Also, researchers would have to decide whether 
to repeat questions in later rounds when better questions could be asked 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002). In the present study, questions for the second 
set of interviews were drawn from the first round interview data to validate (or 
problematise) certain key concepts. The questions for the second group were 
shared with the senior executives in advance of the interview.
Study Limitations
It is appropriate to note that there are exclusions and limitations to this research. 
There is the impact of the researcher on the setting, referred to as the 
“Hawthorne” effect, whereby the purity of the research is compromised simply 
through the interactions necessary to conduct the research. The values of the 
researcher also might have influenced the research (Pidgeon and Henwood 
1997). Evaluation apprehension or ‘social desirability bias’ may have influenced 
the responses as participants may have wanted to project favourable images of 
themselves (Berry 2002). The fact that senior executives were interviewed rather 
than members of other functional areas of the organisation might limit the
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relevance of the findings, but no more so than focusing on any other members of 
the organisation’s hierarchy. In fact, given the strong influence on strategic 
decisions and defining corporate culture inherent in the position, it may be that 
the perceptions of senior executives have more of an impact on the dynamics of 
trust in an organisation in that their directives usually trickle down the 
organisation and form perceptions at every level (Harvey 2010). The general 
concern regarding a focus on companies operating in western cultures was 
partially addressed by interviewing executives from geographically dispersed 
organisations. For example, although Microsoft is based in the US and the 
cultural orientation of the headquarters senior personnel is western, the senior 
executives are responsible for operations all over the world and must be 
sensitive to regional differences. This did not address the potential homogeneity 
that might exist in terms of the all-male executives’ shared educational 
background or personal business philosophy and experience gleaned from 
outside their current place of operation. This is also a small sample size, and is 
not intended to be representative of the larger executive population. This study 
may also be explicitly biased by the executives’ level of success and 
achievement. Although the sample size is small, access to senior executives of 
this calibre is illusive and rich with information. It was determined after analysing 
the data from the first set of interviews that an additional round of interviews 
should be conducted with a new group senior executive elites to explore in more 
depth certain key concepts presented by the first set of executives. Given that 
this is one of the first research studies to attempt to gather the trust perceptions
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of senior executives, it was concluded that an immersive study with a small 
sample would provide rich content and a strong foundation for further research to 
be performed.
Certain demand characteristics may have influenced the research. The fact that 
the interviewer is an older male with many years of experience operating a 
business might influence the subjects. Whereas there could be a sense of 
authority displayed by the executives if the interviewer was a 25-year-old 
graduate student, the present scenario had the potential to create a competitive 
or defensive situation, although there was no evidence that this was the case. 
To the contrary, the characteristics of the interviewer seemed helpful in eliciting 
responses from the interviewees in that there seemed to be an appreciation for 
the understanding of basic business principles that didn’t need elaboration. This 
allowed for the focus to remain on trust in the organisation, rather than having to 
explain, for example, the nuances of a profit and loss statement or balance 
sheet. However, this perception of a shared history and the possibility of a 
shared future can create issues as well (Harvey 2010). The interviews took 
place in familiar surroundings for the subjects (offices, clubs and restaurants) 
where there was a high degree of comfort for the participants.
Elite interviewing methods can sometimes suffer from elite bias, an over­
concentration on certain respondents due to their knowledge and proficiency, 
strategic placing in terms of access, and because researchers like to share their
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high status. In addition, Kezar (2003) points out the need to balance academic 
freedom and one’s obligation to future researchers; unless the aim of the 
interviewer is to elicit a response through conflict (as might occur in journalism), 
the interviewer will clearly be conscious of the obligation to not embarrass or 
raise the hostilities of the elite interviewee such that future access will be 
possible for the interviewer and other researchers. Marshall and Rossman 
(1995: 83) describe certain conditions associated with elite interviewing that may 
arise, potentially creating additional limitations: “Elite individuals are typically 
quite savvy and may resent the restrictions of narrow or ill-phrased questions. 
They may want an active interplay with the interviewer. Well practiced in meeting 
the public, an elite person may turn the interview around, thereby taking charge 
of it”. When this started to occur with the participants in the present study, they 
were guided back to the subject at hand through additional questioning. At no 
time, however, were they interrupted so as to ensure that they felt that their point 
was being made and not being ignored. Interpretations were fed back to the 
senior executives throughout the interviews for the purposes of clarification and 
getting them to think more deeply about certain statements.
The breadth of theoretical and empirical research into trust is vast, and there is 
clearly insufficient space in this thesis to address it all in depth. Some responses 
are afforded a detailed analysis, while others are superficially presented or not 
addressed at all. The attempt here is to present studies that are applicable to 
corporate environments and not run too far astray into concepts that are not
intended for this particular area of consideration. The interviews sought the 
inclusion of novel conceptualisations of trust heretofore not considered in the 
organisational trust literature. Finally, some of the findings are preliminary and 
require further investigation.
First Round of Interviews
The companies in the first round of interviews include a medium sized technology 
company based in the US; a small venture capital firm based in London; a global 
accounting firm; a small software company headquartered in London; a mid­
sized financial services provider now part of a global financial conglomerate; and 
Microsoft, the largest software company in the world based in the United States. 
The executive reports from these six interviews appear in sections 2, 3, and 4 of 
this thesis.
Access to elite executives can be very difficult to gain, and the researcher initially 
relied on his network of colleagues for suggestions on executives to interview 
and their good reputations to make contact. As Flick points out, it is sometimes 
necessary "to ask professionals or colleagues about where to find people to 
study” (Flick 2009: 432). An initial list of potential participants was created based 
on contacts known to the researcher, and letters were sent out requesting an 
interview. The first two interviews were arranged, and the interviewer asked the 
interviewees for names of other senior executives that might consider 
participating in an interview. Additional letters were sent out requesting
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interviews. Two potential subjects refused interviews based on very busy 
schedules that would not accommodate a meeting lasting several hours. It is 
possible that these individuals did not want to discuss the topic of trust as they 
are highly visible and somewhat controversial international business figures. 
Additional executives were contacted and agreed to the interview.
A semi-structured interview was conducted with each executive from the first 
group for a period of 2-4 hours, depending on the time allotted. The semi- 
structured approach was most appropriate in this case because the subjects’ 
knowledge, understanding, views, interactions and experiences were particularly 
meaningful to understanding the social and business realities of trust (Saunders 
et al. 2010: 421-22). Interviewing is considered a more efficient means of 
gathering qualitative data from elites than questionnaires and focus groups, and 
it can generate novel and insightful data (Harvey 2010). The interview was 
designed to elicit personal experiences and understandings of trust in the work 
environment and also to glean responses against specific theories that have 
been proposed in the literature. The interviews were captured on a digital 
recorder and transcribed in full. The data were then analysed for homogeneity 
and heterogeneity with the relevant literature. Initially a software package 
(Atlas.ti v5.0) was used to code the data. The researcher chose to analyse the 
content further by putting paper copies of the transcribed text on the wall and 
writing observations in pen. The researcher is a long-time consultant who is very 
comfortable with this proven method of analysis and found it to be a more
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immersive technique than using the software alone. Content was initially divided 
into broad categories that could be considered to be consistent with the literature, 
different from the literature, and novel in that the data didn’t seem to appear in 
the literature. A thorough analysis of the data resulted in more specific content 
areas emerging that became the main sections of this thesis. The data was 
further distilled into subcategories to a point of what the researcher initially 
thought was theoretical saturation. Where appropriate, concepts expressed 
verbally by the executives were illustrated for later presentation.
Second Round of Interviews
In response to the realisation that theoretical saturation had not been met with 
certain key concepts from the first set of interviews, the researcher elected to 
conduct a second round of semi-structured interviews with different executives 
exploring trust in organisations. The senior executive reports from these seven 
interviews appear in section 5 of this thesis. Taking this step is consistent with 
grounded theory in that “The world that is studied by grounded theorists is very 
much a product of human participation and negotiation. It is a changing world, 
which means the methods used for studying it must be sensitive to its dynamic 
properties. This is what grounded theory attempts to do by focusing on process 
and change” (Willig 2008: 48). Like the companies in the first round, the 
companies in the second round were all based in the United Kingdom and United 
States of America. The respondents were senior executives in a large cancer 
treatment centre, an analytics company, a large movie theatre chain, a vaccine
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manufacturing company, a software provider, a national biosecurity foundation 
and a large mining company. The second round of interviews was not simply 
conducted to extend to the sample size. Rather, in keeping with the traditions of 
the grounded theory, the researcher took what was learned from the first round of 
interviews and tested this knowledge with a second set of senior executives. The 
questions asked to the second set of executives were formulated after a careful 
consideration of the responses from the first group of interviewees to build on 
that knowledge and, hopefully, resolve ambiguities (Glaser and Strauss 2006). 
Consistent with this application of new learning, the data gathering methodology 
was adapted to consider the possible impact it may have on executive 
responses. Unlike the first group, the data from the second group remained 
anonymous, and some of the questions were shared with them in advance so 
they could reflect on the answers before the interview. A graphic representation 
of one key concept (optimal trust) was also shared in advance. It was thought 
that allowing the executives to participate anonymously might result in them 
being more honest and less guarded in their responses. Sharing the questions in 
advance and allowing them to reflect on the answers before the interview might 
also result in more targeted responses given the additional time to consider and 
organise their thoughts. The graphic representation that was shared was from 
the optimal trust concept introduced by an executive from first group and was 
intended to illustrate a somewhat diffuse concept that might be better expressed 
visually rather than verbally. Employing this new method of data gathering 
resulted in an expansion of this methodology chapter. The full version of
grounded theory was followed (rather than the abbreviated version) where the 
researcher collected a preliminary set of data, explored it through open coding, 
linked the data by categories, and then returned to the field to collect further data 
based on what was learned from the first set. This allowed for triangulation of the 
initial data by using new data sources and collection methods. Each interview 
was transcribed and coded before the next interview so the researcher could 
determine when theoretical saturation was being approached.
The data was coded in the same manner as the first group of senior executive 
participants. Throughout the coding process I kept in mind that “Categories in 
grounded theory emerge from the data -  they are not mutually exclusive and 
they evolve throughout the research process” (Willig 2008: 35). The coded data 
from the second round of interviews were then compared to the first. These 
changes are the result of a learning process that took place after the first set of 
interviews. As the first round of interviews progressed, the data collection 
became focused and informed by the emerging content, which sent the 
researcher back to open coding to develop additional categories.
Chapter 4 that follows introduces the senior executives that were interviewed for 
this study. They are accomplished leaders of companies from Great Britain and 
the United States that range from small venture capital organisations to multi­
national conglomerates.
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CHAPTER 4: Descriptions of the Senior Executives and 
Remarks on Interview Conditions
The thirteen senior executives were selected for this study because they 
represent a diverse group of business leaders with a wide array of operational 
and managerial experiences. They range from the CEO of a medium-sized 
consulting firm to the executive in charge of one of the most important divisions 
in one of the largest companies in the world. Together they provide unique and 
valuable perceptions of trust in organisations from the senior executive 
perspective. Each of the six participants in the first group agreed that their 
names could be included in this study for the purpose of academic research. The 
participants were informed and consented to having their names used. 
Admittedly, if they were interviewed anonymously, there might have been a 
theoretical possibility of greater openness. The seven participants from the 
second group were told their identities would remain confidential. They are only 
identified by a brief description of their company. It should be mentioned here 
that the researcher noticed no significant differences in openness and honesty in 
responses between the two groups.
Doug Richard (from interview)
Doug Richard is the former President and CEO of Micrografx Inc., a US publicly 
traded software company with offices in 11 countries. In 1996, Micrografx 
acquired Visual Software, a software company that Mr Richard founded. Before
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Visual Software he was the founder of ITAL Computers, a firm that provided 
CAD/CAM systems integration services to the aerospace industry. Mr Richard is 
currently CEO of Library House, a research and data services company that was 
founded to provide greater transparency and access to innovation based 
companies. He was also a featured venture capitalist on the television 
programme Dragon’s Den which aired on BBC2.
The evolution of Micrografx involved a degree of upheaval and turbulence. Doug 
sold his company to Micrografx in an all-stock deal that made him quite wealthy. 
However, in fewer than three months, his paper wealth had disappeared in a 
scandal that saw the company’s independent audit firm resign, the Board of 
Directors turn over, and Doug replaced as CEO of a company that had lost 95% 
of its value on the stock exchange. After attempting to rebuild the company’s 
reputation over the course of several years, he eventually sold what was left of 
the organisation to Corel Inc. He has since founded Library House, a start-up 
that he describes as built on trust.
Mr Richard was interviewed for approximately 2 1/4 hours over lunch at a 
restaurant and later in a conference room at his office. The lunch interview was 
very casual and I found Mr Richard to be very open and honest. He tended to 
meander off topic which, in the opinion of the interviewer, actually resulted in 
some of the more interesting observations that appear in this thesis. At times Mr 
Richard would begin discussing his personal philosophy of trust rather than
describing his view of trust as experienced in his own work environment. In 
these cases, Mr Richard was directed through questioning back to his trust 
experience in the organisation rather than his idealised conception of how trust 
should operate in companies. Mr Richard became agitated on several occasions 
when discussing the demise of Micrografx. A comfort level was quickly 
established with the interviewer that carried through the rest of the session.
Mr Richard was a desirable interview candidate because of his varied 
background as both the CEO of a large publicly traded corporation and small 
start-up companies.
Martin Rigby (from interview and ET Capital marketing literature)
Since 1992 Martin Rigby has been the Venture Fund Manager of ET Capital, a 
venture capital firm that invests in start-up and early stage high technology 
companies. In 1988 he founded Egan & Talbot, a consultancy specialising in 
venture and corporate finance advice to un-listed growth companies. He has 
made investments in nearly forty technology businesses over the past 16 years. 
He sits on the boards of six companies, including: Bango.net, gosurprise, Impak, 
Oi! Bagel, Force12 and WAX info, and is a non-executive director of the Cascade 
Seed Fund. Prior to that he managed what is now the HSBC UK Enterprise 
Fund for East Anglia & the Home Counties investing in early stage businesses, 
both technology and non-technology, based in East Anglia and the northern 
Home Counties. He read history for his first degree at New College, Oxford, and
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was a regular army officer for seven years before completing an MBA at 
Cranfield University.
Mr Rigby was interviewed for approximately 2 hours at the ET Capital conference 
room. Mr Rigby speaks very quickly, and the pace of the interview was difficult to 
control at times. As a venture capitalist, Mr Rigby had very specific opinions on 
the subject of trust and was pleased to share them with the interviewer. Mr 
Rigby was a desirable interview candidate because of his long venture capital 
background and involvement in multiple global high risk start-up companies.
Michael MacSwiney (from interview)
Michael MacSwiney is a former Managing Partner in the global accounting firm 
Grant Thornton. He joined the firm out of university and quickly rose to partner. 
During his tenure, the accounting profession underwent dramatic change, where 
the once valuable financial advisor was replaced by an almost robotic, process- 
oriented accountant whose role was dictated by restrictive policies designed to 
avoid perceptions of impropriety and lawsuits. According to MacSwiney, where 
once trust was built with the customer by exceeding their expectations, the 
restrictive policies of engagement now greatly hinder the ability to build trust. 
MacSwiney has seen his firm evolve from a corporate giant respected around the 
world to one embroiled in the Parmalat scandal where a reported four billion GBP 
that only existed on the books went unchecked and brought the corporation down 
in disgrace.
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Michael MacSwiney was interviewed for approximately 3 1/4 hours in his office at 
Grant Thornton. The MacSwiney interview can be characterised by gems of 
unique experience sprinkled among detritus. MacSwiney likes to tell long, 
involved stories that seemingly lead nowhere. Yet just when the interviewer 
thought that there was no trail back to the subject at hand, MacSwiney would 
close the irregular loop he’d been drawing and provide valuable experiential data. 
Mr MacSwiney’s status as Managing Partner of one the world’s largest 
accounting firms made him a desirable interview candidate. The accounting 
industry has undergone significant change as a result of scandals such as Enron 
and Parmalat, and Mr MacSwiney’s experiences managing through the changes 
in companies around the world provided a valuable view of organisational trust.
Michael Mainelli (from interview and Z/Yen marketing literature)
Dr Michael Mainelli is the Founder and President of Z/Yen, a London-based 
consultancy that assists large corporations and agencies in solving some of their 
most complex problems. Michael began his career as a research scientist in 
aerospace and computer graphics which led him to start companies in 
seismology, cartography and energy information. In the early 1980’s Dr Mainelli 
created a multi-million dollar oil industry consortium which culminated in the 
development of a complete digital map of the world. He has spent several years 
as a partner and board member of one of the leading accountancy firms directing 
consultancy work in the UK and overseas. Dr Mainelli has worked in the public
sector on privatisations and strategy; in the private sector in a variety of 
industries (banking, insurance, manufacturing, media, retail, utilities, television, 
and distribution) on problems ranging from strategy through information systems, 
quality, human resources, environmental systems and R&D; and in the voluntary 
sector on a number of assignments to improve performance.
Dr Mainelli is on the editorial board of the Journal of Strategic Change as well as 
the Journal of Business Strategy and on the advisory board of the Centre for the 
Study of Financial Innovation. He is a qualified accountant, computer specialist 
and management consultant with a degree from Harvard as well as mathematics 
and engineering at Trinity College Dublin. Michael’s PhD from the London 
School of Economics was in the application of risk/reward methodologies 
involving chaotic systems and strategic planning quality.
Dr Mainelli was interviewed for approximately 3 hours in the Z/Yen conference 
room. He is a “hands-on” CEO that regularly interacts with all levels of 
employees, sells directly to customers, negotiates with investors and suppliers 
and personally works on a variety of projects with members of his staff. Mainelli 
leaps from topic to topic, so the interviewer had to regularly circle him back to 
complete his thoughts. During the interview he constantly drew graphics on 
paper to illustrate his point -  it was very important to him that the interviewer 
completely understood his trust experiences both verbally and visually. When 
Mainelli drifted into the theoretical domain, he was quickly drawn back to his 
direct experiences through questioning, or was asked for specific examples from
the work environment to support his statements. Dr Mainelli was a desirable 
interview candidate due to his experience working closely with a wide variety of 
companies in multiple industries.
Nicholas Baring CBE (from interview)
Nicholas Baring CBE is the recently retired Chairman of the Baring Foundation. 
Prior to this position, Baring was Deputy Chairman of Baring Brothers & Co., 
Chairman of Commercial Union pic., and Chairman of the City Capital Markets 
Committee. Mr Baring is a graduate of Magdalene College, Cambridge, a 
member of the Board of Trustees at Cambridge University's Fitzwilliam Museum 
and is a former Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the National Gallery in 
London.
Baring Brothers & Co. was a small, family-controlled bank founded in the late 
1700s that provided general banking services, underwrote bonds and traded 
commodities. Barings entered the securities market in 1984 with the formation of 
Barings Securities Ltd., and hired a young banker named Nicholas Leeson to 
work in its London office in 1989. Leeson was 22-years-old and did not attend 
University like many of his colleagues at Baring Securities. In 1992, Leeson was 
chosen to run the back office for the newly formed Baring Futures Singapore, a 
subsidiary that traded futures and options. Soon after taking the new position, 
Leeson was given responsibility for running both the back office accounting and 
control functions as well as executing client’s orders. In other words, he was
trusted to place orders on behalf of clients and report the results of those trades
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to the stakeholders back in London. This created a unique opportunity for 
fraudulent behaviour that eventually resulted in the collapse of Baring Brothers & 
Co. after almost 300 years of service. Evidently, this can be considered as a 
classic example of how overtrusting a single individual can lead to adverse 
effects on a company.
Mr Baring’s views on trust in the organisation are of particular interest due to the 
extraordinary consequences to his company of placing too much trust in an 
untrustworthy individual. The advantages and disadvantages of trust are 
apparent in building and destroying the company.
Mr Baring was interviewed for approximately 2 hours at a club called Brooks’s on 
St. James Street in London. Before the interview he spent a few minutes taking 
the interviewer on a tour of the club, which he described as a Whig social 
establishment that dates back to the late 1700s. Although the club was quite 
busy when the interview began, Mr Baring had carefully arranged for us to 
conduct the interview in a large gathering room behind closed doors. We sat in 
the back corner furthest from the doors and he spoke very softly. At first the 
interviewer could surmise that Mr Baring was being very cautious in his approach 
to the topic of trust. It was clearly a topic that has affected him and his family’s 
business in very personal ways, namely his perception that a betrayal of trust 
was at the core of the fall of Baring Brothers & Co. During the first part of the 
interview Mr Baring was very reserved and provided short answers to questions
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that were designed to illicit more expansive responses. After what was perhaps 
twenty minutes he became more open, and many of the questions that had been 
brushed aside earlier were answered fully when rephrased by the interviewer. 
When discussing the fall of Baring Brothers in the context of trust, he 
understandably became (for him) quite agitated and slightly emotional. Nicholas 
Baring was a desirable interview candidate because he was one of two family 
members (along with his brother Peter) that were stewards of the family business 
when it met its demise, and his particular view of trust adds immeasurable value 
to this thesis.
Scott Charney (from interview and Microsoft marketing literature)
Scott Charney is the Chief Trustworthy Computing Officer of Microsoft Corp 
where he focuses on developing strategies to enhance the security of Microsoft 
products, services and infrastructures as part of the Trustworthy Computing 
initiative. It is interesting to note that a huge company like Microsoft actually has 
a position called “Chief Trustworthy Computing Office”, instead of simply relying 
on their brand image to convey trustworthiness among its customers. In a sense, 
therefore, Microsoft is resorting to a surrogate trust measure by creating a 
position specifically targeted towards trustworthiness as enumerated in a later 
chapter. Before coming to Microsoft, Scott was a principal for PWC’s Cybercrime 
Prevention and Response Practice.
During Charney's tenure at PricewaterhouseCoopers, he provided proactive and
reactive computer security services to major companies, including designing and
95
building computer security systems from scratch, testing existing systems, 
conducting cybercrime investigations, and assisting companies responding to 
electronic discovery requests.
Before joining PricewaterhouseCoopers, Charney served as chief of the 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS), Criminal Division, at 
the Department of Justice, from 1991 to 1999. Under his direction, CCIPS 
investigated and prosecuted national and international hacker cases, economic 
espionage cases, and violations of federal criminal copyright and trademark laws. 
Before joining the federal prosecutive ranks, Charney was an assistant district 
attorney in Bronx County, New York, ultimately serving as deputy chief of the 
Investigations Bureau.
Charney holds a degree from Syracuse University College of Law as well as 
Bachelor's degrees in History and English from the State University of New York 
at Binghamton.
Scott Charney was interviewed for approximately 3 hours in his office and in the 
lunch room at Microsoft headquarters outside Seattle, Washington. The 
interview had what might be considered an unpromising start when Charney 
responded to a question regarding his definition of trust by accessing Webster’s 
Dictionary On-line for the answer. The interviewer’s fear was that the rest of the 
responses would come from some other on-line database or Microsoft marketing 
literature. Thankfully that was the last time he went to the computer for an
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answer, and the rest of the interview was thoughtful and based on his personal 
experiences of trust in organisations. Unlike the other interviewees, Mr Charney 
seemed quite interested in the views of other participants, and these questions 
were lightly deflected by the interviewer so as not to colour his responses with 
the views of others.
Mr Charney was a desirable interview candidate because of his breadth of 
experience in law, consulting and corporate management. To the interviewer’s 
knowledge, he is also the only person to hold the title Chief Trustworthy 
Computing Officer for any corporation. Unlike the other interviewees, his specific 
job is to manage trust among the various constituencies which requires him to 
intentionally focus on trust strategies and impacts every day.
Group 2 Senior Executives
The second group of seven senior executives were informed that they would 
remain anonymous. They are senior executives from a cancer treatment centre, 
an analytics company, a movie theatre chain, a therapeutics manufacturing 
company, a software provider, a national biosecurity foundation and a mining 
company.
Only two interview requests were turned down by executives that will remain 
anonymous. Both of these individuals were replaced with other senior executive 
participants.
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A
Chapter 5 that follows begins the study of the nature of trust by analysing the 
definitions of trust as reported by the senior executives.
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CHAPTER 5: Defining Trust
Trust Definitions
The purpose of this chapter is to build a trust typology which distinguishes 
between characteristics of genuine trust and surrogate trust, analyse definitions 
widely cited in the literature against the typology, and compare the results to the 
executives’ definitions to consider homogeneity or heterogeneity of definitions.
A Proposed Trust Typology: Genuine Trust & Surrogate Trust
Based on the variety of definitions presented, on the surface one may be led to 
believe that there is no real consensus among researchers on the meaning of 
trust. To the contrary, an analysis set within the context of the following 
proposed typology shows some of the various definitions to be inclusive of both 
genuine trust and surrogate trust, allowing for the complementary relationship 
that might exist in real-world environments. Genuine trust and surrogate trust are 
characterised and defined as:
Genuine Trust
Key Characteristics -  lack of control, goodwill, benevolence, loyalty, shared 
values and beliefs, leaps of faith, suspension of opportunism risks, and no 
absolute prediction
Genuine trust is a type of trust based on factors that transcend control, where 
trust operates in the domain of goodwill and benevolence resulting from loyalty
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and shared values and beliefs. Genuine trust is associated with leaps of faith, or 
the suspension of the acknowledgement of opportunism risks, where there is no 
means to absolutely predict an outcome, and the decision to move forward in the 
relationship is justified primarily based on goodwill.
Surrogate Trust
Key Characteristics -  controlling factors, responding to opportunism risks, risk 
assessment calculations, penalties, oversight, cognitive
Surrogate trust is a type of trust that requires the inclusion of trust substitutes 
(Fukuyama 1995), or controlling factors, that limit opportunism by means other 
than genuine trust. This type of trust encompasses the full range of trust 
substitutes and controlling factors including elaborate contracts with strict penalty 
clauses, oversight activities, and other elements that are associated with some 
risk assessment calculation. These controlling factors are direct responses to 
known opportunism risks, where suspension of this knowledge is not possible. 
In situations where genuine trust is not necessary or not yet achieved, surrogate 
trust may be the type most appropriate for the exchange relationship to move 
forward. Moreover, it is also important to note that genuine trust may not be 
achieved simply because it would be prohibitively costly to do so. This often calls 
for surrogate trust measures like contracts.
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Many definitions have been proposed by scholars studying trust in exchange 
relationships1. The most widely cited definitions are analysed using the typology 
below. For those that trend primarily toward one trust type or the other (genuine 
or surrogate), the word PRIMARY will appear in the box. This represents my 
conclusion that the primary intent of the scholar is weighted toward one trust type 
over the other. Secondary trends are represented by the word SECONDARY 
appearing in the appropriate box, indicating that there are characteristics 
associated with that trust type in the crafting of the definition, but it is not 
indicative of primary intent. If the intentions are perceived to be equally weighted 
(that is, organisational trust includes characteristics of both genuine and 
surrogate trust), there will be no trend indication noted.
1 The trust definitions considered are particular to exchange relationships and exclude other trust definitions 
used for other contexts such as familial and romantic relationships.
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Table 1. Typology Table with Trust Definitions from Literature
Definition Characteristics of 
Genuine Trust
Characteristics of 
Surrogate Trust
Trust is “the willingness 
of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions 
of another party based on 
the expectation that the 
other will perform a 
particular action 
important to the trusted, 
irrespective of the ability 
to monitor or control that 
other party” (Mayer et al. 
1995: 172).
PRIMARY
The “willingness” 
associated with a 
voluntary acceptance of 
vulnerability to 
opportunistic behaviour
Irrespective of the ability 
to monitor and control, 
there is an expectation of 
trustworthy behaviour
Trust is “a particular level 
of the subjective 
probability with which an 
agent assesses that 
another agent or group of 
agents will perform a 
particular action, both 
before he can monitor 
such action (or 
independently of his 
capacity ever to be able 
to monitor it) and in a
SECONDARY
The recognition that 
monitoring may not be 
possible
PRIMARY
The assessed subjective 
probability of beneficial 
performance could be the 
result of controlling 
factors that are in 
response to known 
opportunism risks
102
context in which it affects 
his own action...the 
probability that he will 
perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not 
detrimental to us is high 
enough for us to consider 
engaging in some form of 
cooperation with him” 
(Gambetta 1988: 217).
Trust is one party’s 
confidence that their 
partner in the exchange 
relationship will not 
exploit its vulnerabilities 
(Dyer and Chu 2003; 
Sabel 1993; Ring and 
Van de Van 1992; 
Barney and Hansen 
1994; Zaheer et al. 
1998).
Confidence might arise 
from goodwill
Exchange partners may 
have loyalty and shared 
values sufficient to 
preclude the need for 
safeguards
Confidence might arise 
from safeguards (trust 
substitutes)
Exchange partners may 
require certain 
contractual safeguards 
early in a relationship to 
protect key interests 
against known 
vulnerabilities. As 
confidence builds, so 
might trust, and the need 
for safeguards may be 
reduced.
Trust is a “type of 
expectation that 
alleviates the fear that
The expectation linked to 
alleviated fear may be 
due to shared values and
The “expectation” that 
alleviates fear of 
opportunistic behaviour
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one’s exchange partner 
will act opportunistically” 
(Bradach and Eccles 
1989: 104).
beliefs, loyalty and 
goodwill
may be associated with 
some calculation based 
on controlling factors
Trust is “the reliance by 
one person, group, or 
firm upon a voluntarily 
accepted duty on the part 
of another person, group 
or firm to recognise and 
protect the rights and 
interests of all others 
engaged in a joint 
endeavour or economic 
exchange” (Hosmer 
1995: 393).
PRIMARY
The “reliance” to protect 
rights and interests, 
which requires the 
acceptance of 
vulnerability (on the part 
of the trustor) and 
benevolence (on the part 
of the trustee)
Trust is “the assumption 
of a trustor that a trustee 
will not take advantage of 
his vulnerability resulting 
from his one-sided pre­
commitment while 
ignoring all other 
possibilities” (Bachmann 
in Nooteboom 2003: 59).
PRIMARY
The trustor knows his/her 
vulnerabilities, is aware 
of the possibility of 
trustee opportunism, and 
chooses to engage the 
exchange partner. 
Although there are no 
guarantees, the trustor is 
willing to take a leap of 
faith that the trustee will 
not act opportunistically
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in the exchange 
relationship. The pre­
commitment is 
considered one-sided, 
and there is a conscious 
choice to ignore the 
uncertainty gap.
Trust is "a psychological 
state comprising the 
intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of 
the intention or behaviour 
of another (Rousseau et 
al. 1998: 395).
The recognition of an 
intention (a willingness) 
to accept vulnerability on 
the positive expectation 
of another’s behaviour
The expectation of 
intention may be based 
on a calculation that 
includes certain 
controlling factors
Table 1 indicates that some of the most widely cited definitions of trust allow for 
the key characteristics of genuine trust and surrogate trust to operate equally in 
the same frame. Certain definitions are not inclusive of surrogate trust, while 
others allow for their inclusion either primarily or secondarily. Of critical 
importance is that trust in organisations isn’t considered by many scholars as 
solely a leap of faith, nor is it simply a cold, calculated assessment fraught with 
risk and penalties. Rather, through their operational definitions of trust, many 
researchers have attempted to be inclusive of both genuine trust and surrogate 
trust, recognising the role that each plays in exchange relationships.
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Based on this analysis of their definitions, it is suggested that Mayer, Hosmer 
and Bachmann might argue that organisational trust belongs in the domain of 
genuine trust. Gambetta might argue that organisational trust, being an 
“assessed subjective probability of beneficial performance”, is more calculative 
and therefore belongs primarily in the surrogate trust domain. The remaining 
scholars would probably argue that trust in organisations actually incorporates 
characteristics of both genuine and surrogate trust. These findings are 
summarised in Table 2.
Table 2. Primary and Secondary Characteristics of Trust Definitions
Scholars Genuine Trust Surrogate Trust
Mayer et al. Primary
Gambetta Secondary Primary
Dyer and Chu; Sabel; 
Ring and Van de Van; 
Barney and Hansen; 
Zaheer et al.
Dual Dual
Bradach and Eccles Dual Dual
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Hosmer Primary
Bachmann Primary
Rousseau et al. Dual Dual
Definitions that incorporate the dual nature of trust in organisations are consistent 
with the work of other scholars (Gulati 1995; Sitkin 1995; Adler and Borys 1996; 
Chiles and McMackin 1996; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Mellewigt et al. 2003) 
where trust and trust substitutes (such as formal contracts) are shown to be 
complementary in exchange relationships. They are contrary to Williamson’s 
(1993) version of transaction cost economics where trust is seen as irrelevant, 
and transactions take place exclusively through the use of safeguards against 
opportunism (trust substitutes). This analysis suggests that the threads of 
continuity for some definitions of trust can be summarised as (1) the recognition 
of vulnerability to opportunism; (2) the willingness to assume risk where absolute 
control over opportunistic behaviour is not possible; (3) the use of both genuine 
trust and surrogate trust (trust substitutes like contracts) in exchange 
relationships, where the reasonable use of substitutes is not perceived as 
damaging to the relationship, but rather is an appropriate measure necessary to 
build the foundation for maturing trust. This observation is along the lines of
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Hwang and Burgers (1997), who argue that trust is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for cooperation.
The Changing Nature of Trust
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) add additional value to the discussion of the 
definitions of trust by introducing the notion that trust changes over time (Boon 
and Holmes 1991), and any static definition fails to be relevant as trust evolves 
and matures. They point out that this is a different perspective on trust from the 
view that the essence of trust cannot be captured by a single, static definition of 
its key elements and attributes. Trust is perceived as a dynamic phenomenon 
that takes on a different character in the early, developing, and mature stages of 
the relationship (Lewicki and Bunker 1996).
In one of the earlier studies, Wicks et al. (1999) remark that trust is a dynamic 
and continuous variable, rather than an either/or phenomenon. Also, as pointed 
out by Dirks and Ferrin (2001), trust embodies the accumulated experiences 
with, and knowledge about, the other party in situations involving vulnerability. 
Accumulation of knowledge and experience involves time and it reinforces the 
operational definition of trust as a dynamic variable.
In one of the recent studies, Khodyakov (2007) argues that rigid distinctions in 
existing social capital theory between high-trust and low trust societies fail to 
account for the complexity of trust. He views trust as a process and suggests a
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definition of trust based on the notion of agency, which underscores the idea of 
temporality and incorporates the roles of the past, present, and future.
Executive Reports
Each of the interviews was started by asking the executives for their definition of 
trust. No context was given, and many of the elaborations by the subjects drifted 
from trust within the business organisation to trust within personal relationships in 
general. Doug Richard was very quick when he responded,
“I define trust very narrowly as an acceptance of letting go - an 
acceptance that other people are capable and therefore will act 
appropriately when getting things done. The act of running a business is 
the act of making decisions. People make thousands and thousands and 
thousands of decisions, and therefore you have to trust them to make the 
right decisions or you don’t. Therefore, if the functional act of being in a 
business is to make decisions, endless quantities of them, you either 
review and command and control or you don’t. Then the act of handing 
over trust is one of handing it over in an appropriate measure and then 
making sure that you think about it. It’s a conscious thing. It is the core 
bond between all individuals in the organisation as they relate to each 
other within the culture of the organisation.”
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Martin Rigby, the venture capitalist, struggled at first, but slowly made his way 
through a somewhat rambling definition.
“Trust is one way of ensuring that commitments are fulfilled. Trust is a 
complex, social phenomenon where one individual enters into a bargain 
with another which is either one time or many times or a lifetime in which 
they ought to do something in turn for something else - or even less tightly 
defined than that, where they simply commit to adhere to some principles, 
such as communication or reliability or financial dependence or investment 
or whatever it might be. It is this business that underpins a commitment 
that is being made either implicitly or explicitly. That is what trust is doing, 
you trust somebody when you believe they have to fulfil an obligation to 
you in essence. That obligation might be an obligation in spirit which 
would be like between marital partners or it might be the fact that when 
two stockbrokers approach the big bang, did a deal in the floor of the 
London's stock exchange my word is my bond. They knew that when one 
had said "yes”, that was a binding contract and he wouldn't renege from 
that. And, of course, what is interesting about it is that today there is less 
and less trust or apparently less trust because people underpin those 
commitments more and more by alternative tools of which contracts and 
legal agreements of the obvious manifestation.”
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Michael MacSwiney’s definition was consistent with Doug Richard in that 
vulnerability on the part of the trustor underpins the trust dynamic.
“Trust is about a willingness to make yourself vulnerable without being 
mishandled. So I think that can happen in business. Trust is that 
something you do won’t be exploited or dealt with in a way different to a 
way that you trusted it would be.”
Upon being asked for his definition of trust, Michael Mainelli was very concise.
“It's when the perception of future volatility equals the reality. That is the 
shortest definition I can come up with. I'm very neutral on this. Trust is 
not a good thing or a bad thing.”
Nicholas Baring was very thoughtful in his response. Compared to the other 
executives, it took quite a long time for him to come up with a definition that he 
felt was satisfactory. As I was soon to find out with many of his answers 
throughout the interview, Baring was clearly filtering his thoughts through the 
experience with Nick Leeson and the fall of Baring’s Bank. After a long pause, 
he quietly gave the following definition:
“It is the ability of individuals to work together, relying on their knowledge of 
an experience with other individuals rather than in some external system of
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rules or regulations. I think it's difficult to envisage today any organisation 
that doesn't have a framework of rules and regulations. I see trust as being 
an essential adjunct to that or complement, and I think we've seen that no 
regulatory system is perfect. There are those who will always seek to find 
a way around it and they will find it."
Scott Charney, the former US federal prosecutor and current Microsoft executive, 
was slightly glib in his response to the question. He immediately turned to his 
computer and said the following:
“I would actually go to Webster’s. That’s what I’d do. As a lawyer -  when 
people say we are debating this definition, I always go and start with the 
Webster’s. The definitions are usually pretty good. According to Webster 
online -  trust is an assured reliance on the character, ability, strength or 
truth of someone or something. So we are really talking about reliance on 
character, ability, strength, or truth.”
Analysis of Responses
Based on the executive reports, it could be argued that an operational definition 
of trust (one that is relevant to the operation of organisations) requires elements 
of both genuine trust and surrogate trust. The executives’ definitions 
demonstrate homogeneity with the definitions employed by Gambetta (1988),
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Dyer and Chu (2003), Sabel (1993), Ring and Van de Van (1992), Barney and 
Hansen (1994), Zaheer et al. (1998), Bradach & Eccles (1989), and Rousseau et 
al. (1998). Doug Richard refers to trust “as an acceptance of letting go”, and that 
the “act of handing over trust is one of handing it over in an appropriate 
measure”. For Richard, trust is not simply a leap of faith, but rather a measured 
response based on some reasonable acceptance of risk. Martin Rigby defines 
trust as “a complex social phenomenon where one individual enters into a 
bargain with another...in which they ought to do something in turn for something 
else”. There is a clear expectation of a fair exchange or transaction that 
underpins the notion of trust. Of particular interest is Rigby’s assertion that 
“today there is less and less trust, or apparently less trust, because people 
underpin those commitments more and more by alternative tools, of which 
contracts and legal agreements are the obvious manifestation”. I would suggest 
that alternative tools are synonymous with surrogates, thus drawing a distinction 
between what might be considered a more pure or genuine trust, and a different 
type of trust that is regulated by alternative tools or trust substitutes. These tools 
are intended to fill gaps, consistent with Rigby’s concept of there being less trust 
necessitating the use of fillers. This notion of trust is close to the cognitive-based 
trust enumerated earlier (Costigan et al. 1998).
Michael MacSwiney states that “Trust is about a willingness to make yourself 
vulnerable without being mishandled”, and that it “is that something you do won’t 
be exploited or dealt with in a way different to a way that you trusted it would be”.
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This is remarkably consistent with many of the cited researchers which address 
the necessity to make oneself vulnerable to exploitation or opportunism as a 
precondition for trust, but introduces risk reduction by referencing the calculation 
associated with expectation meeting reality. MacSwiney gives us the one 
example where it could be argued that the definition trends toward a more 
genuine trust with a secondary influence of subjective probability. Michael 
Mainelli provides the most calculative and direct definition of trust when he 
defines it in terms of “the perception of future volatility equalling reality”. For 
Mainelli, trust is a calculation based on reflection -  either the future volatility is 
consistent with reality (resulting in trust), or the reality is inconsistent with 
perception of future volatility (resulting in distrust). Given the neutrality of the 
statement, trust is neither good nor bad, it is simply a calculation based on the 
anticipated volatility and actual outcome of an engagement. In other words, one 
can be trusted to act in an untrustworthy manner, which is still trustworthy.
Nicholas Baring provides the clearest connection between genuine and surrogate 
trust by defining trust as “the ability of individuals to work together, relying on 
their knowledge of an experience with other individuals rather than in some 
external system of rules or regulations”, and then quickly adding, “it's difficult to 
envisage today any organisation that doesn't have a framework of rules and 
regulations. I see trust as being an essential adjunct to that or complement, and 
I think we've seen that no regulatory system is perfect.” For Baring, the genuine 
characteristics of trust go hand-in-hand with surrogates such as regulations. In
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fact, he infers that the two are actually complementary and necessary. Thus his 
definition of trust seems to include aspects of both cognitive and affect based 
trust.
Scott Charney went straight to the dictionary and found that “Trust is an assured 
reliance on the character, ability, strength or truth of someone or something”. He 
then went on to characterise the definition by referencing the question, “Is 
someone truthful and honest with me?”, and stating that “we are really talking 
about the trust of truth”. Said another way, is the expectation of trustworthiness 
consistent with the reality of trustworthy behaviour? Is his reliance assured?
When placed in the proposed typology table used above for the definitions widely 
cited in the literature, there appears to be a hybrid trust that blends both genuine 
and surrogate characteristics. The definitions suggested by MacSwiney, Mainelli 
and Charney may have primary or secondary characteristics of genuine and 
surrogate trust, but in all cases there are elements of both characteristics 
present. The senior executives’ trust definitions and their genuine and surrogate 
trust characteristics are presented in Table 3.
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Table 3. Typology Table with Executive Trust Definitions
Definition Characteristics of 
Genuine Trust
Characteristics of 
Surrogate Trust
Doug Richard 
An acceptance of letting 
go - the act of handing 
over trust is one of 
handing it over in an 
appropriate measure.
The act of letting go is an 
act of faith
Handing trust over in 
appropriate measure 
points to elements of risk 
assessment calculations 
and employing controlling 
factors
Martin Rigby
A complex social 
phenomenon where one 
individual enters into a 
bargain with another...in 
which they ought to do 
something in turn for 
something else”.
By employing the term 
phenomenon, the 
definition evokes the 
unknown or 
unexplainable -  a lack of 
control with no 
predictable outcome
The concept of 
bargaining one thing in 
exchange for something 
else involves risk 
assessment calculations
Michael MacSwiney 
Trust is about a 
willingness to make 
yourself vulnerable
PRIMARY
The willingness is 
associated with a 
voluntary acceptance of
SECONDARY
There is a risk calculation 
associated with 
expectation meeting
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without being mishandled 
- that something you do 
won’t be exploited or 
dealt with in a way 
different to a way that 
you trusted it would be.
vulnerability to 
opportunistic behaviour
reality
Michael Mainelli 
It's when the perception 
of future volatility equals 
the reality.
SECONDARY
Engaging in the 
transaction so one can 
draw a reflective 
conclusion requires some 
acceptance of lack of 
predictability
PRIMARY
Trust is a reflective act 
based on risk 
assessment calculations 
associated with 
perceived future volatility 
and reality
Nicholas Baring 
The ability of individuals 
to work together, relying 
on their knowledge of an 
experience with other 
individuals rather than in 
some external system of 
rules or regulations. It's 
difficult to envisage today 
any organisation that
Defining trust initially as 
working together in the 
absence of trust 
substitutes such as rules 
and regulations
Acknowledging that rules 
and regulations are 
necessary and actually 
complementary to 
genuine trust
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doesn't have a 
framework of rules and 
regulations. 1 see trust 
as being an essential 
adjunct to that or 
complement
Scott Charney 
Trust is an assured 
reliance on the character, 
ability, strength or truth of 
someone or something.
SECONDARY
Assured reliance rather 
than guaranteed reliance 
assumes some 
vulnerability
PRIMARY
There is a strong 
emphasis on the act of 
assuring reliance, and 
therefore reducing the 
risk in a calculative 
manner
Based on this proposed typology, the executives’ definitions of trust could be 
considered contrary to the definitions used by Mayer et al., Hosmer and 
Bachmann that have primary characteristics consistent with genuine trust, and 
consistent with the hybrid definitions proposed by Gambetta, Dyer and Chu, 
Sabel, Ring and Van de Van, Barney and Hansen, Zaheer et al., Bradach and 
Eccles, and Rousseau et al. that incorporate both genuine and surrogate trust 
characteristics.
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Summary
The purpose of this section was to build a trust typology which distinguishes 
between characteristics of genuine trust and surrogate trust, analyse definitions 
cited in the literature against the typology, and compare the results to the 
executives’ definitions to consider homogeneity or heterogeneity of definitions. 
Genuine trust is a leap of faith2, while surrogate trust is replete with safeguards, 
oversight and other risk reduction elements. Results from the analysis of the 
most widely cited definitions in the literature suggested that, although a few 
scholars tended to fall either in the genuine or surrogate categories exclusively, 
the majority supported a blended or hybrid trust that included faith and 
benevolence with reasonable safeguards. The key threads of continuity that 
emerged were the recognition of vulnerability to opportunism, the willingness to 
assume risk where absolute control over opportunistic behaviour was not 
possible, and the use of both genuine trust and surrogate trust (trust substitutes) 
in exchange relationships, where the reasonable use of substitutes is not 
perceived as damaging to the relationship, but rather is an appropriate measure 
necessary to build the foundation for maturing trust.
The definitions offered by the executive participants blend elements of genuine 
trust and surrogate trust. This is consistent with the majority of mainstream
2 1 take the position that even i f  the relationship is built on a lifetime of friendship and knowledge of a 
person, there is still a leap of faith required to trust without safeguards.
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definitions offered by the scholars in the trust literature. The MacSwiney 
definition favoured a more genuine/affective type of trust, while the Mainelli 
definition was calculative/cognitive in nature and therefore weighted toward 
surrogate trust. In general, however, it can be argued that trust for the 
executives is a weave of genuine and surrogate characteristics as it is defined in 
the business environment. These results support the hybrid trust definitions cited 
by scholars such as Dyer and Chu (2003), Sabel (1993), Ring and Van de Van 
(1992), Barney and Hansen (1994), Zaheer et al. (1998), Bradach and Eccles 
(1989), and Rousseau et al. (1998), and it has been demonstrated that the trust 
definitions reported by senior executives overlap with the concepts imbedded in 
the trust definitions appearing in the literature. It could be argued that a hybrid 
definition of trust might be confusing because it leads one to believe that trust 
means two separate things. The ease with which the executives blended both 
genuine and surrogate characteristics in their definitions would point to a contrary 
conclusion, and one that is consistent with the widely cited definitions in the 
literature. Based on their definitions and the many definitions in the literature, 
genuine and surrogate trust characteristics seem to be necessary complements 
in defining trust. Almost every researcher that explores trust in organisations 
declares a definition of trust at the outset of the study. The findings of this 
analysis introduce the perspective of senior executives and further support the 
validity of widely cited hybrid trust definitions that appear in the literature. 
Chapter 6 that follows continues the exploration of the nature of trust by 
analysing the dynamics of trust as reported by the senior executives.
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CHAPTER 6: Dynamics of Trust
The purpose of this chapter is to understand some widely cited models that 
categorise the nature of trust, examine the homogeneity and heterogeneity of 
executive reports with the literature, and explore the potential dynamics of trust 
as a process by examining how trust is gained and lost in organisations.
Contractual/Competence/Goodwill Trust
It is suggested that building trust is a process sometimes made up of multiple 
interactions over time. Trust is grounded in specific behaviours that either build 
or destroy, and what might take years to establish could be quickly brought down 
with a severe betrayal (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Implicit in the building or 
diminishing of trust is the presence or absence of ethical and moral behaviour 
respectively. Scholars have categorised different qualitative types of trust and 
levels of trust in an attempt to establish thresholds beyond which richer levels of 
trust are attained. Mari Sako (1998) studied the trust relationship between a 
customer and supplier in the automotive industry. She distinguished between 
three types of trust: contractual trust (will the exchange partner meet contractual 
obligations), competence trust (does the exchange partner have the ability to 
perform to the agreed terms and standards), and goodwill trust (will the exchange 
partner not behave opportunistically even when vulnerabilities allow for such 
behaviour). Based on these types, Sako identifies a hierarchy of trust, with a 
narrow set of conditions necessary to qualify as contractual trust, and a broader
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and more values-based set necessary to make the climb to goodwill trust. 
Competence trust falls between contractual trust and goodwill trust. Moving from 
contractual trust to competence trust and goodwill trust requires an increased 
exposure to vulnerability in a symmetric form, but not necessarily at the same 
time. It is assumed that, over time, the amount of perceived vulnerability will be 
approximately the same, but it may not be the same at all points in time. Few 
contracts are sufficiently precise or comprehensive as to fill all the vulnerability 
gaps and extinguish the role of trust.
Sako argues that opportunism safeguards operate at the contractual and 
competence trust level, and the value of trust is limited by the narrow 
requirements necessary to meet that standard. As the spectrum of trust 
broadens, so do the opportunities to glean value from a trust relationship. Like 
Ghoshal and Moran (1996), Sako finds that goodwill trust is associated with less 
tangible but equally valuable outcomes such as improved innovation, information 
sharing and learning. Unlike Williamson (1985), Sako focuses on the enhancers 
of trust, not the inhibitors of opportunism. When the high standards of goodwill 
trust are reached, the value of the relationship is increased. For Sako, limiting 
the value of trust to a mere calculation limits the possible outcomes of trust.
Weak-form/Semi-strong form/Strong-form Trust
Barney and Hansen (1994) refer to three distinct types of trust: weak form trust, 
semi-strong form trust, and strong form trust. Weak form trust is present when
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vulnerabilities or opportunities for opportunism present in an exchange are low. 
Semi-strong trust is associated with transactions that require some governance 
and controls to limit vulnerabilities and increase the costs of opportunistic 
behaviour. With adequate governance measures present the transaction can 
take place. This is the most common approach exercised by economists 
(Hennart 1988; Kogut 1988; Williamson 1985). For Williamson in particular, 
there is no room for trust considerations as he holds the contract to be the 
primary control mechanism for opportunistic behaviour. In Williamson’s view, 
when contracts are created that efficiently govern all aspects of the transaction, 
trust becomes irrelevant and the exchange will take place under the terms of the 
contract. In contrast, Barney and Hansen (1994) find that trust emerges because 
exchange partners find it in their self-interest for economic and social reasons to 
not behave opportunistically. The third type of trust described by Barney & 
Hanson is strong form trust, which emerges when there are significant exchange 
vulnerabilities and opportunities for opportunism, but because of similar values 
and principles, the exchange partners move forward despite the risk. The values 
and principles may be derived from a variety of sources (Arthur 1989; Barney 
1986; Dierickx and Cool 1989), but the connection between exchange partners 
allows the transaction to move forward. Unlike Williamson (1985), Barney and 
Hansen reject the notion that all exchange partners will act opportunistically, and 
that costly governance measures are necessary in every exchange relationship. 
In fact, their analysis suggests that the seeking out of exchange partners that will 
not act opportunistically allows companies to gain the advantages of trade
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without the cost of governance (Barney and Hansen 1994). There is no 
argument with the fact that certain governance mechanisms are in place as a 
result of the fear associated with opportunistic behaviour. Williamson (1993) has 
defined those mechanisms. If higher levels of trust in an exchange relationship 
result in fewer, less stringent and less costly governance mechanisms, wouldn’t it 
make sense to seek out high trust (strong-form trust) exchange partners? And 
wouldn’t the same be true for all exchange partners associated with an 
enterprise, including customers, shareholders and suppliers? For example, a 
fast-growing technology firm that is trying to build trust with shareholders decides 
to increase transparency by adopting XBRL (extensible business reporting 
language), which allows potential and existing investors to freely mine the 
company’s financial statements. This one action signals a willingness to open 
the books to those with questions, and tells investors that the company has
nothing to hide. This may result in additional investment from existing
shareholders, and may be a key to attracting investment from potential
shareholders. The economic benefit to the company is clear -  by taking an
action designed to build trust with shareholders, the company will potentially 
increase investment in the firm (and potentially take investment away from 
competitors). This is not to say that taking this trust-building action as the 
company is heading toward bankruptcy will make a difference, but it may make 
the difference in the mind of an investor considering investment among high- 
growth competitors. It is also important to note that building long term 
relationships might require repeated transactions to increase trust, and these
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actions are costly. Achieving strong form trust requires paying associated costs. 
For example, in the XBRL case, there are costs and risks associated with these 
kinds of actions, such as the costs of the software and personnel to keep it 
updated and the risks of sharing information in a competitive environment. The 
risks and benefits might be different for each individual situation, but if the action 
taken is in direct response to a known trust-building requirement (such as 
transparency for investors), the benefits to the organisation could be significant.
Calculus/Knowledge/ldentification Trust
Like Sako (1998) and Barney and Hansen (1994), Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
theorise the existence of three distinct types of trust: calculus-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. This falls into the realm of 
cognitive based trust as well (Costigan et.al. 1998). Calculus-based trust is 
characterised as trust generated more from the fear of punishment than from the 
rewards associated with trustworthy behaviour, although both are present. 
According to the researchers, the short-term gains from being dishonest must be 
balanced in a calculated way against the long-term benefits of maintaining a 
good reputation (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Here, reputation is used as a 
hostage to ensure trustworthy behaviour, and the threat of deterrence is 
paramount. Knowledge-based trust is a more mature type of trust associated 
with predictability of trustworthy behaviour rather than deterrence against 
untrustworthy behaviour. Knowledge-based trust is earned over time through 
multiple interactions, resulting in a richer understanding of the behaviour patterns
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of exchange partners. There is an active courtship that takes place where 
communication and monitoring of performance leads to more information 
regarding the intentions of exchange partners, resulting in a determination of the 
strength of the parties working relationship. Identification-based trust is the most 
mature level of trust. Exchange partners that achieve this level think like one 
another such that they can act on one another’s behalf. They are committed to 
the same goals and can accurately predict each other’s needs and behaviours as 
a result of multiple interactions, shared values, and desires. Although not 
expressly mentioned by Lewicki and Bunker, identification-based trust could lead 
to disastrous consequences if the parties have ill intentions. It is assumed that 
the leadership of Enron, for example, relied very heavily on identification-based 
trust as they corrupted the organisation into bankruptcy.
Evolving Trust
Sako (1998), Barney and Hansen (1994), and Lewicki and Bunker (1996) 
describe different types of trust that are distinguished by ascending levels. 
Companies move through these ascending levels by performing multiple trust- 
building interactions over time. Not every interaction will build trust -  some may 
diminish trust. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) acknowledge as much by stating that 
some relationships may never move out of calculus-based trust, particularly if 
there is a violation of trust early in the calculus-based relationship. However, 
even the interaction that results from the conflict associated with the breach of 
trust has the capability of strengthening bonds (Sennett 1998:143). The evolving
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trust relationship is represented by the interactions over time in Figure 1. Like 
climbing a mountain, the terrain is rarely a smooth gradual slope leading to the 
top; the undulations vary in steepness, and different relationships reach different 
levels with more or less rapidity. Lewicki and Bunker use the analogy of the 
children’s game Chutes and Ladders, where multiple steps are necessary to 
climb, but landing on a single chute can take you several levels down in one 
move, or possibly down to the bottom. A violation of trust, depending on the 
severity, could have the same effect; what takes repeated interactions to build 
could be diminished or destroyed with one wrong move. Minor violations may be 
recoverable if exchange partners are operating in the middle tier or top tier of the 
trust hierarchy, but those same violations could cause severe (perhaps 
unrecoverable) damage to relationships still operating in the bottom tier. Major 
violations of trust could even cause a tumble from the highest level of the 
hierarchy to the bottom, depending on the severity of the violation and the status 
of the relationship. It is also possible that certain trust relationships could 
develop very quickly, where just a few interactions in a short period could build 
high forms of trust.
127
Figure 1. Evolution of Trust
Contractual / Weak-form / 
Calculus-based Trust
Interactions Over Time
For Sako, there is contractual, competence and goodwill trust; for Barney and 
Hansen, there is weak-form, semi-strong form and strong form trust; for Lewicki 
and Bunker there is calculus-based, knowledge-based and identification-based 
trust. There is some question regarding the benefits of the types of trust in the 
lower two-thirds of the hierarchy; by their nature, the threshold to reach them is 
not high, and therefore more exchange partners can attain those levels. In fact, 
as Lewicki and Bunker (1996) point out, some relationships may never evolve 
beyond the lower levels of trust for several reasons, such as: (a) the relationship
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only requires arms-length transactions, (b) the interdependent relationship 
between the parties is heavily bounded and regulated, (c) the parties have 
already gained enough information about each other to be aware that further 
diligence is unproductive, or (d) violations at the calculus-based trust level have 
taken place. Part (c) is particularly noteworthy. It says that after a certain point, 
continuing to gather more information and build additional trust is likely to be 
unproductive. This idea may be interpreted as if there are diminishing returns to 
trust. In other words, it can be said that more trust is not necessarily better in an 
organisational setup. I refer to this as Hypothesis 1 that will be validated/ rejected 
in Chapter 9 of this thesis based on executive reports.
According to these widely cited studies, where trust seems to provide the 
greatest benefits to exchange partners is in the upper third of the hierarchies, 
which are described as goodwill trust, strong-form trust and identification-based 
trust. To achieve that level requires investment -  trust is not free. However, the 
benefits to exchange partners operating in the upper third could be significant, 
providing a return on the investment made to get there. Whether in the form of 
improved innovation and learning (Sako 1998), less costly contractual and 
governance mechanisms (Barney and Hansen 1994), or creating joint projects 
and collocating to economise transactions (Lewicki and Bunker 1996), trust can 
potentially provide competitive advantages and economic benefits.
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While thus far we have mainly discussed the evolution of trust, it is also important 
understand how distrust might evolve between transacting parties. Reina and 
Reina (1999), for instance, explain how distrust leads to further distrust in a self- 
fulfilling way:
1. Action observed: A manager observes a questionable action by an employee.
2. Assumption made: The manager forms a negative assumption about the 
employee’s behaviour and the employee.
3. Protective action taken: The manager behaves in self-protecting ways to 
safeguard herself from possible betrayal.
4. Action observed: The employee observes the manager’s self-protective action.
5. Assumption made: The employee forms a negative assumption about the 
manager’s behaviour, concluding that the manager is untrustworthy.
6. Protective action taken: The employee behaves in self-protecting ways to 
safeguard himself from possible betrayal.
7. Reinforced assumptions made: The manager believes the employee’s 
behaviour is untrustworthy. This reinforces the negative assumptions she 
originally made regarding the employee.
Trust and Actions
Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) studied the actions associated with exchange 
partner trust. The actions were analysed and found to fall into three broad 
categories: contract adherence, flexibility beyond contract and flexibility outside
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contract. I am suggesting that these action categories could correspond to the 
forms of trust proposed by Sako (1998), Barney and Hansen (1994) and Lewicki 
and Bunker (1996) where contract adherence are activities that build 
contractual/weak form/calculus-based trust, flexibility beyond contract are 
activities that build competence/semi-strong/knowledge-based trust, and 
flexibility outside contract are activities that build goodwill/strong 
form/identification-based trust “There is a set of actions associated with contract 
adherence (paying and delivering on time, maintaining high product quality at all 
times, preserving confidentiality, ensuring the relevant standards are complied 
with and honouring strictly the terms of the contract). There is also a set of 
actions associated with flexibility. These divide into action directly related to 
business activity (being ready to exchange business information, honouring 
informal understanding and being ready to renegotiate the terms of contract at 
any time) which can be seen as filling in the interstices in contracts, or in other 
words as flexibility beyond contract. The third set of actions is more social in 
origin (being ready to help in an emergency, being prepared to give and take and 
being willing to overlook occasional faults) which can be regarded as flexibility 
outside contract.” (Burchell and Wilkinson 1997: 226-227) It could be argued that 
a willingness to engage in these sorts of actions are indicative of the level of trust 
in which the exchange partners operate. For instance, delivering a product in a 
timely manner consistent with the terms of a contract may build trust at the 
lowest level, but simply adhering to contractual terms will not necessarily elevate 
the relationship to the higher levels of the trust hierarchy. There are specific,
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definable actions (behaviours) that can be taken to build trust, and presumably 
there is some outcome from these shared experiences that can elevate the trust 
relationship over time. Burchell and Wilkinson provide examples of these 
actions, and there are probably additional actions that build trust (and others that 
diminish trust). The qualitative trust categories described above and their 
corresponding activities are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Qualitative Trust Categories and Corresponding Activities
Qualitative Trust Categories Corresponding Activities
Contractual Trust 
Weak-form Trust 
Calculus-based Trust
Contract Adherence Activities (paying 
and delivering on time, maintaining 
high product quality at all times, 
preserving confidentiality, ensuring the 
relevant standards are complied with 
and honouring strictly the terms of the 
contract)
Competence Trust 
Semi strong-form Trust 
Knowledge-based Trust
Flexibility Beyond Contract Activities 
(being ready to exchange business 
information, honouring informal 
understanding and being ready to
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renegotiate the terms of contract at any 
time)
Goodwill Trust 
Strong-form Trust 
Identification-based Trust
Flexibility Outside Contract Activities 
(being ready to help in an emergency, 
being prepared to give and take and 
being willing to overlook occasional 
faults)
Of particular interest is the possible interdependence of trust types, where 
contract adherence, flexibility outside contract and flexibility beyond contract are 
inextricably linked (Burchell and Wilkinson 1997). It may be that simply adhering 
to the terms of a contract isn’t enough to sustain business relationships, but 
rather the success of the relationship is intrinsically linked to the expectation 
(and/or demonstration) that higher forms of trust are possible as well.
Placing the corresponding actions into the trust over time model described earlier 
results in the following Figure 2, where the actions performed cause a ratcheting 
of trust up and down through different qualitative categories over time:
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Figure 2. Evolution of Trust with Activities
Goodwill /  Strong-form / 
Identification-based Tntst
Flexibility Outside Contract Activities
Competence / Semi strong- 
form / Knowledge-based Trust
Flexibility Beyond Contract Activities
Contractual / Weak-form / 
Calculus-based Trust
Contract Adherence Activities
Interactions Over Time
Executive Reports
The assertion that trust is a process that ascends and descends through actions 
was explored with each of the executive participants. The intention of the line of 
questioning was to see if the concept of trust as a process would emerge, and to 
determine the actions (as reported by the executives) that cause trust to increase 
and decrease within their organisations.
Doug Richard was immediate in his assertion that trust is a process, but later
qualified that statement by pointing out that it wasn’t a continuous flow process.
He began his explanation of the process as follows:
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“I believe trust is a process, but I believe it is a process that begins with 
faith. And that’s an interesting issue. Do I invest in an unknown...in 
another person...my faith, that they will do something that can help me 
and not hurt me? At some point trust is earned, that’s why it is a process. 
Trust is earned in lots and lots of ways. I am firmly of the belief that you 
start by never saying anything at all that you will then not precisely live up 
to. As a stranger, you have to start with credibility, and credibility can be 
quickly proven. Trust is not necessarily quickly gained, but I think 
credibility can be quickly proven. As the CEO of a company, you are 
immediately forced to make endless decisions -  that is what you do all 
day long, you make judgment calls on things, because they don’t get to 
your desk unless someone wants you to make a call. So you start with 
credibility. Trust is a frame of mind. Trust is an active thing I am 
projecting toward you. And in order to get them there, you have a process 
of getting them trusting. When I say it's a process, it doesn't necessarily 
mean it's a continuous flow process. In my mind, credibility is a base 
currency. Trust gets ratcheted... and it gets ratcheted on the back of 
credibility. If you want someone to trust you, or if you want to increase the 
level of trust they have in you, you must perform acts that are seen by the 
person that you’re aiming them toward as inspiring in them a step up in 
their willingness to trust.”
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In referring to building trust, he is acknowledging that it is not always a constant 
flow of one-way trust moving upward. The ratcheting metaphor leaves one with 
an image of trust as a moving object that is forced up and down a continuum. 
There must be a constant process of give and take between the trustor and the 
trustee, trading vulnerability for reward. Building trust requires fuel comprised of 
intentional trust-inspiring acts.
Richard struggled to understand the qualitative nature of trust:
“There is trust and its consequences, but there are not different types of 
trust. The trust is the same. Whether you abuse that trust or not doesn't 
change the character of the trust. It changes the consequences of the 
trust. There is just trust - either I trust you or I don't. And it's either I'm 
trusting you more over time or less over time, and I would assert that it is a 
step function. Meaning that it kind of cruises along at a certain level once 
it's been established at that level until activities make it change... either it 
steps up or it steps down. You could think of it in engineering terms. 
There must be a forcing function for step phase change...there has to be 
some function, some activity, that forces a step up or a step down.”
During his response to the dynamics of building and losing trust, Richard used 
banking metaphors that placed the subject in an interesting frame.
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“People in a position of power have to give trust in order to get it back - 
thus earn the trust of those below them. As a CEO, I have to show that I 
trust if I ever expect people to be empowered and to act in a way that 
makes them fully enabled to get things done. Equally so, trust has to be 
earned in that one has to act in a trustworthy fashion. That is to say, if 
one does something and then lives by it, then you earn a point of trust. If 
one does something and doesn’t live by it, then you not only lose that 
point of trust, you actually go into a position where it is binary - it takes 
much less effort to create distrust than it does to create trust. And, in fact, 
the cost of creating trust is a consistency of activity that is rarely or never 
broken. Trust is a currency between people. Trust is a matter of coin that 
is exchanged between them and what makes it unique is the total amount 
of coin available can be increased by acts of trust. Once a sufficient 
amount of trust is built up, you can make a mistake and recover trust -  
there is a bank of it. I think trust is built in organisations by starting with an 
assumptive, positive account on all party’s behalf. Therefore, everyone 
should start with a credit account, not with either a neutral or negative 
account, and then they either betray the trust or they can build on it. You 
have to assumptively put the entire organisation in a position where it is 
believed that everyone is trusted by each other and you act according to 
that. People build trust with me by acting in a trustworthy manner so that I 
can see that there is a consonance between their activity and the trust I
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repose in them, so that then what essentially is a loaning of trust becomes 
a credit account of trust.”
Trust as currency is an interesting concept, as is the notion that it takes much 
more effort to build trust than to lose trust. For most, it is also easier to spend 
money than it is to earn it. I don’t believe that Richard is saying that we 
consciously keep track of pence and pounds of trust, but rather that we keep this 
general idea of how much is in the bank and know exactly what is affordable and 
what is not. In order for trust to grow, there must be some seed capital that is 
invested in the relationship so everyone starts with something to build on.
According to Richard, there is either more or less trust in a relationship based on 
the interactions between trustor and trustee. Similar to Lewicki and Bunker’s 
(1996) assertion that there are limits to the value of building trust, he adds a new 
dimension to the trust dynamic by introducing the paradox that the higher the 
trust, the greater the vulnerability and therefore the greater the chance for the 
perception of untrustworthiness. In a sense, his perception attests Hypothesis 1 
proposed in Chapter 9 that more trust is not necessarily better. Since higher trust 
leads to greater vulnerability, parties may not opt for attaining higher trust.
“Trust is diminished in very simple ways. People are empowered and take 
advantage of their trusted position and then do not live up to that trusted 
position. So, what is interesting about that is the more you trust someone
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(the more you invest or handover to them coins of trust), the greater their 
account becomes, but the greater the potential for them to be viewed as 
untrustworthy. And the higher you build it, the higher the potential to fall, 
and therefore, the more you trust someone, the more...essentially the 
more exposed you are to them.”
Consistency of action is vitally important in building and maintaining trust. 
Consistent with the results of the trust definitions analysed in the previous 
chapter, in addition to the faith associated with trust, there is also a need for 
balanced oversight according to Richard.
“Everyone who is in a position of leadership has to a) earn trust by acting 
consistently; and b) display trust by assuming that activities are being 
done in a way in which you want them to be done. It lets people feel 
trusted but at the same time there has to be a very watchful eye on 
anyone who does not act that way and immediate steps need to be taken 
at the earliest possible point of intervention because it takes very little to 
destabilise a small company’s culture assuming somebody acts in a way 
that is not consistent of that philosophy.”
Much like Doug Richard, Martin Rigby described the trust dynamic as a series of 
interactions that either increases or decreases trust in the relationship.
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“Trust is reinforced by the fulfilment of commitments that are being made 
by previous trust relationships. I don't think we should underestimate the 
iterative effect of the exercise in trust. I trusted you yesterday to do 
something or to meet a commitment and you've done it. I trust you again. 
You do it again. You reinforce the trust. The success of the iterations 
does reinforce the trust. In other words if you trust, trust, trust, and then 
the partner lets you down in a small way and not in a big way, you deal 
with it and then the trust is diminished. Trust builds again as that partner 
fulfils obligations, and then they breach, but I do think the iterative nature 
of trust is important.”
Another consistency between Richard and Rigby is the challenge in 
comprehending qualitative hierarchical categorisations of trust. He finds the 
hierarchical categories too convenient in that they don’t reflect the reality of 
business relationships. It should be noted that during this part of the discussion, 
Rigby drew a quantitative hierarchical graphic on a white board going from low 
trust to high trust. I chose to explore his perceptions of qualitative labels by 
writing Sako’s (1998) contractual, competence and goodwill representations 
alongside Rigby’s labels. This was a completely organic evolution in the 
discussion and resulted in the references below to “competence” and “goodwill”.
“I do feel that these are quite difficult areas to map on the same axis. They 
are qualitatively different. You can respect somebody's functional
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competence but never want to do business with them. To some extent I 
may refer it to goodwill but there is no emotional commitment. You 
probably wouldn't want to risk doing business with some people because 
you know how competent they are, but you also know they are a shark. 
There are other people that you really like and would loan a hundred quid 
and not expect to get it back perhaps because you've got goodwill towards 
them. But you’d probably never do a venture capital transaction with 
them. Because they are those sort of people. Lovely people but useless. 
So I'm not sure that these belong on the same scale - so closely related to 
be on the scale. How do you map onto this the fact that I've got this 
entrepreneur and like him - 1 have confidence in him but I know he's under 
a lot of personal pressure - financial, his wife, and that may cause him to 
be less and less reliable business partner going forward. He may look to 
read the fine print to see whether you can get out of this. In some ways 
this is moral judgment on the individual.”
According to Rigby, there are too many situations that occur in organisations that 
contradict clean models of hierarchical trust categories.
For Rigby, the notion of vulnerability is critical to the genesis of trust, and the 
contract provides sufficient ambiguity to create this vulnerability.
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“The nice thing is it is about ambiguity. One of the useful things about 
contracts is their ambiguity. A bit of vulnerability, so that the other party 
can see that you don't exploit the vulnerability and to the contrary maybe 
you give a bit, maybe you are in support a bit. You have to seed some 
vulnerabilities or some opportunities to see whether you can get some 
trust feedback.”
Communication in the venture capital business is of paramount importance. 
Venture capitalists invest other people’s money in multiple operations, and close 
oversight of those companies is not possible. The venture capitalist therefore 
relies on clear and honest communication from the CEO to gauge how the 
company is performing. It is therefore not surprising that Rigby points to the 
quality of communication as the primary driver of whether trust in a relationship is 
growing or shrinking.
“The most obvious thing you do, as a manager, is you communicate with 
your own VC. You aim to try and communicate with them. Good 
entrepreneurs who are good at being able to trust and trying to engender 
trust, are people who get you in and explain to you what's going on, and 
trust you to take bad news as well as good. First of all, good 
communicators. Secondly, I think the worst thing in the world for a VC, in 
particular, is to feel that they are being manipulated into making a decision 
on partial information because there is a predetermined agenda rather
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than because you are actually being asked to take part in the decision 
making process. I think it's diminished by poor communication and I think 
poor communication can be too little communication, inept 
communication, and misleading communication - communication which is 
designed to mislead - an impartial communication. The most trust eroding 
is the last of those. The rest of those you can write off as being cavalier or 
too busy, so it's a marginal erosion of trust. The second is probably 
functional where they have to learn to express and communicate their
ideas competence based. The last of those is absolutely getting to the
heart of trust - you are being manipulated rather than - this is no longer a 
relationship of trust. This is a relationship of you are the schmuck who is 
going to do what that person wants you to do whether you like it or not and 
you are not trusted to take the truth and respond as they would like you to 
respond and modify that response through dialogue. Instead you have to 
be manipulated into responding which is an absolute - manifestly breach 
of trust. There can be no trust if you are being manipulated - manipulation 
in a sense of either partial truth or downright disinformation - lying. I 
remember one adage. We had a moment where we were challenging one 
of our investees, a very nice guy and very trustworthy. I do remember him 
saying to one of our chief executives at a board meeting, ‘Steve, just 
remember to always tell the truth, nothing but the truth, but not necessarily 
the whole truth’. That is a very fine line. Even if you push that too hard 
you know you are eroding trust.”
143
The categorisation of the type of transgression is of particular interest. Not 
communicating enough or in an ineffective manner may erode trust, but outright 
manipulation can destroy the trust relationship. The former can be attributed to a 
lack of competence, while the latter is an intentional act of lying. Interestingly, 
Rigby is not comfortable categorising trust types, but he is comfortable in 
categorising types of transgressions. This calls into question his rejection of 
qualitative representations of trust. If he is comfortable assigning qualitative 
labels to transgressions, it would seem he would have comfort, perhaps with 
more familiarity, in accepting qualitative trust categorisations as well. One might 
also presume that the interviewee is developing his own understanding as he 
answers questions and will therefore be more sophisticated at the end of the 
interview than he is at the start.
Like Richard and Rigby, Michael MacSwiney relies on seeds of vulnerability to 
start the trust relationship.
“The first way to build trust is to trust other people. If I trust you to do 
something, and I trust you and you and make it clear that I trust you 
people. If I make myself vulnerable to you, you will eventually trust me in 
general. If you make yourself vulnerable to people, they are more likely 
to...trust is more likely built, and they are more likely to make themselves 
more vulnerable to you. Be very open. Trust everybody until you have
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cause to distrust, and I think it is quite good. You meet some people in 
business who say ‘I never trust anybody until I've got cause to trust them’. 
I trust everybody until I have a reason to have distrust.”
Trust is then built up over time by empowering and supporting, particularly in time 
of trouble. According to MacSwiney,
“This office built trust with its employees by trying to treat them fairly and 
giving them authority to delegate and supporting them and backing them 
in front of a client, broadly backing your people. That's I think how trust 
happens here. Have an environment where, if a person admits a mistake, 
or comes to you and says they've made a mistake, you don't crucify them; 
you help them. That is the most critical. If a person says they've got a 
domestic problem or they've got a financial problem, they expect and 
come to assume that you will be trying to help, not that you will be trying to 
harm. I think that's where trust comes from.”
Consistent patterns of behaviour that demonstrate trustworthiness, such as 
protecting vulnerable clients, can have great benefits for building trust inside the 
organisation. The following example from MacSwiney illustrates behaviour 
consistent with the highest forms of goodwill and identification-based trust.
145
“Let me tell you something else about the way you can build trust. There 
has been a client of this office for some years - small client, not important, 
and they got into extreme difficulties. Somebody has died and the 
business has gone bust. They are no longer any good as a customer - we 
are never going to make any money off them. If my staff sees that I go out 
of my way to help that individual, they are aware that I've said ‘forget 
about the fees - you've been a good customer for five years’, even if 
they've been a small and not important one. If they see that, they see 
that's the behaviour pattern. What's the message within the business? 
It's trust, because the bosses have not ditched a customer, who is no 
longer any use to them, they’ve been loyal -  they’ve supported them and 
looked after them. So what has your staff learned from that? Maybe that 
is the way we are going to behave. Maybe we'll be looked after the same 
way. The reason for doing it, beyond the fact that I happen to think he has 
good manners and is correct, is that it creates staggering good-will 
because other people will have spotted that situation where you've worked 
for nothing.”
Like Rigby, MacSwiney sees communication as a key driver of building or 
diminishing trust. What seems common practice, such as exaggerating the 
performance of products in marketing literature, can have deleterious 
consequences on trust in the organisation.
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“The greatest dishonesty in the world is telling an untruth - it’s fundamental 
to everything. It is the key crime - a lie is the key crime. It underlies every 
form of dishonesty - it's the issue. Whether the lie is to you or to a third 
party, that's a very big step in a breach of trust and within a company if 
there is a culture of dishonesty and not telling the truth to the managing 
director, ‘everything is alright - yeah, we've got that deal signed - sales 
next month look as good as last month’, the mode begins to become a 
culture of part-truths, half-truths or straight dishonesty as expedience. 
Something is going wrong within your business because basically your 
message is getting distorted. Yet, in many businesses, in a way that 
culture is encouraged and it's encouraged with your marketing department 
to put out literature which doesn't just sell a product but conveys a false 
impression on the product or the capabilities. Once you’re putting that out 
as a story and you know it's dishonest and your people know it's 
dishonest, and people just look at it as a spin for advertising, you’ve begun 
to take the step, and so the culture has begun to be there within the 
business, and that begins to become a slide. If you are slightly second 
rate, maybe the only customer you can get is somebody who is a bit 
marginal, a bit crooked, somebody who will turn a blind eye - all I want is 
an accountant to turn the blind eye or a banker who will turn the blind eye 
or a lawyer - you don't mind a bit of back dating do you? I need your help 
sometimes with documents. So you are slightly second rate -  a nod is as
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good as a wink. That's the beginning of the slide. So, it's because people 
are doing things that are very slightly second rate, and you get sucked in.”
As proposed in the literature and supported by the executive reports, trust and 
safeguards can be complementary in helping trust mature. However, too many 
restrictions placed on businesses can have negative consequences for building 
trust. The safeguards put in place to protect the customer certainly reduce the 
risk associated with the transaction, but taken too far they restrict the ability of 
the organisation to build trust. This observation by MacSwiney is quite similar to 
the findings of Chan (2003) that actions that are needed to build trust may 
actually decrease trust since those actions would be taken as a signal (Six and 
Sorge 2008) that the management does not trust the employees. This also 
seems to support the concept forwarded by some scholars (Lewicki and Bunker 
1996) and the other executives that it is more difficult to build trust than to lose it. 
MacSwiney uses his own profession’s circumstances to make this point.
“In an office like this we do advise in theory, but no advising takes place. 
It is illegal for me to tell you, as a client, to give you any advice on your 
investments - it is illegal. It's criminal offence. The only way I can advise 
you, as a customer, you as a 90 year old widow on your investments, is to 
say ‘I haven’t put 90% of my money in a Chilean tin mine. I dealt with my 
portfolio differently. It's not for me to tell you that it is incautious to have 
90% of your money in a Chilean tin mine.’ I am not authorised to express
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an opinion. The only person who is authorised to express an opinion is 
that stock broker; the crook who put you in there in the first place. It has
become an absurdity so a client/professional relationship is gone.
People have always grumbled about accountants, lawyers, and people to 
an extent. There was a day when by and large if you went in to accountant 
or lawyer's office, the man sitting behind the desk was going to do his best 
for you. The professional relationship, as with a doctor, implied that the 
professional's first concern was the client, the patient, or the customer. 
That was the first concern for which, incidentally, they normally succeeded 
in making a very good living as a professional person. But their first 
concern was for the client. It is an unfortunate reflection now that the first 
concern of many lawyers, many accountants, many bankers, many 
doctors is the amount of money they can make. The second is avoiding 
risk through negligence. Concern for the client is now coming a bad third.”
Like the previous executives, MacSwiney uses financial transaction dynamics to 
describe trust and goodwill that is built-up over time and then is spent when 
transgressions occur. There is a consistent theme running through the executive 
responses of having an account of trust that is drawn upon consistent with the 
cost of the transgression. MacSwiney became quite agitated as he gave the 
following example.
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“If you are put in as the managing partner of any business - you are the 
boss of the business, it is very easy to produce short-term performance. 
Short-term performance is created by cutting costs and upping charges. 
Now you can do that in a professional office. Somebody could come into 
this office and over the next 12 months vastly increase the profitability. 
Freeze all salaries, unload one of your weaker members of staff, up the 
charges to the customers, downgrade the service, and this office will make 
more money next year, the year after, and probably the year after that. As 
the experts are brought in, ‘I want a bonus, based on the turnaround - 1 get 
a vast bonus because look what we have achieved’. What I have done 
has made money by burning trust, by burning good-will. I have behaved 
improperly to my staff. I have robbed my customers. Customers do not 
move that fast. They don't move from banks fast. They don't move from 
dentists, doctors, lawyers or accountants fast. They don't move a lot. So, 
you can cheat them quite badly before they move, but you can't get them 
back again. You can't put a sign up and say we are no longer exploiting. 
We are no longer overcharging. We are no longer giving lousy service. 
We are in a culture where ruthless people are respected. I have seen it, 
and there is one going on with a major international firm of lawyers - that 
pins it down to one of seven, where they are butchering all their provincial 
practices at the moment in pursuit of huge international deals. The 
managing partner is a bachelor; he's completely ruthless. He's on a fast 
earnings - he works day and night. His only interest is making more
money. Partners are getting their throats slit, being paid off, retired. 
Offices are being closed; the business is being quietly destroyed. Profits 
are soaring. What is very said is that his profit motivation, his benefit 
doesn't link to his pension in ten-years-time because it’s the decisions you 
make in the professional practice today that affect the value of business in 
ten years. Any ruthless shit can squeeze profit out of a business. The 
trouble is, we live in a fashionable society where the ruthless shits are 
being supported. Good-will and trust are very close - honesty, integrity, 
good-will, trust - very closely bundled together, and very unfashionable.”
Contrary to the other executives, Michael Mainelli makes no mention of 
vulnerability seeding the trust relationship. Instead he points to expectation 
meeting reality as underpinning the trust relationship from the start.
“We are typically seen to be exceedingly prompt in terms of introducing 
people and following through on what we say we are going to do. The 
idea there is to engender trust by making sure the expectations meet the 
realities - so that we will tell somebody we will do something in five days 
and hopefully it’s done in five days. That is the way of creating trust. That 
finds its way through the organisation the way we teach staff to manage 
customers. They are told to never overpromise, but to make promises 
and keep them. We are exceedingly clear about when you are going to 
deliver something and deliver to that and don't kill yourself because it’s
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what the client wanted to hear -  'yes sir, I'll do it tomorrow’, when you had 
no chance to finish it tomorrow. It's the wrong attitude. That's kind of an 
obvious statement, but that's probably the level at which trust is managed 
here. Trust, in terms of selling to people, trust starts right up front. When 
they meet a sales person and they tell you they are going to have a 
proposal to you tomorrow - if they don't have the proposal to you 
tomorrow, whether you need the proposal tomorrow or not is irrelevant; 
they shouldn't have said it if they don't deliver it, because the expectations 
don’t meet reality.”
Scott Charney from Microsoft echoed similar sentiments. Like Mainelli he 
asserted that building trust is about managing expectations and delivering 
services and products consistent with those expectations.
“I’m a big believer that there is perception and reality and you have to achieve 
both. It’s transparency, it’s integrity -  doing what you say you are doing to do, 
and making sure that the expectation meets the reality.”
Nicholas Baring looked to consistency of behaviour, commonality of background 
and close working relations as the seeds of growing trust, although simply 
seeding trust was no guarantee of outcome.
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“Essentially being consistent in behaviour builds trust - being consistent 
was an important aspect to it, and by not setting out to be cleverest 
financiers on the block. In the corporate finance world I think the best 
service a merchant bank could provide its clients was by advising them 
not to do a particular transaction whereas today the emphasis is all on 
doing the deal. You could stand back and say ‘I don't think this one is 
right for you’. I think we found it easiest to do so (build trust) where they 
were recruiting people who would, in their mind, have the right background 
qualifications, which were in fact rather different in the case of the 
merchant bank and the insurance company, but in both cases there is a 
shared idea of what would make the right sort of recruits. Employments 
back at the archive of Barings, which is a very rich one, you'll find phrases 
like ‘a capital fellow’ and ‘right sort of man’. Shared background, shared 
interests, recommendation from a known party - from trusted parties - then 
keeping very close to each other. Working in common offices -  a concept 
of the partner's role where people would be engaged in completely 
different businesses but you could sense even if you weren't listening in 
for a full conversation, you would pick up the company quite quickly that 
something was going adrift. That was interesting because that was, in a 
sense, sort of informal control.”
According to Baring, the most trusted individuals in the firm needed greater
controls than the firm was prepared for in order to carry out their responsibilities -
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and the results were disastrous. Consistent with Weber et al. (2005), Baring told 
the following story where he tried to replace his anxiety associated with 
dependence on a single person in charge at the Singapore office and poorly 
understood processes with trustworthy individuals with whom he was very close.
“In the particular case of Barings, [trust] was one of the factors that led to 
the firm's problems in the mid-90's. After the big bang in 1986, the financial 
structure around the stock exchange changed in London and a much freer 
form North American style was introduced. A lot of ownerships changed the 
businesses and they moved from being partnerships to being subsidiaries 
of much larger groups. In the particular case of Barings they continued 
essentially in the same form as before but acquired some new elements for 
which it did not have the same tradition or perhaps the same long-term 
approach in their business. We were looking for shorter-term rewards and 
the particular problem was the well tried and trusted members of the firm 
were being asked to control businesses which they had little previous 
experience of and didn't really understand. So that, putting it in a very 
crude, however, simplified way, explains why an individual in Singapore in 
a relatively lowly position in the firm was able to bet the bank.
I think we were incorporating part of a business model which had really 
grown up in the United States. I think, again, with the benefit of hindsight, 
we took on the system of rewards -  of individual rewards related to
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performance - without bringing in the controls which were a necessary 
complement of that.
I can remember even the last part of 1983 and 1986 and 1989 when I left 
Barings, this was already becoming apparent and there were some 
individuals there who - 1 think we all recognised that they could make a big 
contribution to the business but they needed an underpinning of controls, 
and I think that the firm just failed to find the right way through to that 
control system. It was a different relationship and it was felt that by 
introducing some of the trusted figures into their part of the organisation 
one could achieve the similar knowledge. There were some definite 
cavities in the organisation -  a hollowness - where it was thought that 
because (trusted individuals) were involved that they would keep an eye on 
things, but it wasn't always happening - so assumptions were made about 
the degree of control that there was in many ways.”
Controls or safeguards are meant to protect from wrongdoing, and in placing 
them there is recognition that one cannot be completely trusted. But Baring 
purposely placed some of his most trusted individuals (in Sako’s term, those with 
goodwill trust) into an environment intending that their presence would minimise 
risk. Instead they watched as the company took a downward slide that resulted 
in bankruptcy.
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Analysis of Responses
It could be argued that trust is too diffuse a topic to be worthy of consideration in 
transactions (Williamson 1985), or that trust is not a process of interconnected causal 
relationships influenced by performing specific actions. Contrary to these arguments, 
the executive reports demonstrate homogeneity with the literature that suggests trust 
is a process where performing particular actions can cause a gain or loss of trust over 
time. Several of the respondents agreed that trust ebbs and flows based on the 
actions of the trustor and the trustee. For Richard, the process of building trust starts 
with establishing credibility based on good judgment and keeping your word. Trust 
then gets “ratcheted” up or down on the foundation of credibility, and is earned by 
acting consistently and trusting others, and punishing acts of transgression 
immediately. At the same time, Rigby and MacSwiney point out that withholding 
punishment when it is available is an effective way to build trust as well. This is 
consistent with Chan (2003). The distinction here is that withholding punishment may 
build trust with the transgressing party, but may also result in lost trust with those other 
constituents including employees that did not transgress. The process of ratcheting 
up and down is not equally weighted -  according to Richard it is much easier to lose 
trust than to gain trust. This is consistent with Lewicki and Bunker (2006), where the 
cost of transgression is greater than the benefit of trust building behaviour. The 
concept that building trust is a process is critical as it implies that trust is constantly 
moving -  trust is not inherent in transactions, and there is not necessarily a single 
event that will create indefinitely sustainable trust.
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If trust is perceived as a process, there must therefore be initiators that start the 
process and actions that increase or decrease trust over time. Consider the 
similarities among some of the executive reports when they described the actions they 
take to “seed” the trust relationship. These initiators of trust are presented in Table 5.
Table 5. Trust Initiators
Executive Trust Initiators
Doug Richard -Initially accept a vulnerable position 
-Give trust to get it back 
-Assume people are trustworthy and start 
everyone off with a positive account 
-Invest some ‘seed capital’ in the trust 
relationship to see if it grows
Martin Rigby Seed some vulnerability to see if you get the 
trust back
Michael MacSwiney -Initially build trust by trusting other people 
-Make yourself vulnerable 
-Trust everyone until you have a reason to 
distrust
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Although seeding the relationship with vulnerability was seen by many executives as 
important to starting the trust relationship, Baring’s experience demonstrates the 
negative impact of assuming that trust will come back. It needs to be pointed out that 
the risks associated with making oneself vulnerable may not always be worth the 
perceived benefits of the potential for increased trust. If demonstrations of trust must 
include making oneself vulnerable from the outset of the relationship, there must be 
corresponding safeguards to make the transaction risk manageable in a business 
context. This further supports the concept of hybrid trust operating in organisations 
that was described in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
We will now consider the actions described by the executives that increase or 
decrease trust once the trust relationship is established. The various actions 
described by the executives and the reported consequences are presented in Table 6.
Table 6. Actions and the Consequences to Amount of Trust
Executive Reported Action Reported Consequence to Amount of Trust
Acting in a way where there is consonance 
between the response and the trust reposed
Increases trust
Acting consistently Increases trust
Immediately punishing acts of betrayal Increases trust
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Communicating clearly and honestly Increases trust
Providing strong support, particularly when 
most vulnerable
Increases trust
Being transparent in actions Increases trust
Meeting expectations with reality Increases trust
Having a shared background Increases trust
Maintaining close working relations Increases trust
Withholding punishment when appropriate Increases trust
Not meeting requirements of trusted 
position
Decreases trust
Too little, inept or misleading 
communication (lying)
Decreases trust
Relying on restrictive policies that don’t 
allow for risk and shared vulnerability
Decreases trust
The executives could point to these actions as those that they have used or 
experiences that either increased or decreased trust in their business relationships. 
The cause and effect of performing these actions were very clear in the organisational 
environment -- trust moves up or moves down over time depending on the actions 
taken. For the executives, trust is considered an active and important process 
initiated and controlled by the actions and perceptions of the transacting parties. This 
is consistent with widely cited trust literature.
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Rigby’s assertion that building trust takes precise coordination of partners is 
supportive of Ferrin et al.’s (2008) concept of spiralling relationships of perceived 
trustworthiness and cooperation.
Rigby and MacSwiney both had experiences that led them to the conclusion that 
withholding punishment when it is an available option in times of trouble can actually 
build trust. This is supportive of Chan (2003), Six and Sorge (2008) and Gill and 
Butler (1996). Doug Richard pointed out that another way to build trust is to swiftly 
punish transgressors. These apparent contradictory statements could be the result of 
Rigby and MacSwiney referring to building trust with the transgressor, while Richard is 
referring to the trust perceptions of those away from the transgressor that have not 
transgressed. Exploring the trust building and diminishing effects of punishing and not 
punishing acts of transgression on the transgressor and other constituents is worthy of 
further study.
Rigby and MacSwiney also report that, in their experience, trust is built through clear, 
honest and accurate communication, which supports Berger (1991).
MacSwiney gave an example from his own business where excessive safeguards 
have made it very difficult to build trust with his clients. The safeguards are ostensibly 
in place to protect the client and the company and provide for a trusting relationship. 
Taken too far, however, they have instead decreased trust. This is consistent with
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Chan (2003) where actions intended to build trust have been found to actually 
decrease trust.
Baring’s attempt to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour by one of his traders in 
Singapore was consistent with Weber et al. (2005). Baring tried to replace his feelings 
of anxiety associated with dependence on a single individual by placing a trusted 
individual in the environment. This gave him a sense of perceived trustworthiness. In 
this case, the placement was a tragic mistake that was a contributing factor to the 
downfall of his business.
It should be noted that a few of the executives struggled with the concept of qualitative 
trust representations. Rigby and Richard, for example, did not acknowledge that the 
activities they performed resulted in categorically different types of trust in the 
relationship -  only that trust was either quantitatively increased or decreased as a 
consequence of their actions. Thus we can infer that they know which action led to 
increased or decreased trust, but they struggle to categorise trust types. It is quite 
understandable because observing the effects of trust/actions is often easier than 
categorising trust. Measuring/observing the effect of actions is generally easier than 
assessing the level of trust bestowed or ascribing trust types to qualitative categories.
The implication is that qualitative representations of trust in the work environment 
may not be readily apparent to these senior executives. Giving examples of business 
relationships (such as case studies) alongside qualitative categories may allow for
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improved comprehension of trust types by these senior executives. For the senior 
executives in this study, value is readily acknowledged in the identification and study 
of key trust-building and trust-diminishing actions that could practically be applied for 
the benefit of the organisation. The frequent use of banking analogies in the executive 
reports to describe the dynamics of trust seems to support this notion as well. The 
executives were certainly financially astute individuals, but that is not sufficient to 
explain the similarities in their descriptions of trust in their organisations. I believe the 
executives were saying something very important about their trust orientation -  trust is 
perceived as another financial asset at the company’s disposal that can be invested or 
invested in. The senior executives’ use of financial metaphors will be explored further 
in Chapter 9 of this thesis. Like currency in a bank account, it can be saved or spent 
depending on the requirements of the transaction or situation. It is used when the 
investment can provide a meaningful return to the company. And indeed, it could be a 
bad investment as well, which calls for Optimal Trust -  a subject that will be taken up 
in detail in Chapter 7. For these senior executives, trust is another tool that is used 
when necessary to grow the business.
During the interviews I was particularly struck by the concept of the trust paradox. 
When one thinks of trust between transactors, it is usually either seen as a mutually 
beneficial relationship or as one party benefiting at the expense of another. A third 
context that was introduced during the interviews is the situation where two parties 
have such a high degree of trust in the relationship that it increases the potential for 
both parties to lose trust in one another. The literature seems to support the notion
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that as trust increases between transactors they can reach a point of mutual 
identification and goodwill where greater economic benefits can be enjoyed. The trust 
paradox introduced here by Doug Richard extends the concept put forward by Lewicki 
and Bunker (1996) that further attempts to build trust beyond a certain point may be 
unproductive. Going beyond a lack of productivity, the trust paradox caps the value of 
trust and introduces a law of diminishing returns, where too much trust could result in 
diminishing trust -  where continuing to invest in building a trust relationship could have 
negative effects.
The findings from this chapter are supportive of the existing literature, extend 
certain concepts appearing in the literature, and add a layer of executive 
perspective that may contribute to an improved understanding of proposed trust 
theories. The key findings are supportive of the existing literature that suggests 
trust is a process where performing particular actions can cause a gain or loss of 
trust over time. For instance, consistent with Chan (2003), withholding 
punishment when it is available is an effective way to build trust, as is 
communicating honestly, being transparent, acting consistently and having a 
shared background (Berger 1991). Support for Lewicki and Bunker (2006) was 
found , where the cost of transgression is greater than the benefit of trust building 
behaviour, in that executives acknowledged that it is much easier to lose trust 
than to gain trust. Rigby’s assertion that building trust takes precise coordination 
of partners is supportive of Ferrin et al.’s (2008) concept of spiralling 
relationships of perceived trustworthiness and cooperation. Evidence for support
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of Chan (2003) and Lewicki and Bunker (1996) was found where actions 
intended to build trust have can actually decrease trust.
The key findings extend this notion by introducing a trust paradox. Going beyond a 
lack of productivity, the trust paradox caps the value of trust and introduces a law of 
diminishing returns, where too much trust could result in diminishing trust and 
continuing to invest in building a trust relationship could have negative effects.
Finally, the executives added an important and unique perspective to trust in that, 
contrary to being diffuse or qualitative in nature, they perceive trust as another 
financial asset at the company’s disposal that can be invested or invested in.
Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to gain an understanding of some widely cited 
models that categorise the nature of trust, examine the homogeneity and 
heterogeneity among the models and executive reports, and explore the potential 
dynamics of trust as a process by examining how trust is gained and lost in 
organisations. Qualitative trust models that appear in the literature were presented: 
contractual/competence/goodwill trust, weak-form/semi-strong form/strong-form trust, 
and calculus-based/knowledge-based/identification-based trust. Selected literature 
describing how trust is built and diminished and the corresponding actions was 
reviewed and compared to the executive reports.
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There was consistency with the literature that suggests trust is a process that 
increases and decreases over time based on specific actions taken by the transactors. 
There was considerable evidence presented that trust needs to be started by 
accepting some vulnerability, but Baring’s experience demonstrated the need to have 
proper safeguards in place to protect against opportunism. Several specific actions 
were described by the executives that are known to either increase or decrease trust 
in their companies, further supporting the concept of trust as a dynamic process in 
organisations as reported in the literature.
A few executives struggled to understand the importance of qualitative representations 
of trust. As was noted, this is understandable. Some very important and relevant 
work has been done by researchers that developed qualitative models of trust (Sako, 
Barney and Hansen, Lewicki and Bunker for example). The implication of this finding 
(albeit from a small sample) is that qualitative representations of trust in the work 
environment may not be readily apparent to some senior executives. It was 
suggested that providing examples of business relationships (such as case studies) 
alongside qualitative categories may allow for improved comprehension. It was 
reported that trust in their businesses was treated by many of these senior executives 
as a financial asset that is no more or less diffuse than any other financial asset held 
by the organisation. Future research could explore trust as a financial asset of the 
company that, when invested in and strategically used, could create a competitive 
advantage. The potential existence of a trust paradox was a concept that requires
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further study as well, and may have an impact on future research by collaring the 
value of trust at increased levels. It was also suggested that the trust building and 
diminishing effects of penalising or not penalising acts of transgression on different 
constituencies in the organisation is worthy of further study.
Chapter 7 that follows completes this study’s exploration of the nature of trust by 
analysing the concept of optimal trust as reported by the senior executives.
166
CHAPTER 7: Optimal Trust
The Concept of Optimal Trust
One of the objectives of this thesis is to assess the extent to which executive 
reports chime with the trust literature, and explore novel concepts (or concepts 
that aren’t well-represented in the literature) that might arise from the interviews. 
One such concept that deserves additional attention is that of optimal trust. It is 
possible that a conceptualisation of optimal trust described by Michael Mainelli 
may extend our understanding of other conceptualisations of optimal trust that 
appear in the organisational trust literature. The novel contribution here is the 
introduction of anticipated trust and experienced trust, and how closely they are 
matched, as the determinants of optimal trust transactions. Furthermore, an 
optimal trust path graph is presented that allows for optimal trust transactions to 
take place at both low optimal trust levels and high optimal trust levels. Several 
executive reports tend to support this novel treatment as well.
Executive Reports
The optimal trust model proposed by Mainelli is not solely about interdependence 
or uncertainty as proposed by Wicks et al. (1999) and Adobor (2006) 
respectively, but rather incorporates a more experientially focused concept based 
on anticipation and experience. Trust therefore is neither good nor bad -  it is an 
anticipation met with experience, and the difference between the two defines 
whether there is optimal trust, undertrust or overtrust.
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Mainelli describes under-trusting a substantial difference between anticipation 
and experience, where the low anticipated trust doesn’t match the high level of 
experienced trust. Over-trusting occurs when there is a substantial difference 
between anticipation and experience, where the low experienced trust is 
inconsistent with the high level of anticipated trust. According to Mainelli, optimal 
trust occurs when the anticipated level of trust and the experienced level of trust 
are perfectly matched. It is a condition in which the transacting parties are 
neither under-trusting nor over-trusting each other.
What about the other executives and their views on the subject? None of the 
other participants used the term “optimal trust” explicitly. Consistent with the 
literature, however, they did provide evidence that such a conceptualisation is 
valid within the organisation. This assertion will be supported by analysing 
responses for evidence of statements consistent with three key constructs of the 
proposed optimal trust model:
• the importance of anticipated trust vs. experienced trust
• undertrusting and overtrusting (not in name, but represented in concept or 
practice)
• optimal trust (not in name, but in concept or practice)
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This analysis of responses is intended to ground the optimal trust model in the 
functioning of the organisation as experienced by the senior executives.
Support for the concepts of anticipated trust and experienced trust 
In analysing the executives’ responses, it is important to find evidence of the key 
constructs of optimal trust as proposed by Mainelli. Central to his proposition is 
the concept of the gap between the anticipated level of trust in a relationship or 
transaction and the experienced level of trust. For the purpose of this analysis, 
anticipated trust is defined as the levels of trust that transacting parties have in 
one another before the transaction takes place. Experienced trust is defined as 
the levels of trust that transacting parties have in one another after the 
transaction has taken place upon reflecting on the actions taken during the 
transaction.
If this relationship is truly important to trust, it would probably appear in the 
responses of other executives. In fact, each of the executives referenced the 
importance of consistency between anticipation and experience in building trust.
Martin Rigby was very clear that there were advantages and disadvantages to 
trust, and his comments on the subject appear throughout this thesis. When 
discussing the disadvantages of trust, Rigby describes a condition where the 
anticipation of trust doesn’t match the experienced trust in a relationship. Here, 
the gap between anticipation and experience creates distrust. Instead of
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abandoning the relationship altogether, Rigby provides a path to salvaging the 
relationship by taking specific actions designed to reduce the gap between 
anticipated trust and experienced trust. As he puts it,
“The disadvantage, of course, is the expectation that you will trust and be 
trusted, and sometimes the trust, for whatever reason, misunderstanding 
or whatever, doesn’t work out. If you don't trust that person as much, 
somehow you've got to manage the relationship back down to a layer of 
less trust with a more formal exchange of information and decision 
making. More investigating, more due diligence, more contracts, without 
[angering them] and making them feel untrustworthy or unvalued."
What is being suggested here is that there is a proposed optimal level of high 
trust where the anticipated trust and experienced trust don’t match. The goal of 
reaching an optimal level of trust is still attainable, it’s just that the level of 
anticipated trust is going to have to be lowered so that the anticipated and 
experienced levels match. This example points to the validity of the concept of 
having some business relationships with high levels of trust being optimal and 
others where optimal levels of trust are at a low level. In either case, a 
transaction may still take place as long as the anticipated trust is aligned with the 
experienced trust.
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Scott Charney is very clear on the importance of matching the anticipation of 
trust with the actual experience of trust. Like Rigby, his statements support the 
general concept of alignment between anticipation and experience being a key 
factor in determining the amount of trust in a relationship.
“For customers trust works on many levels. Most of it comes back to 
managing their expectations, being honest with them, being transparent in 
your business practices. If your quality is bad but you didn’t represent 
otherwise, then it’s probably less of a trust issue and more of a quality 
issue.”
Charney’s point is that, as long as one represents poor quality and delivers poor 
quality, then trust is not the issue because the anticipation matched the actual 
experience. The quality is a different consideration altogether and has nothing to 
do with building trust or diminishing trust as long as the anticipated outcome and 
experienced outcome are aligned. It could be quite different if transacting parties 
both expected good quality and one party delivered a poor quality product. In 
that case, the anticipation would not match the experience and an optimal trust 
transaction would not take place. In fact, according to Charney, the two are both 
important, but for different reasons.
“I’m a big believer that there is perception and reality and you have to 
achieve both. What I mean by that is, to achieve trust people have to
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basically trust your integrity and all these attributes we are talking about. 
How do you get them to do that? One is you need to encourage them to 
have those good feelings about you; and two, you have to reinforce it with 
your behaviour. If you market trust, if you market this car will run forever 
and you don’t do the things to make it happen, then it’s a scam and it’s 
bad... so my view is that you have to do the reality stuff and the 
perception stuff. You have to make business decisions and behave in an 
ethical way that reflects integrity. As a publicly traded company where 
your brand is an asset, you need to make sure that people know what you 
are doing.”
Here, Charney introduces the concept of marketing trust. Although an interesting 
topic in its own right, it will be explored here to support the concept of building an 
anticipation of performance and having a consistent experience to build trust. In 
his mind, a company (such as Dell, for example) invests a great deal of money 
and effort to market the company as trustworthy to potential customers. They do 
this by making statements regarding products and services (creating anticipation) 
and then acting in a manner consistent with those anticipations to reinforce the 
notion of trust (experienced trust). Perceptions are formed early (Hastie and 
Park 1996) and new information gleaned from further interactions either 
reinforces that impression (Hamilton et al. 1989) or changes it. Consider a 
scenario where a consumer intends to purchase a laptop from one of several 
vendors. The consumer may call Dell sales to gather information, call business
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associates that have Dell laptops, and may review customer satisfaction data on 
the web from companies like JD Power. Behind each of these interactions is a 
strategic effort to build trust in the consumer that is invested in by Dell. For 
instance, the Dell sales rep has probably been through weeks of intensive 
training to ensure trust is built with each answer to a question. The product and 
service satisfaction of existing customers is a focus of many companies trying to 
establish good “word of mouth” marketing. Customer satisfaction surveys are 
closely tracked by companies, and slogans such as “Trust Dell” are intended to 
create an anticipation of trustworthiness. The buyer has to trust the seller in 
many aspects. Katherine Stewart (2003) refers to the vulnerabilities a buyer 
assumes when purchasing goods form a seller, ranging from faulty products to 
poor service, to the seller sharing the buyer’s personal information with others. 
To help the buyer overcome these vulnerabilities, companies invest in creating 
the anticipation in the customer that they are trustworthy with the expectation that 
the consumer will see this level of commitment and form a positive early 
perception of the company. They then invest in downstream interactions (such 
as service) to insure the positive anticipation is reinforced with actual 
experiences -  where the anticipated trust is matched by the trust experienced. 
According to Charney, for his company’s brand (the Microsoft brand) to be 
perceived as worthy of consumer trust, the company has to market itself as 
trustworthy to create the positive perception that the company’s employees can 
then reinforce in practice. For Charney, anticipation and experience should be 
the same. Establishing an anticipation of trust may take place in every
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interaction by those companies wanting to create a positive perception in the 
mind of the consumer. There have been a flood of companies wanting to 
promote themselves as “green”, or caring for the environment. Certain 
companies actively promote their support of charities such as the Special 
Olympics with an expressed intention to demonstrate their values to the 
consuming public. This is consistent with Charney’s assertion that, “As a publicly 
traded company where your brand is an asset, you need to make sure that 
people know what you are doing.” It is an attempt to align the company’s values 
with those things that are important to the buyer in the hope that, through actively 
promoting these aligned areas of importance, the buyer will have a positive early 
perception of the company. When this positive early anticipation is matched with 
a positive experience with the company, it provides the opportunity for trust 
building.
In response to the questions regarding what actions build, reinforce or diminish 
trust, Charney supported the connection between anticipation and experience in 
building trust. He stated,
“The first and foremost thing is I like people who are just honest with me. 
They tell me the way it really is, and I find out -  yep that’s how it really is. 
What would reinforce [trust] or diminish it? It really has to do with -  is 
there something that I expect, or I need or want and they meet that or 
miss it. So, what happens when you mismanage expectations? You get a 
problem. If I tell you ‘if you fly my airline, the prices are cheap but 25% of
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the time you will be delayed about an hour’, you have a choice to make as 
a consumer. Here’s the ironic thing -  you say 'I’m going to fly their airline 
all the time because I save 25% and a quarter of the time they said we 
might be late’, and you find you are late only 10% of the time. What is 
your experience? I’m getting a deal -  it’s great. Your expectations have 
been managed. So to build trust it's a combination of what we tell people 
and then that the objective metrics either reinforce what we tell them or 
not.”
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the gap between anticipation and
experience having an impact on the amount of trust comes from Charney’s own
IT industry. As he tells the story,
“Let’s suppose that you tell a customer that you will make their problem 
right and you don’t even show up. It’s one thing that you showed up and 
you tried to make it right and you made it better but not quite right. So 
people say ’I need 99.99999% availability of my system -  it has to be up 
99.99999% of the time.’ They go ‘we bought your stuff -  we tried to 
deploy it -  we are up 98% of the time’. We go ‘we’ll make it right’. So now 
we say it will be five 9’s and you find 95%. So the variance is too great. 
We go, ‘Well, we might be able to get you up to 95.2’. They go, ‘We need 
a 99.9 -  you were so off. How could you be so off?’”
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This example ties in directly to the amount of variation between anticipation and 
experience being linked to the amount of trust. Having a substantial difference 
between the anticipated outcome and the experienced outcome will lead to a loss 
of trust and perhaps the loss of a customer. A slight variation may not be 
optimal, but it will probably not impact trust and maintain customer satisfaction.
For Nicholas Baring,
“[Trust is] the ability to take at face value what you read or are told about a 
particular part of the business without having to embark on an elaborate 
system of corroboration. In the end it's quite a narrow path you have to 
pursue between these two extremes. Inevitably [trust is diminished] by a 
failure to deliver in the short- or the long-term, and erratic performance.”
He is distinguishing between that which you are told being actually true, and 
having a system of oversight necessary to ensure that perception is met with 
reality. His use of the term “erratic performance” in discussing loss of trust is 
consistent with volatility resulting in less trust, providing further support for 
Mainelli’s proposition. As Doug Richard succinctly puts it, “Trust is diminished in 
very simple ways. People are empowered and take advantage of their trusted 
position and then do not live up to that trusted position”. Like the others, he 
agrees that the amount of trust is determined by the degree of difference 
between anticipation and experience. In this case he is referring to diminished
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trust, and it could be inferred that the corresponding increase in trust would occur 
if people live up to their trusted position.
The consistency of thought with the anticipated / experienced proposition comes 
from Michael MacSwiney in the form of a situation that he encounters in his job 
as accountant and consultant. It should be noted that throughout his interview, 
Mr MacSwiney used hypothetical names for real situations for privacy and 
confidentiality purposes. In this example, he describes a situation where a client 
can’t pay his bills and is quickly losing trust with his suppliers. MacSwiney 
stepped in and pointed out that the reason his suppliers are coming down hard is 
because the client is setting one expectation and then actually doing something 
different. The client’s fear is that if suppliers know what a difficult time he is 
having, they will stop supplying him with goods and services and put him out of 
business. Without referring to the anticipation / experience dynamic explicitly, 
MacSwiney recognises the need to optimally match expectation with reality, even 
if he has to downgrade the level of expectation (which is very similar to Rigby’s 
example where he had to manage the relationship back down to a lower, more 
realistic layer of expectation in order for the transacting parties to get back on 
Irack). If the anticipation is properly placed, and the actual experience is 
consistent with the anticipation, then there is an opportunity for trust to be 
regained. According to MacSwiney,
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“Trust is that something you do won’t be exploited or dealt with in a way 
different to a way that you trusted it would be. When a business is almost 
in irretrievable difficulties, the instinct of management is to lie -- to lie to 
bankers, to lie to suppliers, checks in the post. To lie to employees, ‘things 
aren't as bad as they look. We have a solution - we have some investors 
about to come in to help’. Or tell partial truths. When I go in to try and 
rescue a company in difficulties, you have to change that. I have always 
heard the comment, ‘If our suppliers had any idea of the position we are 
in, we would be out of business tomorrow’. If you sit there with a 
managing director and say ‘well, you are going to be out of business 
tomorrow as a matter of fact, so let's try to follow a sensible plan. Let's 
ring up your principal supplier -  here, I will do for you. I'm sitting here with 
Mr Smith who is with Smith Company. I'm sorry Mr Bloggins, I've been 
called in. We have very severe financial difficulties here. I know you are 
pressing for your money. We owe you 100,000 pounds. There is no way 
it can be paid. What we can do is try and sort out a position and see if we 
can rescue something’. I am told the response will always be expletives 
and ‘we are cutting supply immediately’. I don't believe that has ever 
happened to me when I've done it. Almost without exception the person 
on the other end of the line says ‘Oh God, poor Mr Smith. I thought he 
was in difficulties - how bad is the problem? Will you give us an exact 
report? Obviously we can't increase our exposure, but we'll continue to 
supply. Perhaps we can do the supplies now on a cash basis with what's
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there’. Why has that happened? Because one has told a simply 
disastrous situation and clearly you are not withholding anything. You 
explain the situation is so bad, there's nothing to be withheld. So, 
instantly, you are trusted because you fed that information. The moment 
that has happened you instantly have a base to sort things out. Quite 
often there is no trust at all at the start. His back was to the wall, but now 
we are doing what’s right. By cleaning up you can restore that trust.”
Support for the concepts of undertrustina and overtrustina 
In addition to uncovering evidence of support for anticipated trust and 
experienced trust, if the proposed optimal trust model is applicable to 
organisational environments in general, there should also be support for the 
concepts of overtrusting and undertrusting found in the executive interviews. 
Although not pervasive throughout the executives’ responses, both Baring and 
MacSwiney provide support for the notions of undertrusting and overtrusting. As 
one might recall, Baring’s Bank was brought down by a single individual (Nick 
Leeson) in Singapore making trades on behalf of the firm. As Baring describes 
the situation, it becomes clear that Baring overtrusted Leeson, where he 
anticipated that high trust was appropriate, when in actual fact it was discovered 
based on experience that there was very low trust that should have required 
significant safeguarding. A Baring puts it,
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“[The disadvantages of trust] largely arise where trust is mistakenly granted. 
And in those cases the results of the mistake can be more severe than they 
would be otherwise because the mistake is usually not spotted early enough 
on. There's always that thing you should always press when something 
appears to be better than you expect as well as if somebody [is] doing worse.”
Two other notions are of interest here. First, Baring introduces the idea of a 
temporal nature to overtrusting -  where he seems to suggest that once the 
perception of high trust is in place, there can be a significant time lag until 
enough actual information comes in to change the perception so it more optimally 
matches reality. In fact, so much time may go by that it will be too late -  as was 
the case with Barings. This points to the potential need for cues (or some 
mandatory minimum oversight function) to expeditiously monitor if one is 
overtrusting. Second, and Baring has mentioned this before, there is evidence of 
overtrusting in both the good news and the bad news. For Baring’s executive 
leadership, it was easy to feel that they were trusting appropriately -  the 
anticipated trust seemed to be paying off big in actual financial terms -  until that 
one moment where the fraud was uncovered and the bank fell. Baring’s point is 
that actual performance that exceeds everyone’s expectation is also a potential 
indicator of trouble, and could be the result of overtrusting. MacSwiney seems to 
back this up when he states,
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“A con man will generate actions such that you trust him, but you've made a 
mistake. What can sometimes happen is you’ve mistakenly misplaced your 
trust.”
Support for the concept of optimal trust
It is the intention of this section to build the case for optimal trust based on the 
key constructs and across multiple executive responses. Although no executive 
(except for Mainelli) referred to optimal trust explicitly in name, some responses 
could be considered consistent with an operational notion of optimal trust. The 
following statement by Martin Rigby could be interpreted as support for the idea 
that somewhere between formal management contracts [safeguards -  less trust] 
and less contractual influence [vulnerability -  more trust] there is an optimal trust 
level for the transaction. Rigby describes the dynamics of venture capital 
management as such:
“With a high value investment where you've got more formal management 
or contractual arrangements, you have to trust less. The mandatory degree 
of trust is reduced because the contract is underpinning it, whereas if all 
you've just got is ordinary shares and less contractual influence, you have 
to trust a very high degree because you are relying on the management to 
communicate with you to fulfil that side of the bargain”.
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And in fact, optimal trust doesn’t have to be high trust either. As long as the 
anticipated trust and experienced trust are matched, optimal trust can still exist 
and a transaction can still take place. Rigby’s example of the Appleby Horse Fair 
illustrates this point.
“If you go to the Appleby Horse Fair - the Appleby Horse Fair which is a 
horse fair in the north of England where typically Irish tinkers and some 
other people come together for one weekend and they buy and sell 
horses. This is a very disparate group of people who come from all over 
England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland and although the communities do 
know each other, nonetheless it's a real caveat emptor culture. What you 
see is what you buy. If it turns out bad, that's your problem. The culture is 
quite clear. The degree of trust is very low - deliberately very low. That's 
about as low as you get when it comes to trust. That is what makes this 
liquid fast efficient market work. You don't have to have much trust. You 
see what one party’s got. You know what it is. You buy it.”
In short, a “liquid fast” market with efficient transactions can exist even at very 
low trust levels, as long as anticipated and experienced trust levels are matched.
Doug Richard provides support for the concept of optimal trust as well. He was 
trying to describe how he measures trust in his organisation, and his answer 
could be interpreted in at least two different ways.
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“How do you measure trust? I'll tell you what you can do - you can note 
whether it is going up or down over a period of time as between both 
individuals and generally within the context of the corporation, and you do 
it through the proxies of people's behaviours. There's a certain type of 
behaviour... I think of it as an emergent property of a company where 
people trust one another. I happen to be into emergent properties these 
days, complex systems. I believe that what bubbles out of a trusting 
company is a series of ways of working, where things are uncommonly 
efficient, where the business hums, where people just go and get done 
what needs to get done, where they've worked out all those trivialisations 
that we hear about endlessly.”
Taken one way, Richard is referring to trust going up and down -  moving along a 
spectrum of more or less trust -  and then something different emerges and the 
company becomes exponentially efficient. It could be argued that this 
emergence is actually the point when the company reaches optimal trust among 
all constituencies.
This section included a description of three key components of the proposed 
optimal trust theory and found evidence of support from the senior executives for 
each of these components. The executive reports provided support for the 
importance of matching transacting parties’ anticipated trust with the trust
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experienced. Support for the concepts of undertrusting and overtrusting was 
also presented, as was evidence of support for the concept of optimal trust in 
general. Establishing this support among the executives provides some 
foundation for the validity of optimal trust in general and specifically the optimal 
trust model proposed in this chapter.
Analysis of Responses
The image presented at the beginning of the previous subheading is a 
representation of a sketch made by Mainelli to describe the three concepts of 
undertrusting, overtrusting and optimal trust. The optimal trust parabola is 
reminiscent of Tomkins’ (2001) inverted U-shaped graphic that shows the 
evolving relationship between control and trust. Although it is a reasonable 
graphic to quickly describe the meaning Mainelli is attempting to communicate, 
further consideration illuminates a need for clarification. The graphic is intended 
to show that misalignment of anticipated and experienced trust results in 
undertrusting and overtrusting, while alignment of anticipated trust and 
experienced trust results in optimal trust. The graphic may have more 
usefulness as depicted below in Figure 4, with the level of anticipated trust on the 
x-axis and the level of experienced trust on the y-axis. Presented this way, 
optimal trust is not bound by high trust or low trust. For example, as described 
by Rigby earlier in this chapter, there are certain markets that are very efficient 
operating at low levels of trust because the anticipation and experience of 
transacting parties are aligned. As long as this is the case, there can be both
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optimal high trust transactions and optimal low trust transactions. This supports 
the findings of Uzzi (1996) where optimal trust relationships are not defined 
exclusively by close relationships or distant relationships, but rather are inclusive 
of both. Further, it is consistent with Wicks et al. (1999), albeit a new 
representation, in that optimal trust requires a matched fit. For Wicks et al., 
optimal trust requires a fit between interdependence and trust level. The optimal 
trust concept presented here requires a fit between anticipation and experience 
for optimal trust to be achieved.
Figure 3: Optimai trust path in quadrants
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It is proposed that the Figure 4 above is a more accurate representation of how
trust operates in and between organisations than what is proposed by Mainelli.
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This assertion is based on the executive reports, incorporating some tenets of 
the Mainelli model and the descriptions and characterisations from the other 
interviewees. The line bisecting quadrant 2 and quadrant 3 is an optimal trust 
path that is reached when anticipated trust and experienced trust are matched, 
regardless of whether the match occurs at a low level of trust or a high level of 
trust. Undertrust or overtrust can occur when anticipated trust and experienced 
trust are not matched. Doug Richard shared a story from his early business 
career that will help illustrate each of the four quadrants in practice. Richard was 
approached by an individual requesting a software program to help people 
understand what their bodies would look like after performing a particular diet 
regimen for certain periods of time. Although this may be considered 
commonplace today, in the late 1980s it was quite a substantial request. Richard 
felt he could help him, but wasn’t sure of the outcome. He asked for a very 
reasonable retainer to start work, and would let the customer know if creating 
such a program was possible. The client had done a bit of background work on 
Richard and knew he ran a small but successful business. Richard’s background 
check on the client showed him to be a reputable person in his chosen field and 
matched nicely the description he gave of himself. This established a sufficient 
level of anticipated trust for the transaction to take place. In time Richard 
completed the work and the client paid the full amount Richard was due. In this 
case, the anticipated level of trust was met with the experienced level of trust, 
and both the supplier and customer were pleased with the outcome. This
186
transaction would probably fall somewhere on the optimal trust line in Quadrant II 
as shown below.
Figure 4: Optimal high trust
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Now assume that Richard took the fair retainer and never intended to spend a 
minute looking into the software solution. In this case, the client would be 
severely overtrusting, where he anticipated that Richard was highly trustworthy, 
but he was actually a fraud. This transaction would fall in Quadrant IV (as shown 
below) because the anticipated amount of trust was very different than the low 
experienced amount of trust warranted.
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Figure 5: Overtrust
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In the next scenario, assume that Richard intended to do everything promised, 
but the client demanded extraordinary oversight and contractual requirements for 
the project. In fact, 80% of the total project cost would be consumed by lawyer’s 
fees just to negotiate the contract. There would be little reason for Richard to 
take on a money-losing project. In this case, the client would be undertrusting 
and the transaction would fall in Quadrant I as shown below.
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Figure 6: Undertrust
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In the final scenario, consider that the client knew very little about Richard, but 
with significant safeguards is willing to take the risk just the same. Richard 
knows nothing about the client and is not particularly satisfied with all the costs 
associated with the restrictive safeguards, but wants to see for himself if he can 
master the software challenge that the project presented. Richard takes the job 
with much less profit than he would normally get, and the client is satisfied with 
the safeguards in place to complete the transaction. In this case, the anticipated 
trust and experienced trust are low but still optimally matched for a transaction to 
take place, as shown below.
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Figure 7: Optimal low trust
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This model also allows for transactions to move from low trust to high trust and 
back again, based on actions taken by the transacting parties, and remains 
optimal as long as the anticipation and experience are matched. This is 
consistent with Rigby’s example of salvaging a transaction among mismatched 
parties where,
“If you don't trust that person as much, somehow you've got to manage the 
relationship back down to a layer of less trust with a more formal exchange of 
information and decision making. More investigating, more due diligence, 
more contracts, without [angering them] and making them feel untrustworthy 
or unvalued."
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Summary
This representation of trust incorporates and extends some of the concepts from 
the existing optimal trust literature (Uzzi 1996; Adobor 2006; Wicks et al. 1999), 
and introduces novel contributions from the executive reports. The proposed 
optimal trust continuum may be of a high or low degree, where transactions can 
take place at any point along the optimal path and maintain optimal value. It is 
an iterative and experiential process in that one draws on experience to work 
toward an optimal trust path. The validity of the model will be considered in 
Chapter 10 of this thesis. The data presented here represents a novel 
contribution to the optimal trust literature by introducing an optimal trust model 
which proposes an optimal trust path based on the degree of match between 
anticipated trust levels and experienced trust levels. It incorporates Wicks et al.’s 
(1999) optimal trust concept of fit, but relies on anticipated and experienced trust 
levels instead of interdependence and trust levels. The model also goes beyond 
Adobor’s (2006) reliance on anticipated transaction uncertainty by incorporating 
experience into the model. Although the other executives provide support for the 
key components of the optimal trust model in their reports, further research will 
need to be conducted reinforce the validity of the proposed optimal trust model. 
Chapter 8 that follows explores why executives think that trust is important by 
analysing their claims of the economic value of trust.
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CHAPTER 8: Economic Value of Trust
Economic Impacts of Trust
Building on the understanding of the nature of trust established in the previous 
three chapters, the purpose of this chapter is to explore why executives think 
trust is important by evaluating the potential economic impact trust has on 
organisations and analyse results from the executive interviews to report the 
similarities, differences and novel conceptualisations and compare them with 
widely cited contributors to the field.
Executive Reports
Each of the senior executive respondents spoke freely and openly about the 
importance of trust and the economic impacts it has on the organisation. Several 
of the interviewees described discrete values that trust has in the work 
environment, and a few of the impacts were mentioned on several occasions.
According to several respondents, and consistent with the studies conducted by 
Dyer (1997), Zaheer et al. (1998), and Dyer and Chu (2003), a high level of trust 
in a business relationship reduces costs associated with contract negotiations. 
The sales cycle associated with a company’s products and services can be one 
of the largest costs for any organisation. The same is true for investments made 
by venture capitalists in start-up companies. A typical sales process can involve
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multiple visits to a customer location, several presentations, development of a 
proposal, creation of a contract, the use of expensive attorneys, multiple reviews 
and negotiation cycles, and many other activities that may decrease the 
profitability of the business. It therefore stands to reason that a reduction in any 
part of the sales cycle will positively impact a company’s bottom line. Typically 
the first transaction in the relationship is the most expensive, where the principals 
in the organisations might require extensive and costly safeguards as they get to 
know one another better. It might be reasonable to assert that as the trust in the 
relationship grows, the need for costly safeguards (such as multiple visits, 
restrictive contracts and elaborate oversight measures) would diminish over time. 
Martin Rigby supports this by observing
“We get to this point where we have this shared understanding of the 
business objectives, where it's trying to go, which is both practical in the 
sense that we do understand the operating plan, but it’s also cultural in the 
sense that we understand how the management will behave and what 
they will do, and we are confident that they will behave in what they do. 
That collectively allows us to undertake transactions with the management 
which are quick - to the point. I don't have any great legal underpinning in 
decision making so they can be done quickly and effectively and leave the 
bureaucracy to catch up later to the degree that it is necessary. Of 
course, the bureaucracy itself may be extra slim - an exchange of letters 
as opposed to being some form of legal agreement. That's all I'm trying to
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say is that, invest once using trust to understand and respect and then you 
can do a whole series of transactions on that pool of trust and 
understanding as opposed to having to do due diligence and negotiate a 
contract every time. You can reinvest that acquisition of knowledge and 
trust into a series of decisions or contractual changes or things between 
you. You can choose this systemised pool of knowledge, respect, and 
trust. Whereas without that, every single transaction has to have due 
diligence and contract negotiation repeated.”
Michael MacSwiney echoes Rigby’s observation of efficient contracting with
trusted individuals.
“As a professional now, half of all effort in professional offices is covering 
your back, getting letters of indemnity, escape clauses, caveats, building a 
file to protect every decision, and not making very fast deals where a lot of 
research is not done, a lot of guessing. As an accountant you don't go 
and have a day's meeting with people speaking every language and put a 
deal together and shake and confirm it without having done all the 
homework, but you do if you have a man with a level of trust that is so 
high that you know there can never be an issue of risk.”
Michael Mainelli points to trust as a potential competitive advantage for the 
business in deal making when he remarked:
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“There's something to do with the time it takes you to arrive at a deal. 
Trust is certainly becoming an area of competition in the sense that one 
could argue that you are providing efficiency.”
Another area where trust might impact the economic performance of a company 
is in hiring practices. The actual activities associated with hiring new
professionals to work at a business can be intensive. Posting job
advertisements, reviewing resumes, interviewing dozens of potential candidates 
-  the process can be daunting. Even then there is no assurance that an 
employee will be productive and trustworthy. Doug Richard has found trust to be 
an important element in reducing the costs and improving the results of the hiring 
process.
“I no longer hire on references. I no longer hire on accomplishments. I 
hire solely on the personal advice of a person I already trust. I believe that 
there are huge efficiencies in trust. How much effort is it to hire 
somebody? Head hunters and sourcing and interviewing and reference 
checking... it’s endless. And what do you end up with? Why do you do all 
this? To weed out people you can't trust. Sure, you try to weed out 
people who aren't competent, but you know what? It's easy to find 
competence. It's impossible to find people who are both competent and 
who will put the interests of the business first... who you can trust with a
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portion of the asset that you’ve created. Because I am giving him my 
brand to do something with, and he could easily (mess) it up if he doesn't 
act on our behalf.”
Sometimes hiring is positive because the business is growing and additional staff 
members are required to meet the terms of a new contract or an increase in 
demand for the company’s products and services. In other cases, however, 
hiring is the result of unwanted turnover -  where the company can’t retain 
employees due to some internal dysfunction. Michael MacSwiney describes the 
importance of retention this way:
“Nobody leaves this office. It's been a goal. Trust generates a well-being. 
A high turnover of staff for a professional office is the single most 
expensive and highest risk item here. If you've got employees who have 
been with you for ten years you know how they perform, you know their 
job. You are not wasting time training, wasting time teaching them, you’re 
not having to develop new relationships with customers. Your existing 
employee and your existing customer are your most valuable assets. 
Your new employee and your new customer are the most expensive ones 
to sort out or service or organise."
Among other factors, when trust is present in the organisation staff members 
may have a greater desire to stay with that company. The costs and risks of
poor retention may be avoided if people are trusted. In the absence of trust, 
employees might feel unconnected and seek other opportunities. Scott Charney 
illustrates this point by stating:
“If people don't trust their management, especially if they think their 
management is unethical, then they don't want to work there especially if 
they think they'll get in trouble. Would you want to work at Enron if you 
knew what was going on? You would want to get out as soon as you can. 
Then there are the other elements of disrespect and morale. Your 
management may be doing nothing unethical and illegal, but they mistreat 
you with disrespect in a trust sense. They don't share decisions with you. 
They don't make you part of the process because it reflects that they don't 
trust your judgment or are not interested in what you are thinking. If your 
management lies to you, it doesn’t have to be illegal, it could just be ‘we 
are going to go do this, that, and the other thing’ and then they change 
direction and never tell you or they keep you in the dark. You lose trust in 
your management that you are in the loop. It makes it harder to do your 
job because you don't have the facts you need. You don't know the 
direction of the company.”
Based on the executive reports, trust also seems to allow the structures of 
organisations to be more flat than low trust organisations with multiple layers of 
people responsible for oversight. Businesses with multiple layers are sometimes
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referred to as “top heavy”, where the more senior management that you have 
involved in oversight and decision making, the less responsibility one bears when 
a poor decision is made. These companies may experience slower growth and 
less profitability because of the multiple layers of sign-off that must occur for 
every decision. Doug Richard distinguishes between organisational structures 
consistent with high-trust and low-trust environments.
“Trust permits independence. Trust permits the empowerment of the 
employee. Trust permits a flatter organisation of layers because people 
can have more people under their management. It permits a huge 
number of things that in its absence makes it more costly and less 
efficient. Therefore, it is a core element of profitability. It’s a core element 
of pace of growth. Trust becomes the underlying mechanism by which 
companies are either fast growth or not. The most effective businesses in 
the world are the ones where the fewest number of people can do the 
most amount, and view themselves as being in a position to solve as 
many problems as possible, as often as possible, without reference to 
anyone else, on the behalf and for the benefit of the business. 
Businesses that act effectively in that way tend to outgrow all other 
businesses. It translates to the very core of the business. We are faster 
growing...our revenue grows faster, our costs don’t grow as fast, we are 
making more profit than were we to organise ourselves in a different way 
where we did not invest the time and effort in trusting individuals and
creating a community of people who trust each other. Economic values 
are on top line and bottom line, and those are the only two lines that I 
believe exist in a corporation.”
It was also suggested in the executive reports that trust allows the company to 
respond to changes in the market more quickly. Market changes are inevitable -  
the needs of consumers are constantly evolving. These changes can create new 
opportunities for fast responders and signal the demise of those companies 
unprepared for rapid decision making. Martin Rigby observed:
“It means they are quick to market and quick on their feet and more 
adaptable. It’s the classic business of being able to out-manoeuvre large 
corporations because the trust component in a smaller organisation 
means that information can be shared more quickly and evaluated more 
quickly and new plans are put into place more quickly -  change direction 
more quickly -- and for us that's absolutely right. When it works then the 
communication back to us as the investor compliments and reinforces that 
nimbleness of foot in the development of the business.”
The stock markets around the world can be volatile. Watching the New York and 
London exchanges respond to lower than expected earnings reports from 
companies provides ample evidence. When a company gives an early indication 
of earnings performance, it is usually based on the best information available, yet
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investors sometimes react as if the company was trying to intentionally deceive 
them with their estimates when they are not met. Many factors lead to an 
investor’s decision to sell a stock, and it was observed that one of those 
considerations is the trust the investor has in the company. According to Michael 
MacSwiney, high trust may result in financial stability and longer term investor 
relationships.
“The economic advantages in the long term are shareholders become 
trusting of what you are doing and they believe you when you tell them 
what you are doing. They will accept short term failure in profits because 
they believe the long term motivation and behaviour of management is 
sound. And, whereas if you are not a trustworthy lot, the moment they see 
something going wrong, they assume there is much more so you are 
much more volatile. It’s stability - the long term growth might be better 
than expected in the industry it's in. The risk is slightly less than would be 
the norm for the industry it's in because they may find if you are a 
trustworthy, decent organisation, you can weather a storm much better."
Nicholas Baring described it this way:
“I think one of the sad things about business today is that trust between 
shareholders and its public company and management and boards is very 
much reduced. Everyone is happy as long as profits are increasing. As
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soon as the business hits a rough patch, there's an immediate inclination to 
blame somebody in the corporation. That's trust on a more macro level. 
It's in part brought on by management sometimes having them take 
advantage of their position and not putting the shareholder’s interests first. 
You get a combination of very high rewards in the short-term. That's a very 
fragile relationship which can shatter at any time. In the past there was a 
much greater willingness to live through the difficult times in part because 
of trust.”
Martin Rigby, discussing the economic value of trust, made a very important 
point that not prominent in the literature: The greatest cost of a lack of trust in a 
relationship is not the increased cost of the transaction itself, it is in the lost 
opportunity cost of performing non-value added activities instead of those actions 
that contribute to the core value proposition of growing the business. Rigby 
observed
“The whole goal is to maximise the capital profit from selling the shares of 
the business either by IPO or by trade sale. Therefore, the reason why 
this is unattractive is less about the fact that it costs money to do due 
diligence and set up contracts every time. It's more to do with the fact that 
this is a real waste of management time. What we want to do is for them 
to concentrate on the evolution of the enterprise, and it is the opportunity 
cost of their time and effort and dealing with us engaging in complex
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transactions which is what we want to avoid. Transaction cost is a 
drawback not so much because of the economic value, the direct 
economic cost of the transaction, but because of the opportunity cost in 
management time of getting management engaged in complex set of due 
diligence and contractual negotiations.”
This critical assertion regarding lost opportunity cost will be examined more fully 
in the analysis section of this chapter.
Analysis of Responses
The executive responses tend to demonstrate concordance with the literature 
that suggests trust has economic impacts on organisations. There was particular 
recognition of the importance of trust in reducing contracting and negotiation 
costs, which supports the findings of Dyer and Chu (2003). As reported by Dyer 
(1997), these executives agree that transactions have elements of trust and 
safeguards, and the more trust that is present, the fewer costly safeguards are 
necessary and the costs of the transaction are therefore reduced. There was 
acknowledgement by the executives that trust plays an important role in the 
organisation and that it reduces costs when present and increases costs when 
absent. These reports are consistent with the findings of Zaheer et al. (1998), 
Dirks and Ferrin (2001), and Costigan et al. (1998). In general, these senior 
executives seem to support the breadth of economic values of trust described in 
the literature.
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The activities and economic impacts of trust reported by the senior executives 
are presented in Table 7.
Table 7. Activity and Reported Economic Impact of Trust
Activity Reported Economic Impact of Trust
Contracting & Negotiation Invest in trust early and you can do a 
number of transactions on that pool of 
trust. Reduces legal fees. Fewer 
resources are expended and over a 
shorter time. Doing deals faster may 
be a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace.
Hiring Practices Hiring on the recommendation of 
trusted individuals reduces the number 
of activities necessary to hire and may 
result in better candidates. Paying 
large fees for services such as head 
hunters is avoided.
Retention Employees and customers tend to stay 
with the company longer when there is 
trust. Costs associated with
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severance, hiring, training and selling 
are reduced when turnover is low.
Flattening the organisation Trust allows for fewer people to be 
responsible for more activities -  it 
reduces the need for multiple layers of 
expensive management oversight. 
Allows for greater profitability.
Rapid adaptation to change When trust is pervasive throughout the 
organisation, people have greater 
autonomy in decision-making and can 
respond faster to changes in the 
market. Responding to changing 
market requirements faster than the 
competition is seen as a great 
advantage.
Greater financial stability It was suggested that the more the 
company is trusted by investors, the 
more likely they are to hold their stock 
during rough periods. Share price 
stability during difficult times is of great 
economic value to the organisation.
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These executive reports support the notion that the economic value of trust 
seems to flow through multiple constituencies of the organisation, from managers 
to employees to investors. This builds on the findings of Janowicz-Panjaitan and 
Krishnan (2009) that suggest a trickle-down effect where the poor handling of a 
trust violation at a senior level can negatively impact trust at lower levels of the 
organisation. Given this, taking a holistic approach to trust dynamics in the 
organisation may present a valuable and comprehensive view of how trust and 
distrust work through an organisation. Reducing transaction costs associating 
with contracting is important, but what impact does that isolated event have on 
the other constituencies and the hundreds of other related activities that take 
place in the organisation? It could be argued that trust among constituencies is 
interconnected -  that it is inextricably linked. As such, building trust with one 
constituency could have direct or indirect effects on other constituencies, adding 
an exponential dimension to the economic impacts of trust building and trust 
diminishing activities. Consistent with Robsen (2008), it was reported by the 
senior executives that trust allows for fewer people and a flatter organisation. A 
trusted employer may retain employees longer that are more productive than 
new hires, which is consistent with Uzzi (1996) and Costigan et al. (1998). 
Employees that are trusted might be empowered to make decisions efficiently 
resulting in rapid adaptation to changing market needs. Meeting the needs of the 
marketplace faster may create a competitive advantage that could result in 
growing revenues which meet investor expectations. Investors that trust 
management might continue to buy stock and may hold their positions during the
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inevitable rough patch, thus giving the company financial stability where other 
less trusted competitors may fall far behind. These executives acknowledge the 
interconnectedness of constituencies and that trust (or distrust) can have a ripple 
effect throughout the organisation. This seems to support the value and 
appropriateness of a holistic, interconnected-constituencies approach to studying 
trust.
Consistent with this notion of a more holistic approach to studying trust, Martin 
Rigby expanded the impact boundary by asserting that direct transaction costs 
don’t necessarily have the greatest economic impact on the business -  lost 
opportunity costs may do the real damage. An easy way to describe lost 
opportunity costs is to answer the question -  ‘What productive activities could 
have been performed while carrying out non-productive activities?’ Rigby 
suggests that there is an added cost to safeguarding activities that are carried 
out because insufficient trust exists in the relationship, and this added cost may 
be greater than the direct transaction costs themselves. Consider a business 
scenario where the owner of a business has high turnover because trust has 
been compromised among key staff. Instead of selling products and services to 
new customers and expanding the business, the owner is instead working with a 
search firm to find candidates, conducting interviews, negotiating terms of 
employment, training the new hires, managing through disrupted productivity 
problems, and all of the other activities associated with hiring. The activities
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themselves certainly have direct transaction costs, but one should consider the 
costs associated with lost sales opportunities as well.
Carrying forward the example above, as the business owner tries to address high 
turnover, productivity may decrease, negatively effecting employee morale and 
revenue growth. As described by the executives, missing revenue and earnings 
targets could have a dramatic effect on investor confidence and stability, 
particularly in a company where low levels of trust take away a potential buffer 
against hard times. In the absence of investor trust, the overall financial stability 
of the enterprise could be threatened.
The model of optimal trust presented in Chapter 6 also provides a concept 
worthy of consideration in terms of the economic value of trust to the 
organisation. If one considers an optimal amount of trust for every transaction, 
researchers can begin to study the process for charting an optimal trust path as 
well as what criteria might steer the relationship on and off course. Defining the 
costs of under-trusting and over-trusting could lead to informed decisions on how 
much to invest in the trust relationship, and whether or not there will be a 
reasonable return to that investment in trust. Adopting such a model could 
change the types of decisions that are made by businesses, and alter the 
risk/reward strategies employed. When combined with the assertion that direct 
transaction costs are compounded by lost opportunity costs, the value of defining 
an optimal level of trust for each transaction becomes paramount.
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Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the potential economic impacts trust 
has on organisations and analyse results from the executive interviews to explore 
the consistencies, inconsistencies and novel conceptualisations with widely cited 
contributors to the field. The executive reports provided a wide variety of impacts 
that supported and expanded on the potential benefits that appear in the 
literature. These executives seem to support the notion that research into the full 
breadth of impacts that trust has on the organisation is warranted, and the 
interconnected relationships of trust and the impacts on these connected 
constituencies should continue to be explored. Consistent with the literature, 
trust was reported by these executives to have a direct impact on the costs of 
contracting, negotiating, employee and customer retention, organisational size 
and structure, adaptation to change and financial stability. It was asserted that 
direct transaction costs are compounded by the lost opportunity costs arising 
from attention to non-productive activities such as safeguarding due to a lack of 
trust. The conclusion drawn here is that, as the literature validates for other 
groups studied, senior executives report that trust has multiple economic impacts 
on the organisation. The most noteworthy novel contribution is the potential 
importance of lost opportunity costs that occur when there is insufficient trust in 
the relationship. This concept is not readily apparent in the literature. Based on 
these executive reports, it appears that further study into lost opportunity costs 
may add an additional dimension to the economic impacts of trust on the 
organisation.
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CHAPTER 9: Metaphors and Trust
Uses of Metaphors
Having explored the nature of trust and why executives think trust is important, 
this chapter will continue to build on our understanding of trust by reporting the 
senior executives’ discourse of trust by analysing their use of trust metaphors. 
The senior executives that participated in this study used a variety of metaphors 
to convey their trust perceptions and experiences. Given the potential 
significance of metaphor usage, this chapter is dedicated to analysing the 
metaphors that appeared in the executive interviews with the intention of possibly 
providing a novel approach to understanding how the executives think about trust 
in their organisations.
Executive Reports
Consistent with the process and structure used by Gibson (2001), the metaphors 
used by the executives were pulled directly from transcribed interviews, placed 
into general categories and then labelled with key identifying terms. The method 
proposed by Shen (1992) was followed where metaphors were first organised 
using less stable ad hoc categories to expand the possibility of connection 
between and understanding of one thing in terms of another. After these 
connections were established, the metaphors were placed into more general 
categories. The general categories that were created, and which all the
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executives’ metaphors can be allocated to are (1) Science Metaphors, (2) 
Engineering/System/Spatial Metaphors, (3) Religious Metaphors, (4) Financial 
Metaphors, (5) War/Violence Metaphors, and (6) Mixed/Idiosyncratic Metaphors. 
The general categories and examples of the relevant corresponding labels are 
listed below. To arrive at the categories, an analysis was conducted on the 
transcribed executive interviews. Using the definitions of metaphors described 
above, every executive response was analysed and the metaphors were 
extracted. Each metaphor was assigned a key word or phrase relating to the 
metaphor used (ad hoc categorisation). For instance, metaphors were assigned 
representations such as entropy, flexor, evangelist, trust account, currency, and 
weapon. These were not arbitrary assignments, but rather specific words or 
phrases pulled from the metaphor that best represented the overall comparison 
of one thing to another that constituted the metaphor. Each of the assigned 
words and phrases were further analysed and placed into the more general 
categories of Science Metaphors, Engineering/System/Spatial Metaphors, 
Religious Metaphors, Financial Metaphors, War/Violence Metaphors, and 
Mixed/idiosyncratic Metaphors. The six general categories are listed below 
together with a category definition and the representative key words and phrases 
that determined their placement. The full list of metaphors placed in context from 
the executive reports appears in the Appendix of this thesis. It should be noted 
that this may be a novel contribution to the trust literature as a comprehensive 
review yielded no papers on the subject of executives’ uses of metaphors to 
describe trust in their organisations. I have followed, where appropriate, the
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guidance of Gibson (2001) and Shen (1992) to devise the processes of metaphor 
categorisation and presentation.
Science Metaphors - are metaphors where the objects or processes used in the 
metaphor are associated with the physical or biological sciences. Examples of 
terms from executive metaphors that fit into the Science Metaphors category 
include: entropy, biology, natural and physical, liquid-fast, litmus test, fragile, and 
weather.
Engineering/System/Spatial Metaphors - are metaphors where the objects or 
processes used in the metaphor are associated with engineering or technology. 
This category can also include metaphors that contain systems or spatial 
references. Precision and predictability are common concepts derived from the 
metaphors. Examples of terms that fit into the Engineering/System/Spatial 
Metaphors category include: process, object, adhesive bond, flexor, spectrum, 
pendulum swing, distance, functional, matching mechanism, managing back, 
layer, nimble, integrity shift, topping-up, level, placement, step to slide, creep, 
construction, cycle, soaring on the back, driver, slide, technology, networks, 
interest alignment, semi-autonomy, sweet spot, cavity, machine, lubricant, 
macro/micro, fence, circle, aggregate, asymmetry and touch point.
Religious Metaphors -  are metaphors where the objects or processes used in the 
metaphor are associated with spirituality. This category can include metaphors
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that invoke religious imagery or language related to religious texts. Examples of 
terms that fit into the Religious Metaphors category include: reverential, casting 
bread upon water, turning the other cheek, evangelist, burdens of doctrine, sin, 
Saints, sacrament of marriage, crucifixion, Bible, faith and fervour.
Financial Metaphors -  are metaphors where the objects or processes used in the 
metaphor are associated with business finance, banking or investment. 
Examples of terms that fit into the Financial Metaphors category include: balance 
sheet, profit and loss, trust account, base currency, matter of coin, trust bank, 
endowed accounts, borrowing, start with positive account, investment, flexible 
accounts, exchange, key to trust vault, currency, pool of trust, value, cost, 
arbitrage, transaction, and credit.
WarA/iolence Metaphors -  are metaphors where the objects or processes used 
in the metaphor are associated with violence, harm or fighting. Examples of 
terms that fit into the WarA/iolence Metaphors category include: body blow, 
weapon, vulnerability, big stick, military, fragile, breaking, bodily harm, burning, 
sexual assault, and shattering.
Mixed/ldiosvncratic Metaphors -  are metaphors that either fit into multiple 
categories or no particular category. Examples of terms that belong in the 
Mixed/Idiosyncratic Metaphors category include: permission, game, voyeur, tribal
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trust, colour, short-hand, joint enterprise, exposure, cleaning-up, cooking, feeling, 
brand, herd, and relevance.
Analysis of Responses3
Metaphors serve a number of important functions in conveying complexities that 
are not easily comprehended. As described in previous chapters of this thesis, 
trust can be perceived as a diffuse topic that is difficult to grasp, particularly in the 
way that it is manifested in the organisational environment. It is not unusual, 
then, that the executives chose to employ multiple types of metaphors in order to 
convey complex ideas so that their points would be more easily comprehended. 
Of interest are the types of metaphors used, how they could be categorised in 
the manner above, and the purposes behind the use of particular metaphors 
given key characteristics of the metaphor.
Roberts and Kreuz (1994) created a goal taxonomy that allowed 158 subjects to 
specify the discourse goals they wanted to achieve by using certain figures of 
speech, including metaphors. This study explored why people chose to use 
metaphors and what they were hoping the listener would take away as a result. 
The most prevalent reasons reported for using metaphors were (1) to clarify, (2) 
to add interest, (3) to provoke thought, (4) to compare similarities, and (5) to be 
eloquent. Taken together, these are all discourse goals that are oriented toward
3 The limited number of literature citations in this section is reflective of the fact that this is a novel 
contribution to the trust literature that has not been considered in other studies at the time of this writing.
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helping the listener understand a concept the speaker wants to convey. It could 
be argued that eloquence is more of a selfish perception-oriented goal, but 
speaking eloquently can also allow for greater comprehension by the listener.
After analysing the content of the science metaphors, it can be seen that the 
executives may have been attempting to convey trust as a dynamic and evolving 
part of the work environment. This is characterised by statements such as trust 
is like entropy, it grows, it permeates the permeable membrane of a business, 
whereas dishonesty is like a cancer that needs to be excised, it causes the death 
of the business, and it is degenerative. The science metaphors used by the 
executives were also very elaborate and used eloquent language to great effect. 
Doug Richard states that trust is
“like entropy -  that of its own, in the absence of knowledge, in the 
absence of information, in the absence of clarity, in the absence of goals 
people can reach, in the absence of achievements they can be rewarded 
for, in the absence of structures, cultural structures, that reward the people 
that everyone knows are doing a good job, and punish the people that are 
not, that there is a sense of fairness and equity in the world, people will 
inevitably distrust”.
Stating that trust is like entropy -  or in a constant state of dynamic and inevitable 
deterioration -  invokes an image of trust always trending toward extinction but for
the sustained efforts of individuals wanting to build trust. This metaphor infers 
that trust requires constant attention and effort to fight against trust’s natural 
tendency to disintegrate and fall into distrust. He goes on to say that the edge of 
a business is a “permeable membrane” through which trust and distrust flow 
freely to other parts of the business both internally and externally. Richard 
specifically points out that, in science, cell walls have permeable membranes that 
allow for easy passage, whereas impermeable membranes stop whatever comes 
in contact with them. He states emphatically that “the edge of a business is very, 
very permeable”. In other words, a single indiscretion tolerated inside the 
business can quickly leak through the permeable membrane of the business and 
into the external world of customers, suppliers and shareholders. The use of the 
permeable membrane and cell metaphor add a living, dynamic dimension to the 
metaphor that other metaphors might not (such as an open door or window). On 
the opposite end of the spectrum, distrust is portrayed as a degenerative disease 
capable of killing a business. Although this metaphor could be seen as any 
degenerative disease, the most immediate candidate to the interviewer was 
cancer. Taken with the previous metaphor associated with permeable 
membranes of cells, the use of these particular science-based metaphors spell 
out an interesting trust and distrust dynamic as described by the executives. 
Trust and distrust are not containable -  the impact of a single act can multiply 
inside (Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan 2009) and outside the organisation. If 
the acts are beneficial, they could provide value and improve the overall health of 
the organisation. If they are detrimental, however, they could do irreparable
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damage to the organisation over time. If trust is perceived as stationary, dormant 
or passive, it would not be considered a dynamic and evolving part of the 
business, which is a concept that the executives wanted to convey. These 
particular science metaphors were used to draw a clear distinction between the 
business living a healthy life (with trust) and catching the degenerative disease of 
distrust resulting in death.
The use of engineering, system and spatial metaphors were used by the 
executives in some cases to introduce an analytical and predictive character to 
the discussion of trust in the organisation. Trust is described as a step function, 
a step-phase change, a forcing function, a complex system, a mechanism for 
growth, a flexor, and a matching mechanism. Trust is subject to pendulum 
swings, operating across a defined spectrum, causing integrity shifts, and is 
perceived to cycle, slide, soar, align, construct, aggregate and lubricate. The 
seminal attributes of engineering are precision and predictability. If the common 
notion of trust is as an undefined, diffuse almost ethereal concept, the executives 
were clearly attempting to place hard edges around and systemise trust in the 
organisation. Tools can be held and used to build or destroy. Step functions are 
discrete increases or decreases in operations. Cycles occur predictably over and 
over again, and lubricants are advanced technologies that reduce friction and 
allow for more efficient operation. Utilising engineering metaphors allowed the 
executives to bring the concept of trust from the unknown to the visible, 
predictable, formulaic realm of mechanics. This desire to add a dimension of
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predictability and engineering discipline to the conceptualisation of trust seems in 
contrast to the diminished surety associated with other metaphors (such as 
religious metaphors) used by executives. The contradictions inherent in the 
executives’ use of metaphors will be addressed in a later section of this chapter.
Religious metaphors may have been used by the executives to introduce the 
importance of faith and severity of belief and discipline into understanding their 
conceptualisations of trust. Trust in God was used as a metaphor for trust in the 
organisation. Trust was characterised as reverential, by casting bread upon the 
water, carrying burdens of doctrine, and requiring evangelism, faith and fervour. 
Distrust is the sin of breaching trust and results in crucifixion. It can be said that 
few things are more personal to those with religious beliefs than their religious 
convictions. It is in no way assumed that each of the executives held strong 
religious beliefs, and their use of religious metaphors may have been the result of 
colloquial reference. Whether intentional or not, the executives’ use of religious 
metaphors and references to stories from the Bible introduced a moral dimension 
to their trust conceptualisations. For the executives that employed these 
metaphors, there are moral obligations associated with integrity and being 
honest. To act differently can be considered sinful. According to Howard 
Lesnick (1993), religious metaphors are used to give meaning to human life -  
what it means to be human and the purpose for living. Applied to the 
organisational environment, the executives could have been utilising religious 
metaphors to equate being trusting and trustworthy with the most fundamental
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meanings of working for an organisation. Regardless of their personal religious 
beliefs (if any), the use of specific words such as reverential, evangelism, and 
faith places trust in an elevated place in terms of their philosophy of leading an 
organisation. It is that foundation that the executives may have been trying to lay 
with their use of religious metaphors.
Financial metaphors have been used throughout history to create a language 
bond between parties coming from disparate disciplines. William James and 
John Dewey used financial metaphors to compromise with civilisations that 
respected business enterprise and communicate with references that were 
meaningful to them and those to whom they spoke (Livingston 1996). So it is 
with the executives and their frequent use of financial metaphors. Finance is a 
language that they understand, and the precise use of particular financial terms 
in metaphors conveys a meaning that is equally as precise and meaningful. In 
this study, trust and faith are compared to a balance sheet and P&L (profit and 
loss statement). There are trust accounts. Trust is a currency, a matter of coin, 
and a bank. You can start with a positive account of trust, borrow against a trust 
account, and endow trust. You can invest in trust, hand over the keys to the trust 
vault, transact trust, have a pool of trust, and a trust credit. There can be trust 
arbitrage, and there is a cost of trust. Through their use of financial metaphors, 
the executives treat trust as a company asset that can be invested, traded, saved 
or spent. The comfort with which they used financial metaphors can easily be 
explained by reading their backgrounds. Each executive has a strong
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background in finance from their academic training and their roles within 
companies. There is also a precision with which financial metaphors are used 
that demonstrates that they are not struggling to find a connection between the 
elements of the metaphor -  to them, the connection is clear and easily explained 
and understood. It should be noted that there may have been some interview 
bias introduced as the researcher also has a background in finance and therefore 
readily comprehended the references. This was known to the executives. As 
such, the executives may have not felt the need to explain financial metaphors in 
great detail. The use of financial metaphors also grounds trust in more 
transactional terms compared to the spirituality of a religious metaphor or the life- 
or-death consequences associated with a science metaphor. It makes the 
concept of trust accessible to anyone that has ever conducted a transaction -  
bought, sold, or invested -  basically everyone. Financial metaphors for trust 
form a structure around trust and define the processes by which it is transacted 
in the business environment. Similarly, if trust is considered a financial asset of 
the company like currency, it is conceptually less diffuse. The tasks performed 
are familiar, unlike perhaps more technical terms such as step function and 
permeable membrane.
War and violence metaphors may have been used by executives to convey pain, 
injury and other consequences associated with trust and distrust. Trust can 
protect businesses from inevitable ‘body blows’. The executives stated that trust 
is a ‘weapon’ but is also ‘fragile’ and can be ‘broken’. It can also be burned.
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Trust can provide for German military efficiency, but can also have you pointing 
your guns in the wrong direction. Betraying trust and improper behaviour is like 
sexual assault (it doesn’t just happen once), and can result in the abuse of the 
vulnerable. The executives’ use of war and violence metaphors seems to fall 
across the spectrum from benign references to military effectiveness to extreme 
references of bodily harm and violation. One possible reason for the use of the 
more violent metaphors is that the executives wanted to convey the real physical 
hurt that a betrayal of trust can inflict. War and violence metaphors include such 
terms as ‘scalp’, ‘shatter’ and ‘assault’. The executives using these metaphors 
were probably attempting to take the impacts of trust out of the mental realm and 
into the physical. War metaphors were used to convey efficiency of action, 
precision and ineffectiveness of wrong actions.
Mixed/Idiosyncratic metaphors are those metaphors that defy categorisation in 
this analysis. They were used by the executives to convey the permissive nature 
of trust, that trust is a feeling, and that trust is a brand among others.
There is a practical value to understanding the possible motivations behind the 
use of particular metaphors as they may provide novel insights into the speaker’s 
perception of trust and provide guidance on how to proceed with the relationship. 
For instance, if an individual uses metaphors consistent with the science 
category, one might conclude that the individual perceives trust as a dynamic, 
evolving part of the business. As such, it might be important to recognise that
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the trust relationship will change over time and flexibility and adaptability to 
changing conditions will be important to maintain a strong relationship. If 
metaphors fall into the financial category, one could surmise that the individual 
perceives trust as an asset that is meant to be invested for a return like any other 
asset in the corporation. In that case, it might be appropriate to ask what kind of 
financial returns are expected to ensure a trusting relationship is built. If 
engineering metaphors are used, one could gather that the individual might view 
trust as predictable and measurable. It might be appropriate in that case to ask 
what precise performance measures (when achieved) might help build the trust 
relationship. If religious metaphors are used, it might indicate that the trust 
relationship is very personal to the individual and breaching that trust will inflict 
emotional damage. They may hold trust in a special place, and it could call for 
developing a nurturing trust relationship and regularly communicating the security 
and comfort between transacting parties. If war and violence metaphors are 
used, it is possible that the individual recognises that trust can be both harmful 
and protective. In that case, it would be important to monitor the individual in the 
early stages of relationship development to ensure that you are dealing with a 
trustworthy party.
Table 8 summarises the metaphor categories, the metaphor user’s perception of 
trust, and the proposed trust building response from the listener. It is from the 
perspectives of a customer and supplier, where the perception of trust refers to 
the customer’s perception of trust (as defined by their use of metaphors) and the
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response from a supplier wanting to build trust with the customer. It is suggested 
that understanding a speaker’s perception of trust through their use of metaphors 
may allow the listener to respond in a way that is appropriate for building trust. 
Further research will need to be conducted to validate this concept.
Table 8. Metaphors, trust perceptions and responses
Metaphor Category Perception of trust Trust building 
response
Science Dynamic, evolving part 
of the organisation
Recognise that the trust 
relationship will change 
over time and you must 
be flexible and prepared 
to adapt to the changing 
needs of the customer.
Engineering/System/Spatial Measurable, quantifiable Build in precise 
performance measures 
(even down to the task 
level) to provide 
constant reinforcement 
that everything is on 
schedule and there are 
no surprises.
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Religious Personal, emotional 
bond
Nurture the relationship; 
provide an abundance 
of communication and 
reinforce the security of 
both the business and 
personal relationship.
Financial Company asset Measure the return on 
investment (ROI) 
provided by your 
involvement - increased 
ROI means greater trust.
WarA/iolence Trust can harm and 
protect
Monitor the relationship 
carefully in the early 
stages to see if you are 
dealing with a 
trustworthy individual or 
an opportunist.
It is possible that the perceptions of trust as communicated through metaphors 
could provide valuable insight and guidance in moving a trusting relationship 
forward.
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Imagery, sophisticated metaphors and contradiction
In addition to the metaphors presented in the preceding section, the executives 
employed imagery when discussing trust in their organisations, and used some 
sophisticated metaphors that warrant further consideration. Also, it was found 
during the review of their responses that certain metaphors were contradictory to 
one another. These topics are explored in an attempt to glean a better 
understanding of their thoughts on trust.
Imagery
Maclnnis and Price (1987) define imagery as a distinct way of representing 
information, more associated with painting a picture rather than providing a 
description (Fodor 1981). The executives’ selective use of imagery allows them 
to create representations of trust dynamics in their organisations that mere 
definitions couldn’t accomplish. Below are some selected examples of uses of 
imagery that add additional depth to the understanding of the executives’ 
conceptualisations of trust in their organisations.
While exploring the dynamics of trust in the organisation, Doug Richard 
remarked,
“I believe that what bubbles out of a trusting company is a series of ways 
of working, where things are uncommonly efficient, where the business 
hums, where people just go and get done what needs to get done, where
224
they've worked out all those trivialisations that we hear about endlessly.”
The image elicited could be that of a science experiment where a beaker filled 
with a unique mixture causes only the valuable essence of the concoction to 
emerge from the top. Although the ingredients of a trusting company aren’t 
defined here, what comes from those ingredients are important to the 
organisation -  including efficiency, shared purpose and focus on mission.
Michael MacSwiney commented,
“Corporations will go through a period where they become trusted, they 
become paternal or maternal or benign or benevolent - and then inevitably 
some high profile series of incidents show that most corporations are not 
to be trusted and that trust is shattered and then the pendulum swings the 
other way too far and then it is assumed that all corporations are not to be 
trusted, and therefore, it spreads across the entire business culture, and a 
lot of businesses knee jerk react to that by clamping down as it were, and 
that is a metaphor, by letting their internal culture, even if they had a 
culture of trust, dispel so that they can be seen to be taking action. I think 
that that is action without merit, especially if you are in a trust based 
culture.”
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The image presented here is that trust is a pendulum that swings back and forth - 
sometimes swinging too far given the circumstances. The use of a pendulum is 
particularly interesting as it elicits a sense of predictability. A force placed upon it 
will cause the pendulum to start swinging; perhaps erratically at first, and then it 
falls into a predictable rhythm of sways that decrease over time until a new force 
is placed upon it. In the same way, trust in an organisation can be erratic when 
actions that cause distrust are introduced. This can cause extreme variance 
from the normal sway and the pendulum of trust goes into a space where the 
company can no longer be trusted. It is the knee jerk reaction of the company 
then to “clamp down”, or grab the pendulum to stop the swinging, in the hope that 
others will see quick action on the part of the company to get things under 
control. Stopping the pendulum altogether, however, can have unintended 
negative consequences and bring the company’s progress to a halt.
When discussing the disadvantages of trust, Martin Rigby said,
“The disadvantage, of course, is the expectation that you will trust and be 
trusted, and sometimes the trust, for whatever reason, misunderstanding 
or whatever, you don't want to trust as much as you used to trust. 
Somehow you've got to manage coming back from trust. Or, in my case, 
as an investor, I'm a steward of other people's money. I have to go 
through the hoops. I might want to trust completely and say Ray, it 
doesn't even need a letter. All we'll do is shake hands on it today and you
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get on with i t  I'm a regulated fund manager. I have big institutions that 
give me money to manage. They would expect me to have a process. 
So, therefore, we've got to wind trust back and say, But I'm sorry Ray, 
we're going to have to go through these hoops, even though it seems to 
be undermining trust because I'm a steward of other people's money, I 
have to be seen to be going through the processes. So that's one 
disadvantage of trust - is sometimes you can appear not to live up to it.”
The use of the term “winding back” elicits the image of having cast a lure too far 
beyond the ideal spot and reeling the line in to achieve a desired result. The 
winding back could refer to the use of safeguards to reduce the vulnerability 
resulting from too much trust. It is proposed in Chapter 6 of this thesis that there 
is an ideal or optimal amount of trust for every transaction, and a model for 
directing the relationship toward that optimal point is described. The imagery 
created by this metaphor is effective as it represents a cast that falls well beyond 
the optimal point, and it must be reeled back to where it belongs given the desire 
to complete the transaction in the most efficient and appropriate way. Casting 
too far will not result in a catch -  nor will casting too short. It is rare to cast the 
exact right amount the first time, just as it can be difficult to allow for just the right 
amount of trust in the first transaction. There must be a mechanism to allow for a 
winding back or reeling in of the trust so that one is neither too vulnerable nor too 
opportunistic. Similarly, the imagery elicited by this metaphor could be that of a 
kite that has been let out too far, resulting in losing sight of the kite. It would be
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prudent to wind back the string and bring the kite closer in -  not so close that it 
loses the breeze and crashes to the ground -  but just the right amount so the kite 
can sail efficiently and within sight.
In his description of misplaced trust, Nicholas Baring states,
“I can remember even the last part of 1983 and 1986 and 1989 when I left 
Barings, this was already becoming apparent and there were some 
individuals there who - 1 think we all recognised that they could make a big 
contribution to the business but they needed an underpinning of controls, 
and I think that the firm just failed to find the right way through to that 
control system. It was a different relationship and it was felt that by 
introducing some of the trusted figures into their part of the organisation 
one could achieve the similar knowledge. There were some definite 
cavities in the organisation -  a hollowness.”
The imagery used here is that of a cavity or hollowness being filled with trust, as 
perhaps a cavity in a tooth might be filled with gold or silver to stop the decay. It 
is an illustrative use of the term “cavities” as it brings to mind the entire process 
of cavity formation and repair. Like a cavity in a tooth being started by acid 
producing bacteria, acts of distrust can create holes in a business that decay the 
structure and cause pain. Filling the cavity will stop the decaying process and re­
establish the structural strength. In the case of this metaphor, the executive
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refers to the introduction of “some trusted figures" to fill the cavities in the 
business caused by distrust. More specifically, a situation had evolved where the 
executive knew a distrustful individual was harming the business, and he felt that 
sending a trusted member of the team to work with the individual (to fill in the 
cavity) might prevent further damage and restore the integrity of the enterprise. 
He was using trust to fill the void in the belief that the problem would be solved.
When describing the importance of trust, Doug Richard said,
“When you talk about trust between Corporation A and Corporation B, 
from a vendor and a customer, it’s really between people who manage the 
lead individuals who manage that relationship, and if one of those sets of 
individuals sets out to earn the trust of the individuals on the other side of 
that fence, so you are still back to individuals deciding to trust or not and in 
handing over the keys to trust.”
By employing this imagery, perhaps Richard wanted to ensure that trust was 
perceived as a valuable and precious asset that is held closely and securely 
behind lock and key -  perhaps protected in a vault. People only place their most 
important possessions in a vault. It may be jewellery, cash, or some sentimental 
item that is seen as irreplaceable. For this executive, trust is seen as the 
equivalent to these valuable items. It is unclear why trust is placed in this value 
category. Is it seen as a valuable asset such as jewellery or currency? Or is it
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seen as something much more personal and sentimental that cannot be easily 
replaced? It could be both, where it has a hard value like cash and yet also 
carries with it a part of the person handing it over -  a part of their soul and 
personal investment much more linked to principles and beliefs. The keys to the 
vault are handed over to those that are worthy based on a set of decision-making 
criteria. Once that is done, the giver is vulnerable to the taker. Will the taker 
abuse the trust which has been given, or will they reciprocate in kind and 
recognise the value of the gesture? That is where faith and risk, trust and 
safeguards intersect in the hope that a successful transaction will take place.
Addressing the economic impact of trust on his organisation, Martin Rigby stated,
“It means they are quick to market and quick on their feet and more 
adaptable - the classic business of being able to out-manoeuvre large 
corporations because the trust component in a smaller organisation 
means that information can be shared more quickly and evaluated more 
quickly and new plans are put into place more quickly. Direction change 
more quickly -- and for us, that's absolutely right. When it works, then the 
communication back to us (as the investor) compliments and reinforces 
that nimbleness of foot in the development of the business.”
The concept of trust making the organisation more nimble of foot brings to mind 
the image of a professional athlete getting extra athleticism out of high-
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performance shoes, where the business is the athlete and the high-performance 
shoes represent trust. Just like the right shoes can make an athlete quicker on 
his feet and more adaptable to evolving situations on the pitch, so can trust make 
a business quicker, faster, and able to change directions more rapidly -  in short, 
more nimble of foot. This equates to the economic values of trust such as doing 
deals faster, hiring more efficiently and responding to change more rapidly. 
Imagine if a world class footballer had to play the game in dress shoes. It would 
certainly hamper his ability to run, make cuts and control his motion. This same 
footballer with the right high-performance football shoes would be able to dig into 
the ground, make sharp cuts, accelerate and decelerate as the pace of the game 
and scoring opportunities dictated. So it is with trust in a business. According to 
the executives, when trust is present in a business it allows for faster responses, 
decision making and altogether better performance of those charged with 
delivering the goods.
Sophisticated Metaphors
In addition to the explicit imagery employed, the executives also use metaphors 
that, upon deeper analysis, demonstrate an elaborate approach to 
communicating their conceptualisations of trust and allow for a deeper 
understanding of their intentions. One such example comes from Michael 
Mainelli and the information technology domain.
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“Our theoretical background to trust is probably built on two things. I had 
to come at it with a computing paradigm which is very much the kind of 
handshake type protocols - I've got a piece of information that has come 
down the wire. How do I know who it's from? How do I send back to the 
person who sent me that piece of information that I am who I am? 
Basically how do we handshake? And I think there's a lot in that. This is a 
good idea because I think that the Computing Paradigm is a very, very 
good one and is boiling down to the essence of a transaction of 
communication.”
At first glance, this metaphor may seem simple in its construction and intention. 
However, understanding the technology and purpose underlying a “computer 
handshake” adds a depth and breadth to this metaphor that make it much more 
meaningful and relevant in understanding the dynamics of trust. In its simplest 
terms, handshaking is the process whereby one computer establishes a 
connection with another computer and begins communicating. A message is 
sent from one device to the other indicating a desire to open up a channel of 
communication. Based on the message sent and how it is received, the two 
devices then send several messages back and forth in an attempt to establish an 
agreeable communication protocol, or the rules in which the two will 
communicate. During this sending and receiving of messages, the foreign 
computers are learning more about each other and negotiating before formal and 
secure communications are established. More than anything, it is the way in
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which two entities greet one another and verify key information before moving to 
the next level of the communications relationship. With this understanding of the 
concept of computer handshaking, it is not difficult to understand the relevance of 
the metaphor when applied to trust relationships. The executive is describing his 
manner of establishing trust with people -  he sends a signal to another party 
indicating his desire to establish a trust relationship, and based on what he learns 
throughout several interactions, and based on a set of established criteria, he 
can make the decision to enter into this relationship or not. Certain key 
information has to be verified before formal communications can be established 
beyond the initial outreach. Put another way, you have to verify who you are 
talking to and what they are made of before a relationship can be established. 
Like computer handshaking, the sharing of information and mutual 
acknowledgement of a desirable match provides for additional security and 
alignment for future interactions.
Perhaps one of the most provocative metaphors used by Doug Richard was the 
concept of trust as a weapon.
“Trust is a weapon. I believe there is an absolute direct hard-core 
correlation between trusting and vulnerability, and that there is no way 
around it. The two are aligned perfectly. The more I trust you, the more I 
am vulnerable to you abusing that trust. Thus, being trusted is a weapon, 
trusting is not. Let me make it even more cynical. Acting in a trustworthy
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manner is a very powerful weapon. If you just took that statement in an 
unadorned fashion and said it to somebody, they would be hard-pressed 
to figure out what that meant. Notice I said the word acting, that's the hub 
of that sentence. I didn't say being trustworthy, I said acting in a 
trustworthy manner."
Richard establishes a direct correlation between the amount one trusts another 
party and the vulnerability the trusting party is accepting. The more one trusts, 
the more vulnerable they are to opportunistic behaviour of the trusted party. 
The weapon, as described, is in being trusted, and therefore belongs to the 
trusted party. As the beneficiary of someone else’s trust, the trusted party can 
turn that trust against them in an instant. It is the con man’s game -  earn the 
confidence and trust of another individual with the expressed intention of 
betraying that trust. A high-profile example of this occurred in the United States 
when an investment manager named Bernie Madoff was handed the trust of 
friends and investors to place their money in securities that would provide them a 
fair return on their investments. He then squandered their money (as much as 
$80 billion dollars) by running an elaborate Ponzi scheme that essentially stole 
their life savings on the back of trust. This example is used to illustrate the 
second part of the executive’s point above. Being trustworthy is not the weapon, 
but rather “acting in a trustworthy manner” is the weapon. The distinction is 
clear. If I am a trustworthy individual that means no harm to those trusting me, 
trust is not considered a weapon regardless of the lack of success I may have in
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any endeavour. If however I am only acting in a trustworthy manner, playing a 
part so as to convince you that I will not take advantage of your vulnerable state, 
according to this executive I am using one of the most powerful weapons 
available. When you are at your most exposed, the weapon can be turned 
against you and you’re left with little recourse. When described in these terms, 
trust becomes a paramount criterion of decision-making, where the 
consequences of placing trust in the hands of the wrong person can be 
devastating.
Much has been made of the economic value of trust in a previous chapter. It is 
proposed that trust makes businesses more efficient and productive when 
present. Scott Charney chose to put it this way:
“I think in that sense it's a really useful exercise in looking at trust because 
I think leveraged well, used well, and understood well, it can give a short 
hand for business transactions which is incredibly impatient and fast.”
Short hand is used in correspondence to abbreviate communications through the 
use of symbols instead of the long hand writing employed most commonly. Here 
trust is defined as a kind of short hand for business transactions that allow them 
to be carried out more efficiently. When trust is present, it may alleviate many of 
the safeguards normally present in transactions -  such as multiple meetings to 
make a sale, several interactions with expensive lawyers, massive contracts that
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restrict the two parties’ ability to work productively and with greater freedom. 
Trust as short hand means that there doesn’t need to be as much said, explained 
or transcribed between parties to communicate and transact. The metaphor 
points to an added efficiency that isn’t present when trust is absent.
Almost all of the executives used financial metaphors to communicate their 
conceptualisations of trust in their organisations. Many of these were described 
earlier in this chapter. One financial metaphor used by Doug Richard seemed 
particularly interesting and didn’t necessarily lend itself to being understood a 
priori and thus requires some elaboration.
“I believe that there is only one type of trust and the only difference 
between faith and trust is that one is a balance sheet and one is a P&L. 
Faith is what you have at the moment -- trust is what is moving back and 
forth.”
Although efficiently stated, this metaphor is deep in meaning and relevance. In 
business finance terms, a balance sheet is a snapshot of a company’s financial 
standing at a precise moment in time. A P&L (or profit and loss statement) is a 
statement that summarises the revenues (or income) and expenses of a 
business over time, such as weekly, quarterly or annually. P&L statements are 
generally considered to be a better indicator of the functioning of the business 
because they give evidence of the company’s ability to move revenues up and
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expenses down, or increase assets and lower liabilities. The executive that used 
this metaphor states that faith is like a balance sheet -  it’s what you have at a 
specific moment in time, but it’s not as important an indicator of the health of the 
business as trust, which he equates to a P&L. One can have faith or hope that a 
business is doing the right thing, but faith is rarely based on empirical evidence. 
It is always there (regardless of when the snapshot is taken) and rarely wavers or 
varies greatly. Trust, on the other hand, moves up and down and is constantly 
changing based on the circumstances and forces working for or against it. The 
notion of trust “moving back and forth” is consistent with the two sides of a 
ledger, where income is expended or invested to create further revenue 
generating opportunities. An employee may lose trust in a manager until that 
manager takes an action that reinforces and builds trust again with that 
employee. Just like the income and expenses reported in a P&L over time, trust 
will move up and down. By drawing this distinction, Richard points to trust as the 
true indicator of how a business is doing just as he would look to the P&L to 
measure the health of the business.
Contradiction
The executives repeatedly used metaphors to describe their conceptualisations 
of trust in their organisations. Many of the metaphors were consistent with the 
operational conceptualisations explored in other chapters of this thesis -  but that 
was not always true. In some cases, possibly due to the inherent complexity of 
the nature of trust, several of the metaphors employed by executives were
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contradictory to one another. Taken on a macro scale, for example, the very 
precision of engineering metaphors seem to clash with the faith-based religious 
metaphors. Yet, both were used by executives with regular frequency and equal 
conviction. Before addressing the possible reasons for these contradictions, it is 
appropriate to review some specific examples. To some, trust is quantifiable and 
measurable. For example, when Doug Richard was asked how he measured 
trust, he responded,
“I'll tell you what you can do - you can note whether it is going up or down 
over a period of time as between both individuals and generally within the 
context of the Corporation, and you do it through the proxies of people's 
behaviours”.
For Richard, monitoring behaviour gives the best indication of whether trust is 
building or fading. Yet, in contrast, Martin Rigby put forward the challenge,
“You describe to me precisely the edge of the universe, and I'll tell you 
how to measure trust.”
In other words, a measure of trust is unknowable. How can two executives that 
both recognise the importance of trust to their organisations have such differing 
opinions about the act of measuring trust? In this case, one can question the 
reliability of monitoring behaviours as a measure for trust. When pressed, it was
not clear what specific behaviours the executive used for trust assessment 
beyond happy and productive employees. It is not uncommon for an employee 
to seem happy and productive as they simultaneously plan to leave one 
company for another more satisfying job. On the other hand, is the 
measurement of trust truly as mysterious as the edge of the universe? Probably 
not, as there have been numerous measures of trust proposed by scholars that 
purport to be effective (Cook 1980; Laporta 1997). The ability (or lack thereof) to 
quantify or measure trust is just one example of the numerous contradictions in 
the use of metaphors to be found in the executive reports. Consider the following 
tables of contradictory statements made by the executives. Table 9 is a 
presentation of contradictory metaphors the executives used to convey trust 
measurement. Table 10 is a presentation of contradictory metaphors the 
executives used when discussing the predictability of trust. It should be noted 
that some of the cells in Table 10 are empty because this is not intended to 
report a balanced and polar set of opinions.
Table 9. Contradictory metaphors: trust measurement
Trust is measurable (quantifiable) Trust is not measurable (not 
quantifiable)
How do you measure trust? I'll tell you 
what you can do - you can note 
whether it is going up or down over a
You describe to me precisely the edge 
of the universe, and I’ll tell you how to 
measure trust.
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period of time as between both 
individuals and generally within the 
context of the Corporation, and you do 
it through the proxies of people's 
behaviours
If you want to measure trust, the 
measurement has these three distinct 
components in it that have to be 
aggregated.
At the end of the day trust is a feeling 
so it’s future perceived perceptions -  
it’s not just mathematical -  it’s about 
how you feel your relationship is going 
to be with this firm that really matters.
But you have to be intelligent about the 
handing out of trust; the measurement 
of what constitutes trustworthy 
behaviour just because trust is very, 
very useful and very, very important 
does not mean you have to be naive.
Observational analysis is just as useful 
in the biological sciences as the 
measuring of speed of particles is in 
the physical sciences; so too in trust. 
Just because it’s a phenomenon that 
you are actively observing doesn’t 
mean that it has to be quantified -  oh 
he’s got one unit, he has two -  you 
don’t have to count but you do have to 
observe, analyse, and understand.
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He has already calculated a negative 
account.
They trusted me so they borrowed that 
trust on my account for his benefit and 
he trusted me, so then he borrowed on 
my account for their benefit. If anyone 
had not acted in accord, my account 
would have diminished considerably.
1 think trust is built in organisations by 
starting with an assumptive, positive 
account on all parties’ behalf. 
Therefore, everyone should start with a 
credit account, not with either a neutral 
or negative account, and then they 
either betray the trust or they can build 
on it.
So, what is interesting about that is the 
more you trust someone, the more you 
invest or handover to them coins of 
trust, the greater their account
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becomes, but the greater the potential 
for them to be viewed as untrustworthy.
That's all I'm trying to say is that, invest 
once using trust to understand and 
respect and then you can do a whole 
series of transactions on that pool of 
trust and understanding as opposed to 
having to do due diligence and 
negotiate a contract every time.
Trust is a currency between people is 
my basic premise.
Table 10. Contradictory metaphors: trust predictability
Predictable Not Predictable
If you want someone to trust you, or if 
you want to increase the level of trust 
they have in you, you must perform 
acts that are seen by the person that 
you’re aiming them toward, as to 
inspire in them a step up in their
Honesty breeds trust more than 
anything. The challenge is, it’s hard to 
be honest with unpredictable facts.
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willingness to trust.
Troubled times are either exciting or 
frightening depending upon whether or 
not you trust that everyone is there to 
catch you. You trust whether the 
business will survive, if you believe.
1 would take the view that in the 
absence of the creation of trust, there 
is no neutral—trust is a dynamic -  it is 
moving all the time. If you’re not 
creating, encouraging and developing 
trust in your relationships, it falls into 
distrust.
Loyalty to the corporation is never 
unshakeable.
As soon as somebody acts in a way 
that is untrustworthy, it will simply 
spread throughout that portion of the 
business and it will spread to lots and 
lots of points outside the business,
We expected the wider system to 
enforce honesty at certain levels, and 
that breaks down if the feedback loop 
isn’t there.
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The executives also used metaphors to describe four distinct representations of 
trust dynamics in the organisation that were contradictory to one another. Trust 
was described as increasing and decreasing (Step Trust), going side-to-side 
(Continuum Trust), swaying like a pendulum (Swinging Trust) and falling into 
layers, levels and stages (Layer Trust).
Step Trust can be represented as trust increasing and decreasing (stepping up or 
stepping down) over a number of interactions.
Examples of executive statements describing Step Trust include:
“(Trust) is a step function... not a smooth process. When I say it's a 
process, it doesn't necessarily mean it's a continuous flow process.” (Doug 
Richard)
“And it's either I'm trusting you more overtime or less overtime, and I 
would assert that it is a step function. Meaning that it kind of cruises along 
at a certain level once it's been established at that level until activities 
make it change... either it steps up or it steps down.” (Doug Richard)
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“The most effective management tool I can imagine is being very effective 
at the forcing functions that cause people to increase the amount they 
trust you.” (Doug Richard)
“With a high value investment where you've got more formal management 
or contractual arrangements, you have to trust less. The mandatory 
degree of trust is reduced because the contract is underpinning it, 
whereas if all you've just got is ordinary shares and less contractual 
influence, you have to trust a very high degree because you are relying on 
the management to communicate with you to fulfil that side of the 
bargain.” (Martin Rigby)
Continuum trust can be represented as trust moving across a trust spectrum.
Distance from one point to another is indicative of this type of trust
representation.
Examples of executive statements describing Continuum Trust include:
“You trust them this far. Somebody else you trust that far.” (Martin Rigby) 
“Somehow you've got to manage coming back from trust.” (Martin Rigby)
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Swinging Trust can be represented as a pendulum swaying in the air from one 
extreme to the opposite extreme.
An example of an executive statement describing Swinging Trust is:
“Corporations will go through a period where they become trusted, they 
become paternal or maternal or benign or benevolent and then inevitably 
some high profile series of incidents show that most corporations are not 
to be trusted and that trust is shattered and then the pendulum swings the 
other way too far and then it is assumed that all corporations are not to be 
trusted, and therefore, it spreads across the entire business culture, and a 
lot of businesses knee jerk react to that by clamping down as it were, and 
that is a metaphor, by letting their internal culture, even if they had a 
culture of trust, dispel so that they can be seen to be taking action.” 
(Michael MacSwiney)
Layer Trust can be represented as a series of layers, levels or stages that are 
indicative of some qualitative change in trust (rather than the quantitative change 
associated with Step Trust). The idea of layer trust may be looked upon as a 
support to the hierarchical notion of trust enumerated in Chapter 5.
Examples of executive statements describing Layer Trust is:
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“The other thing, of course, is how you reach a layer of trust. What 
happens if you lose confidence? If you lose trust? If you don't trust that 
person as much, somehow you've got to manage the relationship back 
down to a layer of less trust and more formal exchange of information and 
decision making - more investigating - more due diligence - more 
contracts.” (Martin Rigby)
“So what was that level of trust? It built up to a level, whereas as a 
professional now, half of all effort in professional offices is covering your 
back, getting letters of indemnity, escape clauses, caveats, building a file 
to protect every decision.” (Michael MacSwiney)
“This is the right level of trust in society taking into account the full range 
of interactions. When you’ve got too much trust, you wind up with con 
men and make you wind up with volatility in the system. When you have 
too little trust, you wind up with high transaction costs, and again, you 
have more volatility in the system.” (Michael Mainelli)
“Trust is this thing...different people will entrust others to different degrees 
at different levels of trust." (Nicholas Baring)
What can account for these distinctly different representations of trust and 
outright contradictions regarding trust measurement and trust predictability? Hill
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and Levenhagen’s (1995) study of contradictions within metaphors may provide 
some guidance. According to the authors, metaphor contradiction increases the 
effectiveness of communicating a novel concept or vision. Contradictions 
capture the temporal tension (Bird 1988) between concepts and reality (Hill and 
Levenhagen 1995). When applied to the question of contradictory metaphors 
from the executive reports, the notion of capturing temporal tension could provide 
insight. For the executives that believe they are measuring trust through 
behaviour assessment, trust is indeed measurable in a meaningful way for that 
executive and organisation. For those that believe that measuring trust is akin to 
measuring the edges of the universe, the notion of behaviour assessment as a 
reliable measure of trust is not acceptable. For one, measuring trust is a reality, 
for the other it is simply theoretical conceptualisation. In that inherent 
contradiction is the principle value -  the tension created in the contradiction 
provides the most effective way to communicate the complexities of trust. Trust 
can be predictable and unpredictable. It can be quantifiable and unquantifiable. 
It can step and swing -  in the same way as there can be controlled chaos and 
virtual reality. There may be no other pathway for properly communicating the 
novel concept of trust but to provide a series of contradictions so one might 
capture the tension between reality and conceptualisation. That may be where 
the best idea of trust lies.
Trust can be a difficult concept to grasp just as it can be difficult to explain the 
way it manifests itself in a company. The executives used multiple metaphors to
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try and communicate the relevance and importance of trust. In addition to 
measurable and immeasurable, predictable and unpredictable, trust is seen as 
dynamic (Trust is a dynamic -  it is moving all the time. If you’re not creating, 
encouraging and developing trust in your relationships, it falls into distrust) and 
as stable as currency (So, what is interesting about that is the more you trust 
someone, the more you invest or handover to them coins of trust, the greater 
their account becomes). Trust is characterised as a liquid lubricant (It oils the 
wheels in a sense. Things work smoothly. It cuts out some of the friction) and 
something solid that can be handed-off (the person who hands off trust). 
Comprehending the full breadth of trust may require one to travel from the 
tangible to the ethereal, a place where contradiction is accepted and necessary 
for full conceptual understanding.
The executives use multiple metaphors, some contradictory, to communicate 
their novel conceptualisations of trust in their organisations. They employ 
imagery in their metaphors to create a visual reference for the listener that may 
aid in the understanding of the point they are making. They use sophisticated 
metaphors to add dimension to trust that mere definition can’t accomplish. It may 
be the very nature of trust that explains why these communication techniques are 
used. Oliver Williamson (1985) asserted that trust is too diffuse a topic to be 
considered in transactions, but the executives’ use of metaphors in this study 
indicates a strong desire to communicate the importance of trust in transactions 
and everyday business life.
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Summary
The purpose of this chapter was to address the variety of metaphors employed 
by executives when conveying their conceptualisations of trust in the 
organisation. A review of the literature produced some research into the reasons 
why metaphors are used and methods by which metaphors can be categorised. 
The metaphors presented in this chapter were extracted from hundreds of pages 
of transcribed interviews, analysed, and categorised into six distinct metaphor 
types: 1) Science Metaphors, 2) Engineering/Systems/Spatial Metaphors, 3)
Religious Metaphors, 4) Financial Metaphors, 5) WarA/iolence Metaphors, and 6) 
Mixed/Idiosyncratic Metaphors. Each metaphor category was analysed and 
intentions of executive usage were proposed. It was proposed that Science 
metaphors were used by the executives to convey trust as a living organism 
within the organisation. Healthy organisations were associated with trusting 
organisations, while distrust was associated with degenerative disease and the 
death of the organisation. Engineering/Systems/Spatial metaphors were used to 
introduce an analytical, measurable and predictive character to trust in 
organisations. It was proposed that the executives used these metaphors to 
dispel the notion that trust is a diffuse and ethereal concept and make it more 
concrete and definable in the way it manifests itself in the organisation. Religious 
metaphors introduced a spiritual dimension to trust that accentuated the 
meaningful role it performs in the organisation. Although appearing to be 
potentially contradictory to the secular metaphors associated with engineering
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and finance, it is suggested that the use of these metaphors is actually 
complimentary and provides a novel perspective of the breadth of 
conceptualisations of trust presented by the executives. It was proposed that 
financial metaphors were used due to the executives’ familiarity and comfort with 
the terms, and further established trust as precise, manageable and measurable. 
Placing trust within the known and well-defined processes of financial 
transactions allowed the executives to discuss trust as a company asset that can 
be invested, saved or spent. It was proffered that war and violence metaphors 
were used by executives to convey the physical pain associated with broken trust 
and the military precision of the organisation when trust is present. It was 
suggested that the use of violence metaphors was an attempt by the executives 
to bring trust out of the psychological world and into the physical world. 
Mixed/Idiosyncratic metaphors that defied categorisation for this analysis were 
also employed by executives to convey an understanding of complex 
conceptualisations of trust in organisations. It was proposed that the use of 
particular categories of metaphors may provide insight into perceptions of trust 
that could give guidance on how to proceed with relationships. The metaphors 
were further explored by breaking them out into contradictory categories and 
conceptualisations. The executives used metaphors that described trust as 
measurable and not measurable, predictable and unpredictable, as stepping up 
and down, swinging, operating on a continuum and moving through qualitative 
stages. It was proposed that contradictory metaphors provide a pathway for 
communicating and understanding the complexities of trust in the organisation.
Imagery creates a visual reference for the listener that may aid in understanding 
the point the executives are trying to communicate. Sophisticated metaphors 
were used to add dimension to the nature of trust that goes well beyond 
definitions.
It has been reported in the literature that metaphors provide deep insights into 
how we communicate complex ideas because they are based on a conceptual 
and experiential process that structures our world (Su 2002). The senior 
executives used a variety of metaphors to convey their trust perceptions and 
experiences, and through these metaphors they have provided additional insight 
into their thoughts about trust in their organisations.
Chapter 10 that follows presents alternative configurations of trust reported by 
the senior executives and provides an expanded understanding of the nature, 
importance and conceptualisation of trust. An optimal trust model compiled from 
the executive reports is also presented.
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CHAPTER 10: Configurations and Model of Trust
Alternative Configurations of Trust
In addition to an optimal trust model based on anticipated trust and experienced 
trust, the data provided in the executive reports can be interpreted in alternative 
configurations. The executives reported several economic benefits of trust in 
chapter 8 of this thesis. High trust was reported to shorten the sales cycle, 
improve hiring practices, increase retention, make the organisation flatter, allow 
for rapid adaptation to change, and provide greater financial stability, among 
others. When the amount of trust between transacting parties and corresponding 
benefits are graphed, where the x-axis is the amount of trust and the y-axis is the 
benefit derived, and the executive responses are represented in this way, the 
diversity of trust dynamics is illustrated.
Rigby referred to the condition whereby trust reaches a certain level and plateaus 
at a point where no more benefit can be derived. This would be consistent with 
Wicks et al.’s (1999) concept of overinvesting in trust where continued 
investment in trust which has reached its optimal point will not provide additional 
benefits. Graphically represented, the trust plateau concept might be consistent 
with the following:
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Figure 8: Trust Plateau
Trust Plateau
Where beyond trust point A, benefits 
of trust don’t increase or decrease
Amount of Trust
As trust increases, the corresponding benefits increase until point A. At this 
point, the trust continues to increase but the benefits don’t increase. The 
implication is that continuing to invest in trust may increase the amount, but it will 
only stand to maintain the benefits achieved without creating additional value.
The optimal trust concept described in the earlier chapter can be depicted on the 
trust/benefit graph as well.
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Figure 9: Optimal trust
Optimal Trust
Where beyond optimal trust point B, 
benefits of trust decline
Amount of Trust
Initially, as before, trust increases over time in a linear manner with the benefits 
derived. At point B, an optimal trust point is reached where the amount of trust 
created provides the greatest benefit. After this point, the benefits associated 
with trust decrease even though the amount of trust continues to increase. This 
would actually be consistent with the concept of an alternative representation of 
the trust paradox that was proposed in an earlier chapter. The trust paradox was 
described as a condition in which, beyond a certain point, trust has exceeded the 
parties’ capacity and turns into distrust. In short, the parties feel too vulnerable to 
one another. As it could apply here, instead of turning to distrust, the paradox is 
more consistent with a law of diminishing returns, where continued increases in 
trust beyond some optimal point B actually decrease the benefits because the
parties are feeling too vulnerable and the benefits decline.
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Now consider a straight linear model, which would be the quantitative equivalent 
of the widely cited qualitative hierarchical models proposed in the literature. The 
hierarchical models suggest that improved benefits are improved as the quality of 
trust increases. As one might recall, Sako (1998) refers to the levels in 
ascending order as contractual trust, competence trust and goodwill trust. 
Barney and Hansen (1994) propose weak-form trust, semi-strong form trust and 
strong-form trust. Lewicki and Bunker (1996) label the levels as calculus-based 
trust, knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust. These ascending 
levels could be represented graphically as such:
Figure 10: Linear trust
Linear Trust
As trust increases, the benefits 
increase
Amount of Trust
This is a linear representation of trend, although as Lewicki and Bunker (1996)
recognise, trust evolution may actually be more like the game Chutes and
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Ladders, where trust may slide up and down on the way to the top based on 
actions that either build trust or diminish trust. The implication of a linear trust 
model is that an increase in benefits corresponds with an increase in the amount 
of trust. One could argue that, based on the executive’s responses, this model 
doesn’t represent the full breadth of trust and all its manifestations.
Doug Richard described an organisational condition based on high levels of trust 
resulting in a way of working that is “uncommonly efficient, where the business 
hums”. This notion of an exponential increase in the benefits of trust can be 
represented graphically as the following:
Figure 11: Exponential trust
Exponential Trust
Where beyond trust point C, benefits
of trust increase at an exponential 
rate
Amount of Trust
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In this case trust increases with noticeable benefits until point C, where some 
condition associated with the amount of trust causes an exponential increase in 
the benefits derived.
These graphic representations of the executives’ operational conceptualisations 
of trust in organisations expand the understanding of trust dynamics. There 
seems to be evidence that there are multiple ways for trust to grow and diminish 
in organisations, and the corresponding benefits are numerous. The 
conceptualisations based on the executives’ experiences, although not being 
held out to be necessarily correct, introduce a range of potential trust dynamics 
that contribute to the literature.
A Proposed Model for Achieving Optimal Trust
This proposed model for achieving optimal trust consolidates much of the 
information from the literature and executive reports, and incorporates concepts 
that are consistent with the literature, incompatible with the literature, and novel 
conceptualisations that appear throughout this thesis. The intention is to respond 
to the executive reports that a model should represent the real-life operational 
process of a transaction with actions that have been purported to build and 
diminish trust. The added requirement of taking actions to achieve an optimal 
trust path in transactions is the result of the author’s desire to present a model 
that may be useful for executive decision-making. A focus is placed on the
model’s appropriateness for implementation in an organisation in the hope that
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the comprehensive inclusion of key concepts and practical utility will make it 
valuable for transacting agents.
Key assumptions in this proposed model are 1) trust is a two or multi-sided 
process (there is more than one agent); 2) agents enter a new transaction at a 
suboptimal level of anticipated trust; 3) there is an optimal level of trust that can 
be achieved; and 4) trust is a process that can be manipulated in degree by 
actions taken by transacting parties.
Remember the four quadrants of the trust grid presented earlier:
Low
Anticipated
Trust
High Experienced Trust
II. Optimal Trust
I. Undertrust
High
Anticipated
Trust
IV. Overtrust
III. Optimal Trust
Low Experienced Trust
Every action taken in a transaction can be represented in one of the quadrants of 
this grid. For example, a company is being acquired in an all-stock transaction.
The two parties (the seller and the acquirer) are in the late stages leading to
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closing when the acquirer stipulates that one-third of the stock must be held for 
an extra year based on some desired outcome that is still in question. The seller, 
who has exhibited trustworthy behaviour throughout the acquisition process and 
has perceived the acquirer as trustworthy based on actions, is offended by the 
request. In this case, from the perspective of the seller, the acquirer is 
undertrusting and the action would fall into Quadrant I. Some condition may 
have led the acquirer to feel that he was overtrusting at some point (Quadrant 
IV), and he needed to balance the trust level by placing a safeguard in the 
transaction terms. In this case, the acquirer would be trying to achieve a level of 
optimal trust in the transaction, but from the perspective of the seller, he has just 
committed an action of undertrusting. Here, from the seller’s perspective, there 
is not a consistency between the anticipated level of trust and the actions taken 
for the seller (experienced trust), but there is for the acquirer. In short, the 
transactors are not in sync. The goal then between transacting parties is to 
move the actions from Quadrants I and IV and toward the optimal trust path that 
runs through Quadrants II and III. The model proposed is intended to provide a 
construct within which transactors will achieve this movement toward the optimal 
trust path.
STEP ONE: Negotiation of terms of the relationship
Before a transaction is carried out, transacting parties will develop a perception 
of one another. This perception will lead them through a negotiation of terms
260
upon which a transaction may or may not take place. Assuming the parties still 
desire to move forward with the transaction, they will move to Step Two.
STEP TWO: Enter a new transaction (at a suboptimal level) with defined 
transaction variables.
It is assumed at this stage that the transaction is at a suboptimal level because 
the parties have no experiences transacting together. There may be asymmetry 
in the relationship, where one party is heavily safeguarding and the other is 
heavily vulnerable. It is considered suboptimal because the terms that were 
negotiated result in undertrusting and overtusting. To have reached this step, the 
parties must have agreed that the economic benefit or some other condition 
outweighs the suboptimal nature of the interaction. This is where the seeding of 
vulnerability needs to be met with some benevolence and reciprocity on the part 
of the less vulnerable party.
STEP THREE: Communicate and observe behaviours and actions of one 
another as the transaction is carried out
At this step the transacting parties are starting to augment their perceptions with 
the reality or actual experiences associated with the transaction. This is where 
the parties can start to steer the undertrusting and overtrusting conditions of the 
transaction toward the optimal trust path.
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STEP FOUR: Based on observations, take actions that adjust the conditions or 
terms of the relationship by increasing trust (accepting vulnerability) or 
implementing additional safeguards.
In this step, if the transacting parties are completely out of sync, the transaction 
can break down. If one party believes that there should be some relief from 
certain safeguards while the other party is demanding additional safeguards, the 
transaction is in a volatile state. It may be the best decision to not transact at all. 
If, on the other hand, the need for relief from safeguards is met by the actions 
that more optimally match vulnerabilities, then the transactors are moving toward 
an optimal path.
STEP FIVE: Work toward a relationship where there is balance between 
anticipated trust and the actions leading toward an actual optimal outcome.
When transacting parties have reached this step, they are on the same page in 
terms of anticipation of trustworthiness and their goal is to take actions that are 
consistent with this shared anticipation. It can be said at this stage that the 
transacting parties are acting like a joint enterprise with a mutual understanding 
of one another and the goals of the transaction.
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STEP SIX: When both parties no longer have to take any additional actions to 
balance between anticipated trust and the actions necessary to reach an actual 
optimal outcome, optimal trust in the transaction has been achieved.
This step is where the transacting parties are enjoying the benefits of an optimal 
trust transaction. Put simply, actions taken are consistent with shared 
anticipation (they are doing what they said they would do).
Incorporating additional findings from the executive reports adds value to the 
implementation of the model. It is critical to communicate openly and often 
throughout the entire process -  from STEP ONE through STEP SIX. Employing 
the strategies outlined in previous chapters may provide early insight into trust 
perceptions that could provide guidance for building a strong, long lasting 
relationship. Recall the metaphor categories, corresponding trust perceptions 
and responses.
Metaphor Category Perception of trust Trust building 
response
Science Dynamic, evolving part 
of the organisation
Recognise that the trust 
relationship will change 
over time and you must 
be flexible and prepared 
to adapt to the changing
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needs of the customer
Engineering/System/Spatial Measurable, quantifiable Build in precise 
performance measures 
(even down to the task 
level) to provide 
constant reinforcement 
that everything is on 
schedule and there are 
no surprises
Religious Personal, emotional 
bond
Nurture the relationship; 
provide an abundance 
of communication and 
reinforce the security of 
both the business and 
personal relationship
Financial Company asset Measure the return on 
investment (ROI) 
provided by your 
involvement - increased 
ROI means greater trust
War/Violence Trust can harm and 
protect
Monitor the relationship 
carefully in the early 
stages to see if you are
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dealing with a 
trustworthy individual or 
an opportunist
Listening for the unique way that trust is conceptualised through metaphor may 
allow for a response that steers the transaction toward an optimal path with 
increased efficiency. Furthermore, continuing to listen for metaphor clues may 
prevent steering off the optimal trust path or accelerate returning to the path after 
a problem is encountered.
When carrying out STEP TWO: Enter a new transaction (at a suboptimal level) 
with defined transaction variables, it is important to incorporate the trust initiator 
described by the executives as initially accepting a vulnerable position (as 
vulnerable as is prudent) -  seed some vulnerability to see if you get it back -  
initially build trust by trusting other people. During STEP THREE: Communicate 
and observe behaviours and actions of one another as the transaction is carried 
out and STEP FOUR: Based on observations, take actions that adjust the 
conditions or terms of the relationship by increasing trust (accepting vulnerability) 
or implementing additional safeguards, it is the time to take the actions described 
by the executives that are appropriate for the situation, such as:
• Acting in a way where there is consonance between the response and the 
trust reposed
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• Acting consistently
• Immediately punishing acts of betrayal
• Communicating clearly and honestly
• Providing strong support, particularly to the more vulnerable party
• Being transparent in actions
• Meeting expectations with reality
• Maintaining close working relationships
This is certainly not intended to be a comprehensive list, and any list would have 
to be appropriate for the context of the transaction and include safeguarding 
actions such as additional oversight. However, these actions were described by 
the executives as increasing trust and may be useful in steering the transactors 
toward an optimal trust path.
The benefits of reaching an optimal trust path could include many of the 
economic benefits reported by executives in Chapter 8 of this thesis, where 
transactions are defined in the most general sense as two or more parties 
engaging in an exchange. Those benefits include:
Contracting and Negotiation - Invest in trust early and you can do a number of 
transactions on, as Doug Richard calls it, your “trust account”. Reduces legal 
fees. Fewer resources are expended and over a shorter time. Doing deals 
faster may be a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
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Flattening the organisation - Trust allows for fewer people to be responsible for 
more -  it reduces the need for multiple layers of expensive management 
oversight. Allows for greater profitability.
Hiring Practices - Hiring on the recommendation of trusted individuals reduces 
the number of activities necessary to hire and may result in better candidates. 
Paying large fees for services such as head-hunters is avoided.
Rapid adaptation to change - When trust is pervasive throughout the 
organisation, people have greater autonomy in decision-making and can respond 
faster to changes in the market. Responding to changing market requirements 
faster than the competition is seen as a great advantage.
Retention - Employees and customers tend to stay with the company longer 
when there is trust. Costs associated with severance, hiring, training and selling 
are reduced when turnover is low.
Greater financial stability - It was suggested that the more the company is trusted 
by investors, the more likely they are to hold their stock during rough periods. 
Share price stability during difficult times is of great economic value to the 
organisation.
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Summary
After reviewing the dynamics of trust in the organisation as described by the 
executive reports, and representing those descriptions graphically, a model for 
achieving optimal trust for transacting parties was proposed. The Optimal Trust 
Model builds on the reports of each of the executives and on the literature 
contributions of several scholars such as Wicks et al. (1999). After reframing 
optimal trust within a four quadrant grid to graphically express anticipated trust 
and experienced trust, a six step process was proposed. If followed, the six step 
process is purported to enable transacting parties to reach an optimal trust path 
while conducting a transaction. Put succinctly, the steps are: 1) negotiation of 
terms; 2) entering the transaction with defined transaction variables; 3) 
communicating and observing behaviours and actions; 4) taking actions that 
adjust the negotiated terms based on observations; 5) working for balance 
between anticipated trust and experienced trust that lead toward an actual 
optimal outcome; and 6) reaching an actual optimal outcome with no additional 
actions necessary to balance between perceived trust and actual trust. 
Understanding the types of metaphors used to communicate perceptions of trust 
and the corresponding responses were incorporated into the model with the 
expectation that they could help provide greater efficiencies in reaching the 
optimal trust path. Examples of specific actions reported by executives to initiate 
and steer trust were placed into their respective steps with the understanding that 
a more comprehensive and context-specific list could be developed for any
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specific transaction. The economic benefits described by the executives based 
on their experiences in their organisations were described with the qualification 
that these were only a few of the possible outcomes that might be realised as a 
result if implementing the process.
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CHAPTER 11: Study Contributions and Conclusion
This study was conducted to contribute to the organisational trust literature by 
investigating how senior executives conceptualise and report the relevance of 
trust to their organisations, and comparing the executive reports to the existing 
literature to find consistencies, inconsistencies, and novel conceptualisations. In 
particular, this study introduced conceptualisations of trust in organisations as 
reported by CEOs and senior executives, a group that has yet to be sufficiently 
represented in the trust literature. It was determined at the start that in-depth 
interviews with a few elite executives would result in richer content than 
conducting a survey or short-form interview of many executives. Thirteen senior 
executives were interviewed from companies in the UK and US. Reports from 
the interviews were analysed against the existing theoretical and empirical trust 
literature to explore consistencies, inconsistencies and novel conceptualisations.
Contributions of this Study and Implications for Further Research
This study found instances of homogeneity between the executive reports and 
the trust literature, extensions of concepts in the trust literature, and introduced 
some novel conceptualisations of trust in organisations that are worthy of further 
study. The definitions of trust cited in the literature are critical -  the chosen
definition for any study provides the contextual foundation for the researcher.
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Chapter 5 was dedicated to defining trust and provided a proposed typology that 
allowed for the dissection of several of the most widely cited definitions of trust 
appearing in the literature. By analysing the meanings underlying the lexicons, 
potentially important implications emerged. The executive reports demonstrated 
homogeneity with those definitions that were inclusive of both genuine and 
surrogate trust characteristics, and departed from those definitions that relied too 
exclusively on genuine characteristics (such as lack of control, goodwill, 
benevolence, loyalty, shared values and beliefs, leaps of faith, suspension of 
opportunism risks, no absolute prediction) or surrogate characteristics (such as 
contracts, controlling factors, responding to opportunism risks, risk assessment 
calculations, penalties, oversight). As the most cited definitions in the literature 
incorporate characteristics of both genuine and surrogate trust, including Dyer 
and Chu (2003), Sabel (1993), Ring and Van de Van (1992), Barney and Hansen 
(1994), and Zaheer et al. (1998), these executive reports further support this 
hybrid approach to defining trust. Specifically, these executive reports provide 
support for definitions that allow for the following characteristics: recognition of 
vulnerability to opportunism; willingness to assume risk; and a blending of trust 
substitutes that enhance rather than detract from trust. The recognition of 
vulnerability to opportunism appeared as a key characteristic in the executives’ 
attempts to define trust. This refers to the acknowledgement by both parties that 
there may be instances during the transaction where one party is more 
vulnerable to the actions of the other. For a transaction to take place, apart from 
acknowledgement of vulnerability, there must be a willingness to assume risk
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where absolute control over opportunistic behaviour is not possible. The ideal 
situation exists when there is an absence of opportunistic behaviour by the 
trustee so that the trustor may assume a vulnerable position with the expectation 
that he will not be taken advantage of. In business transactions, however, it may 
not be appropriate or responsible to make such assumptions. The executives 
supported the concept of utilising trust substitutes in exchange relationships, 
where the reasonable use of these substitutes provides a safeguard against the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour without damaging the evolving trust 
relationship. Used in appropriate measure, the senior executives report that trust 
substitutes can help build the foundation for maturing trust.
The executives supported the assertion from the literature that trust is a dynamic 
process that increases and decreases over time based on the actions taken by 
transactors (Powell 1996; Anderson and Narus 1990; Granovetter 1985; Gulati 
1995; Uzzi 1996; Axelrod 1984; Browning et al. 1995). Of most relevance to the 
executives is the further identification and study of specific actions and their 
consequences on the trust relationship (Whitener et al. 1998).
It is suggested that the possible existence of a trust paradox is worthy of further 
study. This extends Lewicki and Bunker’s (1996) assertion that there are limits to 
the value of building trust. The paradox lies in the notion that a willingness to 
trust too much may actually result in diminished trust. If there is too much shared 
vulnerability, the gap is so large that trust can’t fill it. Concern over the amount of
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risk itself may be sufficient to cause a loss of trust. The proposed trust paradox 
places a cap on the value of trust. This would be contrary to the belief that the 
more trust there is in a relationship, the stronger the relationship becomes and 
the more economic value can be gleaned for transacting parties.
MacSwiney’s experience that too many controls placed on his business had 
negative consequences for building trust supports Chan’s (2003) finding that 
controlling actions needed to build trust may actually decrease trust.
Baring supported the findings of Weber et al. (2005) when he attempted to 
replace his anxiety associated with dependence on a single person by inserting a 
trusted individual into the questionable environment. Richard’s experience that 
building trust takes more time and is more difficult than losing trust supports the 
same claim made by Lewicki and Bunker (1996; 2006).
Rigby and MacSwiney reinforced the findings of Chan (2003) when they reported 
that withholding punishment for transgressions can actually build trust. This was 
contrary to Richard’s assertion that one of the ways to build trust is to punish 
transgressors immediately. Further research into administering punishment and 
withholding punishment, and its effects on trust in the organisation may provide 
clarification to this contradiction.
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Rigby claims that trust takes precise coordination of partners is consistent with 
Ferrin et al.’s (2008) concept of interconnected spiralling relationships, and both 
Rigby and MacSwiney agree with the findings of Berger (1991) where trust is 
built through clear, honest and accurate communication.
An exploration of the concept of optimal trust yielded the reconsideration of a 
concept that has appeared in the literature for five decades (Horsburgh 1961; 
Wicks et al. 1999; Parkhe and Miller 2000; Davies and Rundall 2000; Jeffries and 
Reed 2000; Adler 2001; Malhotra and Murnighan 2003; Adobor 2006; Gargiulo 
and Ertug 2006). A review of responses from the executive interviews revealed 
evidence of optimal trust constructs in concept being practiced throughout many 
of their organisations. It was important to find evidence of these constructs in the 
responses to lend some validity to the conceptualisation of optimal trust to 
ensure this wasn’t an isolated notion. Integrating the work of the cited authors 
and the executive reports in this study yielded a model of optimal trust as a path 
laid out against a grid of high/low anticipated trust and high/low experienced 
trust. This allows for optimal trust to travel across the spectrum from optimal low 
trust interactions to optimal high trust interactions, recognising that not all optimal 
trust transactions must have a high level of trust for them to be valuable. The 
key distinction from other optimal trust models (Wicks et al. 1999; Adobor 2006) 
is the matching of anticipated trust between transactors and experienced trust 
between transactors, and the introduction of an optimal trust path.
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A new area if inquiry opens up when one considers the existence of an optimal 
amount of trust for every transaction. It could lead to the development of a 
process for charting an optimal trust path for transactions, as well as what criteria 
might steer the relationship on and off course. Defining the costs of under- 
trusting and over-trusting could lead to informed decisions on how much trust to 
invest in the relationship, and whether or not there will be a reasonable return on 
investing in trust. Adopting a model such as the one proposed in this thesis 
could change the types of decisions that are made by businesses, and impact 
the risk/reward strategies employed. Further research needs to be conducted to 
validate the proposed optimal trust model and the potential benefits that could 
come from its implementation.
This thesis also contributes to the literature on the economic value of trust in the 
organisation. Every executive in this study reported at least one economic impact of 
trust on their organisation. There were reports that trust is capital, another asset for 
the organisation to invest for desirable outcomes. It was described as a matter of 
coin, and that accounts of trust are built up and diminished based on actions taken. 
According to these executives, trust can be saved or spent depending on the 
requirements of the transaction or situation. It is used when the investment can 
provide a meaningful return to the company. For these senior executives, trust is 
another capital asset that is used when necessary to grow the business. Consistent 
with the widely cited literature, transactions carried out in their organisations have 
elements of trust and safeguards. Trust can result in fewer costly safeguards and the
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costs of the transaction are therefore reduced (Cummings and Bromiley 1996; Handy 
1993 for example). There was acknowledgement by the executives that trust plays an 
important role in the organisation and that it generally reduces costs when present and 
increases costs when absent, which is consistent with studies conducted by Dyer 
(1997), Barney and Hansen (1996), and Zaheer et al. (1998) among others. Among 
the executives’ reported economic benefits of trust (and consistent with the literature) 
are reduced contract and negotiating costs (Dyer and Chu 2003), reduced hiring costs 
(Uzzi 1996), greater employee retention (Dirks and Ferrin 2001), a flatter organisation 
with fewer levels of costly management (Robsen 2008), rapid adaptation to changing 
market conditions (competitive advantage), and greater financial stability (particularly 
during difficult economic times).
It is clear from the experience of these senior executives that trust, for them, 
doesn’t operate in isolation -  it is interconnected and permeates throughout the 
entire enterprise. Gaining or losing trust with one constituency may impact 
another constituency, such as a manager losing trust with an employee that has 
an effect on productivity, influencing the employee’s performance with a 
customer that in turn trusts the employee less based on poor performance. This 
interconnection of trust potentially extends to internal and external stakeholders. 
Janowicz-Panjaitan and Krishnan (2009) suggest a trickle-down effect where the 
poor handling of a trust violation at a senior level can negatively impact trust at 
lower levels of the organisation. However, the findings from the executive 
reports on the economic value of trust suggest that further research should be
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conducted into the full breadth of interconnections and impacts that trust has on 
the organisation, to include not only senior executives and employees, but 
shareholders, customers, suppliers and others associated with the company 
internally and externally.
The introduction of opportunity costs has the potential to further expand our 
understanding of the impact of trust on the economic health of the enterprise. In 
my review of the literature, I did not find a study that took into account lost 
opportunity costs when assessing the economic impact of trust in organisations. 
To illustrate this concept, consider the costs of turnover in a sales organisation 
where the turnover can be attributed to a loss of trust. There are the traditional 
costs associated with turnover such as severance packages, search firms, and 
training new salespeople. But what about the costs associated with the 
customers that aren’t being called upon because of the search and training 
activities being carried out by sales employees and executives? The hours spent 
addressing turnover are hours not spent devoted to generating new sales. The 
lost opportunities in this case are the revenue generating customers that were 
not acquired because the revenue generating employees were spending time 
hiring replacements for the departed employees. Further research on lost 
opportunity costs could add to our understanding of the full economic impact of 
trust on the organisation.
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The executives made extensive use of metaphors to convey their 
conceptualisations of trust in organisations that otherwise might not have been 
understood or easily comprehended. Given the potential significance associated 
with metaphor usage (Su 2002), the metaphors that appeared in the executive 
interviews were presented and analysed with the intention of possibly providing a 
novel approach to understanding how the executives think about trust in their 
organisations. Intentions associated with the use of specific metaphor categories 
were proposed based on the content of the metaphor. This study went beyond 
an examination of metaphor structure by placing the metaphors in categories 
with particular characteristics. It was proposed that their use of specific 
metaphors represent attempts by the executives to position trust within the more 
precise and predictable domain of engineering and finance, and the more 
emotional domain associated with religion, life and evolution, war and violence. 
It is suggested that these are complimentary domains and are necessary to 
represent the full breadth of the trust conceptualisations conveyed by the 
executives. Further analysis was conducted that placed the metaphors in 
contradictory categories that described trust as measurable and non-measurable, 
predictable and unpredictable, increasing and decreasing in a step manner, 
swinging like a pendulum, operating along a continuum and falling into certain 
qualitative levels, layers and stages. The concept of temporal tension (Bird 1998) 
was introduced to explain how contradiction is sometimes necessary to 
accurately convey the full breadth of conceptual complexities. It was proposed 
that, if a listener can determine how the speaker perceives trust through the use
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of metaphors, the listener may be able to build trust by giving an appropriate 
response. Further research into this area might involve empirical studies within 
the work environment to see if the executives’ use of metaphors is shared by 
employees, and how these metaphorical representations might be similar or 
different. This could have a variety of implications for areas such as effective 
communication, work productivity, negotiation, change management and conflict 
resolution.
The optimal trust path presented in Chapter 7 was used as the foundation for 
developing a proposed model for achieving optimal trust. The model integrates 
the key findings from executive interviews and the literature. It provides the 
steps for steering a transaction away from undertrusting and overtrusting, and 
toward an optimal trust path. The steps of the model are:
STEP ONE: 
STEP TWO: 
STEP THREE: 
STEP FOUR:
STEP FIVE: 
STEP SIX:
Negotiation of terms of the relationship
Enter a new transaction with defined transaction variables
Communicate and observe behaviours and actions
Take actions that adjust the conditions or terms of the
relationship
Work for balance of anticipated and experienced trust 
Achieve a balance of anticipated and experienced trust
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The executive reports provided the actions that help guide transacting parties 
toward an optimal path, such as being transparent, acting consistently, 
communicating clearly and honestly, immediately punishing acts of betrayal, and 
meeting expectations with reality. The executive reports also provided the 
economic benefits of trust. The outcomes of an optimal trust transaction might 
include reduced costs associated with contracting and hiring, a flatter 
organisation, and rapid adaptation to changing market conditions among others. 
In reviewing the full breadth of work conducted in the exploration of operational 
conceptualisations of trust in organisations, there appears to be a need for a 
comprehensive model that can be applied in companies for decision-making and 
corporate governance. In this proposed model I have defined the broad steps, 
specific tasks and expected outcomes, all of which may hold promise for making 
more optimal transacting partners. By adding to the list of actions that build and 
diminish trust (as suggested by the executive reports), and expanding on the 
study of the impacts of trust in the work environment (to include such 
considerations as lost opportunity costs), this could be a “living” model that 
adapts to the changing conditions and needs of the multiple constituencies 
present in organisational ecosystems.
Concluding Remarks
I have gone to great lengths to insure that I was not presenting the senior 
executive reports as somehow more “right” than other assertions made in the
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literature. At no time should it be inferred that I am agreeing with the executives 
rather than reporting their experiences.
This study begins to fill a gap in the trust literature created by the scarcity of 
research exploring senior executive conceptualisations of trust in the 
organisation. My motivation was to understand the perspective of those 
responsible for the governance and strategic decision-making of the organisation 
as it related to trust. The idea for this thesis emerged after a comprehensive 
review of the literature, and the genuine concern that organisational trust 
research as a scholarly discipline had not yet explored the rich perspective of 
corporate leadership. As a long-time consultant and business owner, I have 
always had a curiosity regarding trust in the organisation. This general area of 
inquiry led me to explore the relevant literature while serving as CEO of a 
software company. My objective in undertaking this PhD was to understand how 
trust manifests itself in transactions, and how the organisation might benefit from 
building trust with every interaction.
The executives interviewed for this study are successful business leaders 
responsible for managing a variety of relationships in the work environment. 
That is not to say that their opinions are representative of all executives. This 
study provided an in-depth analysis of their particular conceptualisations of trust. 
Placed in proper context, their experiences are their own, and yet they provide 
rare and important insights into the executives’ trust experiences and
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conceptualisations. What became immediately clear was that they had thought 
deeply about trust as a normal part of their duties, and they could communicate 
their thoughts on the subject without reference to any situation other than their 
immediate working environment. What was important to me as a researcher 
(understanding their definitions of trust, for example), was not necessarily 
relevant to them. For these executives, application is paramount. As such, they 
each expressed a desire to understand the specific trust-building actions they 
could perform and the consequences of those actions. They want to know how 
to put a monetary figure on their actions, how to measure performance and 
progress, and how they can develop an implementable model that creates a 
business case for investing in trust. These are fertile areas for further research.
This thesis has explored important areas of inquiry reported directly by those with 
significant influence over the strategic decisions made in companies that drive 
economies. The conclusions drawn from this study provide additional 
considerations for researchers as they explore the dynamics of trust in 
organisations.
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APPENDIX
Semi-structured Interview Questionnaire
1. How do you define trust in relation to your organisation?
2. Is trust important to your organisation? If so, in what ways? If not, 
why?
3. How do you build trust in your organisation?
4. How do others build trust with you?
5. How is trust diminished in your organisation?
6. How do you use trust for advantage in your organisation (what are the 
rewards)?
7. How has trust resulted in disadvantages for your organisation (what 
are the punishments)?
8. Has trust played a role in building the company? If so, how? If not, 
why?
9. Will it play a role in the future operation of the company? If so, how? If 
not, why?
10. Do you measure trust? If so, how?
11. Do you actively seek high trust relationships? If so, what are the 
criteria?
12. Is there an economic value of trust? If so, what is it and how is it 
demonstrated? If not, why?
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Metaphors Used by Executives
Science Metaphors Entropy metaphor
I would take the view that in the absence of the creation of 
trust, there is no neutral—trust is a dynamic -  it is moving 
all the time. If you’re not creating, encouraging and 
developing trust in your relationships, it falls into distrust. 
It’s like entropy -  that of its own, in the absence of 
knowledge, in the absence of information, in the absence 
of clarity, in the absence of goals people can reach, in the 
absence of achievements they can be rewarded for, in the 
absence of structures, cultural structures, that reward the 
people that everyone knows are doing a good job, and 
punish the people that are not, that there is a sense of 
fairness and equity in the world, people will inevitably 
distrust.
Biology metaphor: trust is the core -  everything else 
just symptoms
You must understand how much it has coloured my 
thinking in my whole life. The first time I have had an 
opportunity, since Micrografx, to start a new company 
from zero - from ground up -  perfectly blank slate - 1 made 
a conscious decision that I was always going to act in a 
way that increased the trust of those other people I work 
with. That every single, definable significant activity was 
going to be one that increased trust. You have no idea 
how much you resonated with me that day when you said 
trust. I think about it all the time because I think that 
companies will succeed on almost nothing but trust... 
because at the end of the day, companies are a big bunch 
of people all piled in a bunch of rooms doing stuff. People 
talk about companies being learning companies and 
inspiring and having creativity and being full of energy and 
going somewhere...bull. All of those things are the visible 
symptoms of something else inside that organisation, and 
I believe it's because you have a group of people who are 
choosing to trust all the other participants in the 
business... at least enough so that it's a positive, and that 
there are reinforcing mechanisms for it to grow on a near 
endless basis. And that is only done by somebody 
leading the way. Somebody has to start. So when I 
started Library House... it was the first business I 
started... just this teeny little business, but it's a perfect
303
condition for experimentation. I was obsessed coming out 
of Micrografx with starting a company that shared none of 
its attributes... I wanted nothing like that. And I didn't 
really give a shit whether that was the optimal way to grow 
a company. I only hold the belief I’m telling you now after 
running Library House for two years, because when I 
started Library House I thought it might be neat to have a 
little fun. To be honest, I started Library House because I 
really wanted to run a think tank that would be influential 
on policy in governments, and social issues, and I wasn’t 
rich enough to fund a nonprofit, and nobody would hire 
me to run one because I have zero qualifications for it. So 
I figured I would build my own bully pulpit. It sounded like 
a really cool idea. So I was trying to invent a little 
business that could do research that could then put the 
organisation in a position to espouse a view, an analytical 
view, a think tank view on societal and policy issues that 
relate to my area of interest. But I was starting a for-profit 
business... how do I make a profit? Because it needed to 
fund itself to grow. So I started it for whimsical reasons, if 
you think about it. But when I started it I thought I'm not 
ever, ever, ever going to have anything like Micrografx 
ever again... nothing like that. I cannot have a 
fundamental culture of distrust, where everybody distrusts 
everybody, where people are always hiding, where every 
bad behaviour comes back to the fact that “I couldn't tell 
Doug that”...
Biology metaphor (cancer)
Hire slow, fire fast. I deeply believe that if somebody is 
untrustworthy, they should be removed from the business 
full stop. They should be excised and taken out of the 
business because they will simple corrupt the business 
comprehensively, but that is not how the world works. 
You may know they are untrustworthy because you are 
careful and understanding of what constitutes a trust act 
and a non-trust act, but you may not be empowered 
simply because they may not have acted in the way that 
permits you to fire them.
Biology metaphor (permeable membrane)
It is a permeable membrane -  the edge of a business. 
“Permeable membrane” in science, is the edge of the cell 
wall -  things pass through it. So impermeable membrane 
means it is a full stop -  you can’t get through it. The edge 
of a business is very, very permeable. Many people
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within a business touch many people outside that 
business, and therefore, what a business is is simply not 
comprised, its brand, how it’s viewed, as an entity is the 
sum of all of those engagements to the outside world. 
However much we might want to control it otherwise, we 
don’t, and we fool ourselves heroically if we think that we 
control the brand image of a business merely by saying 
“here we are, here’s our advertising, here’s our collateral, 
here’s our marketing, here’s our whatever” because the 
fact of the matter is a business’s relationship to the 
outside world touches at a thousand points because very, 
very few people in the business only touch other people 
inside the business. There are many, many, many, many 
different people they touch. There are lots and lots of 
stakeholders, and in the most subtle ways businesses can 
be viewed negatively and viewed as an untrustworthy 
business. So, yes, if somebody is a corrupting influence, 
that corruption will spread, and what reminded me how 
somebody recently came into the business who wasn’t 
acting in a trusting fashion didn’t come in a neutral point, 
at the very least, how quickly it caused -  internally within 
the business and externally in certain parts, and had I not 
intervened quickly, that would have created a different 
business very quickly and that would have been a 
corruption that would have spread very quickly throughout 
the whole business. Businesses do not have tight edges. 
So, if there is a person in some organisation or there is a 
division inside that operates with other divisions, however 
granularly you care to ask the question, even on the level 
of the individual people, which is where it ultimately 
happens -- as soon as somebody acts in a way that is 
untrustworthy, it will simply spread throughout that portion 
of the business and it will spread to lots and lots of points 
outside the business, and those points outside the 
business will then, whether they do it expressly or 
provertly (sic), or implicitly, will act towards that business 
and towards others who act towards that business so that 
business will have its brand, what it is, the world’s view of 
it will shift.
Natural and physical science metaphor
It’s like the difference between natural and physical 
sciences. When you observe pure science and natural 
science and you are observing the behaviour of cellular 
organisms or anything, but you may not be in a position 
initially in complex systems to be able to measure
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precisely what’s going on, but you can observe them and 
therefore see themes and trends and examples and 
emergent behaviours. That’s just as scientific...that 
observational analysis is just as useful in the biological 
sciences as the measuring of speed of particles is in the 
physical sciences so too in trust just because it’s a 
phenomenon that you are actively observing doesn’t 
mean that it has to be quantified -  oh he’s got one unit, he 
has two -  you don’t have to count but you do have to 
observe, analyse, and understand.
Liquid fast metaphor
If you go to the Applebee Horse Fair - the Applebee Horse 
Fair which is a horse fair in the north of England where 
typically Irish tinkers, but some other people come 
together for one weekend and they buy and sell horses. 
This is a very disparate group of people who come from 
all over England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland and 
although the communities do know each other, 
nonetheless it's a real caveat emptor culture. What you 
see is what you buy. If it turns out bad, that's your 
problem. The culture is quite clear. The degree of trust is 
very low - deliberately very low. That is what makes this a 
liquid fast efficient market work. You don't have to have 
much trust. You see what one party’s got. You know 
what it is. You buy it.
Biology metaphor
Trust permeates a contract in the sense that every detail, 
every single living breathing detail of default and a remedy 
is spelled out or it can be a more general level of trust.
Litmus test metaphor
I think trust is simply - the absence of trust or presence of 
trust is sort of litmus issue isn't it? You engage with one 
party and you say you trust the other party"? And they 
say yes or nothing. If they say no, then the trust is gone.
Gardening metaphor
You have to seed some vulnerabilities or some 
opportunities to see whether you can get some trust 
feedback.
Fragile metaphor (crystallise)
You sometimes see a case - you can present something 
which is absolutely the opposite of what may be right just
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to crystallise the mind that the other thing is right. If there 
is a suspicion within a business that will be held against 
you, mishandled, that is a type of trust which is being 
broken. This is talking about a trust in a procedure not a 
trust in terms of whether somebody has nicked the petty 
cash or not.
Biology metaphor (business as a living thing that 
dishonesty kills)
Quite commonly dishonesty of that nature is covered up 
because it seemed to be so damaging if customers and 
suppliers know about it. If you want to cover it up, it's the 
end of a business. It will die within five or ten or fifteen 
years because you have a dishonesty that has been 
caught, and it has not been rewarded, but it has not being 
punished.
Biology metaphor (dishonesty is degenerative 
disease)
Although that conflicts with my view that dishonesty is a 
degenerative disease once you've committed the first.
Biology metaphor (cheating is degenerative)
Tax advice is very difficult - the difference between 
avoidance and evasion. Evasion is dishonest; avoidance 
some would say is dishonest, but it is organising your 
affairs in complete disclosure but beating the Chancellor 
at the game. What we have always said to such people 
is, that evasion mark, forget even the morality of it for it's 
not for me to tell another person the morality of it, but it is 
also stupid because you get into that field and you are so 
busy fiddling around with that for a few pence that you 
miss the avoidance which may be several millions. The 
avoidance is legal, honest, disclosed. Some would say it's 
not moral but then that depends upon your view of how or 
why tax should be paid. But at least it's clear. You do 
see that the people who cheat on the little things, their aim 
is the game and cheating is degenerative because it gets 
bigger and bigger.
Weather metaphor
The long term growth is likely to be better than expected 
in the industry it's in. The risk is slightly less than would 
be the norm for the industry it's in because they may find 
if you are a trustworthy, decent organisation, you can 
weather a storm much better.
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Biology metaphor (disease)
We don't accept that dishonesty is degenerative, is a 
disease.
Biology metaphor (permeation)
You are assuming that a common pattern of behaviour 
would permeate right through the organisation, and young 
Leeson came from a different background, and didn't 
really owe any allegiance to that tradition.
Biology metaphor (breeding)
Here’s the challenge -  you want to be honest. Honesty 
breeds trust more than anything. The challenge is, it’s 
hard to be honest with unpredictable facts.
Engineering, 
System and Spatial 
Metaphors
Process metaphor (step function)
(Trust) is a step function... not a smooth process. When 1 
say it's a process, it doesn't necessarily mean it's a 
continuous flow process.
Object metaphor (trust is handed-off)
It’s not whether you are to be trusted. It’s whether they 
choose to be trusting that we are talking about. Trust has 
nothing to do with the recipient - it only has to do with the 
presenter - the person who hands off trust. To my mind 
the words you are trusted aren’t real -  that doesn’t 
describe it -  it is a misstatement. The statement is “1 trust 
you”, not “you are trusted”. It has nothing to do with you... 
it has to do with me. It has to do with me trusting you. 
Therefore, trust is a frame of mind. Trust is an active 
thing 1 am projecting toward you. And in order to get them 
there, you have a process of getting them trusting.
Engineering metaphor (forcing function for step 
phase change)
The trust is the same. Whether you abuse that trust or 
not doesn't change the character of the trust. It changes 
the consequences of the trust. There is just trust - either 1 
trust you or 1 don't. And it's either I'm trusting you more 
overtime or less overtime, and 1 would assert that it is a 
step function. Meaning that it kind of cruises along at a 
certain level once it's been established at that level until 
activities make it change... either it steps up or it steps
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down. You could think of it in engineering terms. There 
must be a forcing function for step phase change...there 
has to be some function, some activity, that forces a step 
up ora step down.
Engineering metaphor (trust is a tool)
The most effective management tool I can imagine is 
being very effective at the forcing functions that cause 
people to increase the amount they trust you. And I can 
imagine no other thing that is more powerful -- in 
achieving... either management in a corporation or to 
getting a cult... or to getting a girl to love you, or anything.
Spatial metaphor: (must be from Mars for hiring 
someone solely based on trust)
All of a sudden, I was from Mars, because he literally 
could not imagine... and quite frankly, most people 
couldn't imagine ever contemplating hiring somebody 
without reading a resume. But I hadn't gotten around to it. 
There was the pressure of time... this conversation had to 
happen... I had agreed to have the conversation... and 
Mark is somebody I trust, and he told me that he trusted 
this guy implicitly... and I trust Mark implicitly. So I hadn't 
really thought it through very well. Usually I would have 
read the resume so I could have a more intelligent 
conversation, but it hadn't crossed my mind. He said, “I 
can't believe you’re hiring me and you haven't read my 
resume”. I said ‘Til tell you what... I promise to read your 
resume, but can we just get you hired now so we can get 
off the phone?”
Space metaphor (edge of the universe)
I'll tell you what, I’ll make a deal with you. You describe to 
me precisely the edge of the universe, and I'll tell you how 
to measure trust.
Engineering metaphor (complex systems)
How do you measure trust? I'll tell you what you can do - 
you can note whether it is going up or down over a period 
of time as between both individuals and generally within 
the context of the Corporation, and you do it through the 
proxies of people's behaviours. There's a certain type of 
behaviour... I think of it as an emergent property of a 
company where people trust one another. I happen to be 
into emergent properties these days, complex systems. I 
believe that what bubbles out of a trusting company is a
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series of ways of working, where things are uncommonly 
efficient, where the business hums, where people just go 
and get done what needs to get done, where they've 
worked out all those trivialisations that we hear about 
endlessly. I read endlessly about how these companies 
will spend millions and millions of dollars building these 
facilities where they have creative spaces, networking 
spaces and open plans to encourage dialogue and to 
embolden creativity-- we're talking about desks and chairs 
and walls. Talk about procrastination, talk about diverting 
yourself from the real issues. If a bunch of people trust 
each other, I've got news for you... you can kind of put 
them into any old space... space is fucking irrelevant. 
How many gazillions of dollars have been spent in the 
world doing things like facilities to create a better business 
- you have got to be kidding me.
Adhesive bond metaphor (trust is core bond)
(Trust) is the core bond between all individuals in the 
organisation as they relate to each other within their 
culture of the organisation.
Engineering (mechanical) metaphor
Therefore, it is a core element of profitability. It’s a core 
element of pace of growth. Trust becomes the underlying 
mechanism by which companies are either fast growth or 
not.
Flexor metaphor (tension causes cracks and 
fractures)
All businesses go through moments of tension, and if it 
does, businesses win and lose battles. Businesses go 
through points of stress due to capital, or competitors, or 
anything. They’re external, they do not operate in 
vacuums. The growth of a business is not inevitable; in 
fact there is nothing inevitable about it. It is a force of will 
upon the world, and therefore, you are in combat with 
others, you are in tension with the world, and those 
tensions translate into the business, and the business has 
to have the integral strength to be able to handle those 
body blows as they happen. If you don’t have strong 
bonds of trust within the organisation, then the 
organisation becomes brittle. It doesn’t absorb and then 
cracks or fractures.
Flexor metaphor (no flex in the company)___________
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One can grow a company that is quite Stalinist. One can 
grow a company where everything is measured and 
people are incredibly repressed, and those can also be 
successful companies, but I think that in fact those 
companies also suffer from an underbelly of weakness in 
that they don’t flex at all. Therefore, so long as the market 
conditions that permit that machine that’s been built to be 
very efficient, then that’s a mechanism.
Flexor metaphor (stress on the company causes 
fracture)
I’ve seen this in sales cultures that are brutal. I’ve seen 
companies where everybody is measured all the time in a 
million different ways, and considerable company 
resources are put into it, and those companies were 
efficient, but I’ve also seen that as soon as the 
unexpected comes along, those companies rarely, 
especially ones that grow in scale, and this is especially 
the issue, once you are beyond the visible horizon, once 
you are a CEO and you no longer can talk to everyone, in 
fact you are talking to people who talk to people who talk 
to people who talk to people, and therefore everything is 
beyond the visible, companies that are built in the mode 
where everything is measured and everything is 
accounted for, and there is essentially no trust... trust is 
not put into the equation in the first place, it is a 
functionally described organisation without any reference 
to culture. Those companies tend to literally crack when it 
is sufficiently adheres to severe stress; the dynamic from 
the outside hits them.
Flexor metaphor (no flex in the system)
K-Mart was as military an operation that had ever been 
built. They just had no flex in their system. But, as a 
metaphor for running a business, the advantage of trust is 
that you can grow more efficient organisation -- it goes 
right to the bottom line, and this ties to profit. And 
business is about profit.
Spectrum metaphor (trust runs across a spectrum)
The harsh underside of that is if someone, on more than 
occasion, acts in a fashion that is untrustworthy, you have 
to go exactly to the opposite side of the spectrum. You 
have to assume that they are, in fact, untrustworthy. And, 
therefore, act in a manner with them that protects yourself 
completely.______________________________________
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Pendulum swing metaphor (the trust pendulum)
I think the world goes through a pendulum swing. I think 
the western world in the last 50 or 75 or 100 years has 
gone through a series of phases where the notion of a 
corporation as an entity to be trusted or distrusted goes 
through sort of a cycle. Corporations will go through a 
period where they become trusted, they become paternal 
or maternal or benign or benevolent and then inevitably 
some high profile series of incidents show that most 
corporations are not to be trusted and that trust is 
shattered and then “the pendulum swings the other way 
too far” and then it is assumed that all corporations are 
not to be trusted, and therefore, it spreads across the 
entire business culture, and a lot of businesses knee jerk 
react to that by clamping down as it were, and that is a 
metaphor, by letting their internal culture, even if they had 
a culture of trust, dispel so that they can be seen to be 
taking action. I think that that is action without merit 
especially if you are in a trust based culture.
Distance metaphor (further trust)
You trust them this far. Somebody else you trust that far.
Functional trust metaphor (trust has a function)
One of the advantages of venture capital is of course we 
are stewards of other people's money so the great 
advantage is when I engage with an entrepreneur, I can 
say, "Look, I look after other people's money, not my 
money.” And if it comes to the crunch, and we have this 
degree of trust, but it's contrary to my investor's interest to 
do something, but you want me to do it and you’re relying 
on this bond of trust, I’m not going to do it. I’m always 
going to act in the interests of my investors. That's what 
I'm paid to do. I'm a steward. That's very helpful - it 
blows the cobwebs away and gets rid of the emotional 
trust and brings it back to - I guess what it does is, 
professional trust, functional trust.
Matching mechanism metaphor (trust matches similar 
characteristics)
So maybe what trust is in the end is a sort of subtle 
matching mechanism, which if you can get two people to 
look alike, think alike, feel alike, be alike, then they can 
meld into a contract which will never get articulated in 
legal terms but which gets fulfilled. Whereas if you have a
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mismatch, culturally, financially, whatever, then you do 
need something to tie the two together and trust can't do 
it. You won't get trust with that mismatch and that's when 
you need to use a contract to make the two work.
Managing back metaphor
The disadvantage, of course, is the expectation that you 
will trust and be trusted, and sometimes the trust, for 
whatever reason, misunderstanding or whatever, you 
don't want to trust as much as you used to trust. 
Somehow you've got to manage coming back from trust. 
Or, in my case, as an investor, I'm a steward of other 
people's money. I have to go through the hoops. I might 
want to trust completely and say "Ray, it doesn't even 
need a letter." "All we'll do is shake hands on it today and 
you get on with it." I'm a regulated fund manager. I have 
big institutions that give me money to manage. They 
would expect me to have a process. So, therefore, we've 
got to wind trust back and say "but I'm sorry Ray, we're 
going to have to go through these hoops" even though it 
seems to be undermining trust because I'm a steward of 
other people's money, I have to be seen to be going 
through the processes. So that's one disadvantage of 
trust - is sometimes you can appear not to live up to it.
Layer metaphor
The other thing, of course, is how you reach a layer of 
trust. What happens if you lose confidence? If you lose 
trust. If you don't trust that person as much somehow 
you've got to manage the relationship back down to a 
layer of less trust and more formal exchange of 
information and decision making - more investigating - 
more due diligence - more contracts - without pissing 
them off and making them feel untrustworthy or unvalued. 
They are all emotional people. I get this problem quite a 
lot - it's a big problem. "Don't you trust me"? "Of course I 
trust you, but..." I guess the way we manage our way 
around it - one of the good things about it is, again, you 
must rely on this idea that you are being a steward of 
other people's money.
Trust spectrum metaphor
With a high value investment where you've got more 
formal management or contractual arrangements, you 
have to trust less. The mandatory degree of trust is 
reduced because the contract is underpinning it, whereas
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if all you've just got is ordinary shares and less contractual 
influence, you have to trust a very high degree because 
you are relying on the management to communicate with 
you to fulfill that side of the bargain.
Nimble metaphor
It means they are quick to market and quick on their feet 
and more adaptable. The classic business of being able 
to out-manoeuvre large corporations because the trust 
component in a smaller organisation means that 
information can be shared more quickly and evaluated 
more quickly and new plans are put into place more 
quickly. Direction change more quickly -- and for us that's 
absolutely right. When it works, then the communication 
back to us as the investor compliments and reinforces that 
nimbleness of foot in the development of the business.
Distance metaphor (trust stages moving)
What was going wrong in the business is that nobody 
would tell him because they mistrusted what would 
happen if they did tell him. Yet clear mistakes were being 
made. This sort of trust element moved one stage further, 
people would never hire anybody in that build-up that 
could possibly be a threat to them because they feared 
that the Chairman might turn around and say that person 
you hired is better than you, we are going to put him over 
the top of you or demote you or he'll have your job and 
you'll be demoted. So, an effect of this was employees 
not trusting where the company might go and, therefore, 
using every possible device to ensure that nobody else 
came into the company that could threaten their particular 
patch. That is a perfectly normal type of reaction trying to 
protect your patch. It's extremely difficult to get an 
environment where people only ever hire people better 
than themselves. Businesses which expand fast and 
grow only grow if your senior men only hire people who 
have capabilities that are as good as or possibly better 
than their own. The moment there is a culture brought by 
trust or otherwise, that you never hire anybody who might 
be a threat or who might be better than you and seem to 
be better than you.
Integrity shift metaphor
The culture of misbehaviour by a very small number of 
people at the top permeates down. In the extreme, you 
get a flunky who eventually gets to the position of power
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so he, himself, believes he should be entitled to help 
himself to company funds. Once you are helping yourself 
to a lunch that costs 30 pounds, it is a very small move to 
helping yourself to half a million stolen over four years. It 
is a very small move, because the fundamental shift has 
taken place, the integrity shift has happened. So as an 
advisor to people I have always said, “Never, never take 
benefits out of your business”. If you are an owner of a 
business or an executive, you are paid a lot, you get a 
dividend, and you have the ownership, do these things 
privately in your life.
Topping-up metaphor
I don't think you have to keep topping it up. I think you 
can get in a behaviour pattern. Businesses are so strange 
because trust and behaviour gets embodied, people may 
come into the business and go out of the business that 
don't conform, who aren't trustworthy, but they don't 
necessarily damage their underlying behaviour.
Level metaphor
And he always knew, and it was the truth, that I always 
did everything for him that I could - the best. So what was 
that level of trust? It built up to a level, whereas as a 
professional now, half of all effort in professional offices is 
covering your back, getting letters of indemnity, escape 
clauses, caveats, building a file to protect every decision, 
and not making very fast deals where a lot of research is 
not done, a lot of guessing - you don't go and have a 
day's meeting with people speaking every language and 
put a deal together and shake and confirm on it, as an 
accountant without having done all the homework, but you 
do if you have a man with a level of trust that is so high 
that you know there can never be an issue of risk.
Placement metaphor
One of the interesting things is if you mistakenly 
misplaced your trust, the greater your quality of level of 
that trust at the moment when you find it was misplaced.
Step to slide metaphor
Once you’re putting that out as a story and you know it's 
dishonest and your people know it's dishonest, and 
people just look at it as a spin for advertising, you’ve 
begun to take the step, and so the culture has begun to 
be there within the business, and that begins to become a
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slide.
Creep metaphor
We have a very topical one at the moment with Shell. I 
have a friend who, a woman who is sort of a consultant, 
and she'd go in and deal with a sort of office environment 
- 7, 8, 10 years ago she did a lot of work for Shell. And 
talking about it, she said if you really knew what I knew 
about the culture of Shell, you would not hold any shares 
in that company. I said "what do you mean"? She said 
"well it's just completely wrong - the management 
relationships are completely wrong - it's stuck in a time 
warp, but the relationships are also wrong." I said "well, 
everybody in the investment world knows that you never 
sell Shell." Well, here we are ten years on actually -  and 
she had sensed something that was emerging - just 
creeping in there was become a pattern of dishonesty.
Construction metaphor
If you want to build a business now - if you set it up and 
build it with trust, you will ultimately succeed.
Cycle metaphor
So, you get a 30 year old who sets up a business with 
decent principles, who generates trust, generates good­
will and grows that business. He eventually retires at 60 
and less able people are replacing him because they tend 
to go from extroverts and innovators who may well be 
honest to grey or boring or greedy. That's where I tend to 
think businesses tend to go in cycles. I think if you look at 
a lot of small operations that behave in a very trustworthy 
manner and proportionately it seems as businesses get 
bigger the less.
Soaring on the back metaphor
The trouble is, in the short term profits can soar on the 
back of untrustworthy, dishonourable, and fairly rotten 
behaviour.
Driver metaphor
I think it is completely a fundamental business driver - 
trust and honesty. There are so in fact close - trust and 
honest dealing.
Slide metaphor
If you are slightly second rate, maybe the only customer
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you can get is somebody who is a bit marginal, a bit 
crooked, somebody who will turn a blind eye - all I want is 
an accountant to turn the blind eye or a banker who will 
turn the blind eye or a lawyer - you don't mind a bit of 
back dating do you? I need your help sometimes with 
documents. So you are slightly second rate -  a nod is as 
good as a wink. That's the beginning of the slide. So, it's 
because people are doing things that are very slightly 
second rate, and you get sucked in.
Technology metaphor (computer handshake)
Our theoretical background to trust is probably built on 
two things. I had to come at it with a computing paradigm 
which is very much the kind of handshake type protocols - 
I've got a piece of information that has come down the 
wire. How do I know who it's from? How do I tell that 
piece of - how do I send back to the person who sent me 
that piece of information that I am who I am? Basically 
how do we handshake? And I think there's a lot in that, so 
essentially you are seeing Craig at Microsoft, this is a 
good idea because I think that the Computing Paradigm is 
a very, very good one and is boiling down to the essence 
of a transaction of communication.
System metaphor
We expected the wider system to enforce honesty at 
certain levels, and that breaks down if the feedback loop 
isn’t there. At this point in time money laundering is a 
very good example of that where you have tremendous 
amounts of money laundering regulations but no feedback 
about "are we catching anybody”? How many reports 
were made? What happens to them? So you've got no 
feedback in the system and, therefore, the trust also 
breaks down.
Networks metaphor
We use models like this in this office fairly frequently here 
in terms of the way we build our trust networks.
Interest alignment metaphor
A lot of people talk about aligning interest as either an 
indicator of trust or as a mechanism to achieve trust. I 
have a problem with it certainly in the first role because I 
can trust somebody to do something, and I'm not sure that 
their interests are in aligned with mine. I sail a lot - so 
there are loads of people out there who like to be seen by
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their communities to be life savers and run after lifeboats 
and institutes and things like that. I'll be counting on them 
if I ever had an accident, so I'm not in any way shame 
them. They don't know me at all. They are out there, and 
if I put in a distress call and they come out and save me, 
they are doing it for their team. They are doing it for their 
community. They are doing it because of the way they 
perceive themselves. But I expect them to come out and 
deliver. My trust in them is that they will deliver what they 
say they will.
System metaphor (less volatility)
[Trust means less] volatility in the system. Look at 
something as simple as a supplier/buyer relationship. 
Less time arguing. Less time over contracts. Less time 
querying things. You ring me up I tell you, Guy, same as 
usual. When do you need it? Next Friday? You'll have it 
by next Friday. Usual price? That's right Guy. That's a 
much more efficient relationship than "How do I know 
when I'm going to get that Mike"? "Can you give me any 
guarantees on that"? "What happens if you don't 
deliver"?
Semi-autonomy metaphor
I did not enjoy real knowledge of what was going on, 
because I did not have a relationship around the world 
with the members of this company such that they told me 
what was going on. In every different place there were 
pockets and groups that just trusted each other. And this 
culture of semi-autonomy, that's a metaphor really for 
reservation of trust, in the sense that they weren't working 
with each other and they had gotten into the habit of not 
working with each other, and the development 
organisation was semi-autonomous, and had developed a 
culture of trust only on to itself, and therefore viewed all of 
these other organisations not as clients, but frankly as 
challengers to do their autonomy. You don't trust people 
who challenge you -  you’re not on the same side of the 
fence.
System metaphor (efficiency)
The more you squeeze the volatility out of the system, the 
more efficient the system is. The more you squeeze that 
out it affects the system all over.
Construction metaphor___________________________
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So if you can achieve a lot of transactions very rapidly, 
trust will build up.
Bond metaphor
Imagine we have an organisation where our word is our 
bond.
Sweet spot metaphor
There is some optimal zone for trust. This is the right 
level of trust in society taking into account the full range of 
interactions. When you’ve got too much trust, you wind 
up with con men and make you wind up with volatility in 
the system. When you have too little trust, you wind up 
with high transaction costs, and again, you have more 
volatility in the system. So, basically somewhere there’s a 
sweet spot of the right level of trust.
Bond metaphor
It was very important in the merchant banking world, not 
only within the organisation but between the organisation 
and its clients and customers. The phrase "my word is 
my bond" typified the stock exchange in its traditional 
style and was very important. Yes you did have legal 
agreements but those usually came very much at the end 
when the operation was about to involve other parties 
outside so it became a public interest in one form or 
another.
Cavity metaphor
I can remember even the last part of 1983 and 1986 and 
1989 when I left Barings, this was already becoming 
apparent and there were some individuals there who - I 
think we all recognised that they could make a big 
contribution to the business but they needed an 
underpinning of controls, and I think that the firm just 
failed to find the right way through to that control system. 
It was a different relationship and it was felt that by 
introducing some of the trusted figures into their part of 
the organisation one could achieve the similar knowledge. 
There were some definite cavities in the organisation -  a 
hollowness.
Spatial metaphor (boxed in/new fields)
[Trust] gives the business flexibility. It gives individuals 
room in which to move instead of being boxed in. It was 
great job satisfaction provided there was enough motive
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power given from the top, and the business didn’t rely too 
much on its past reputation - that's always a danger - and 
stopped being active. That happened to some of the 
comparable businesses in the city of London. They just 
faded out. I suppose instinctively they were trying to 
preserve what had been gained in the past rather than 
going out and seeking new fields to distinguish 
themselves. In the end it's quite a narrow path you have 
to pursue between these two extremes.
Placement metaphor
I remember one subsidiary where the manager 
consistently put a gloss on the results which was 
accepted because he had been there a long time and 
people who were his controllers thought they knew him 
and found out their trust to some extent had been 
misplaced. It was a disaster.
Machine metaphor
And it can happen at the head of an organisation where 
an individual or a group of individuals rule the roost and 
their colleagues put their trust in them without perhaps 
thinking it through and then a major error is made -  the 
machinery isn't there to question it, but it could equally 
happen much lower down.
Lubricant metaphor
[Trust] does have an economic value. It oils the wheels in 
a sense. Things work smoothly. It cuts out some of the 
friction.
Macro/micro metaphor
On one hand you want to trust the people you work for as 
individuals. So it depends on what level you are talking 
about. This is the difference between the micro and the 
macrocosms. On a microcosm, my staff -  I say “we trust 
Scott and he does the right thing for us and gives fair 
raises and he’s open and transparent about his policies; 
and his door is always open, and I can talk to him 
confidentially -  he doesn’t leak it.” All of that is trust in a 
microcosm sense. In a macrocosm sense, it’s like, what if 
I say to my staff “well I’m going to do the right thing, but 
I’m overruled by someone higher up the chain.” So, they 
go “well, I trust my microcosm, but I don’t like the macro.” 
Usually, for me, as an individual, that is embodied by the 
CEO, in my view, because the CEO can make the rules
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and set the tenor and all that.
Construction (destruction) metaphor
Destroy trust and you are probably losing the customer.
If you’ve destroyed all trust.
Level metaphor
When you get regulations it’s because the trust level is so 
low that people don’t think it’s rehabilitatable by the people 
violated the trust.
Fence metaphor
So, it's important to have trust with suppliers and part of 
that is creating processes that provide safety for both sides, 
So what did Mark Twain say..."Good fences make good 
neighbours?" You may have a trustful relationship but the tr 
might be compromised if someone thinks you might have 
stolen something.
Circle metaphor
So the interesting trust question becomes if you had a bad 
experience in one circle, how does it affect your decisions if 
other circles and how does that affect the company? If 
someone buys XP at home, and there's a vulnerability that 
their identity is stolen or their kids are exposed to pornograj 
on the Internet or whatever bad things, and they hold us 
responsible. What happens when the salesman from Micro; 
goes in and says "I want you to buy 500 copies of Windov 
And he goes "my identity was stolen." "Well that was ; 
home
life, not here." "Yeah, but so what." "Your company left a b 
taste in my mouth." "You weren't responsible with this or w 
that." So, it's actually probably, especially with IT being so 
widely distributed, it's probably an interesting difference.
Aggregate metaphor
You have to think about the aggregation -- the individual 
actions plus aggregation. The individual action is "did you 
treat that shareholder well"? "Did you respond to their 
complaint"? "Did you also respond to that shareholder in 
their consumer capacity when they called up saying the 
product didn't work and they wanted a refund?" "Did you 
treat that consumer well when he was on the job using 
your product that had a problem”? If you want to measure 
trust, the measurement has these three distinct 
components in it that have to be aggregated. They may
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not all be positive experiences. Some may be positive. 
Some may be negative. 1 think it's somewhat common 
sense that people aggregate a lot of experiences but their 
next door neighbour is their best friend and their spouses. 
Based on an aggregate they have that feeling of "1 like 
that guy or 1 don't like that guy.” "1 trust them with my life." 
"1 wouldn't trust them as far as 1 could throw them."
Asymmetry metaphor
So what we often say you have to think about asymmetric 
risk which is if you make the right decision, your business 
may improve and you'll have the good return and that's 
great and it helps the company as a whole but it mostly 
helps you as your contribution. If you make the wrong 
decision, the risk isn't just to you. The whole brand takes 
the visible public hit. So to some extent when you make 
these decisions, when you say "well I'm making this 
decision and if it doesn't work out, well then I'll eat it." 
You aren't the only one who is going to eat it. The whole 
company is going to eat it in a brand sense, and you are 
going to have someone who says "that Microsoft product - 
1 don't know, 1 have a bad feel about it." Even though the 
product has great ratings, great this, great that.
Touch point metaphor
So from what we have been talking about...well we now 
understand, is you get multiple touch points, to be really 
successful and need to succeed on each touch point. The 
touch points are massively distributed. Consultants may 
touch a customer. Your product may touch a customer. 
The customer may be a shareholder who touches the 
investment people, so you have multiple touch points 
widely distributed. To be wildly successful you have to 
succeed on all touch points, which is a very distributed 
model.
Religious
Metaphors
Religious metaphor (trust in God is metaphor for trust 
in organisations)
In a sense it is a continuum -  at the one end, you don’t 
actually mind and say “God how curious”, and on the 
other end you mind and you say "how potentially 
disturbing to my world view”. It’s the same issue that 
some of the world’s leading physicists run into when they 
have found that their most cherished hypotheses look
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closer to religious beliefs than they do to hypotheses of 
statements of the actions of the physical universe. There 
is a whole dialogue of the great physicists that talk about 
the difficulty they have...not in reconciling faith and 
physics, but in dealing with the fact that they need so little 
reconciliation. Thus, I’ll come back to the exact same 
issue. I personally have an issue with the fact that the 
cultural world of a corporation has disturbing similarities 
with faith-based relationships... that people invest in 
religions, either in God, or in the symbols of God, or in the 
community of their church; religion is local, communities 
bond together and those communities -  people think 
people have a personal relationship with God, they may or 
may not, but what they certainly have is the support of 
others nearby them who share their belief in whatever 
belief they have.
Religious metaphor (reverential trust)
There are some similarities here that I find hard to 
understand. The only thing that they all have in common 
is a community of people who invest a greater portion of 
their lives in it. Trust is this thing...different people will 
entrust others to different degrees at different levels of 
trust. Some people are very trusting, some people are 
very untrusting. Everybody starts off differently. Now you 
walk into a business culture where there’s lots and lots of 
good reasons not to trust. And in fact, to be more precise, 
where you invest your trust only to the degree where you 
can see that it will keep your job. So where there is 
generally an air of no trust, cliques form, teams form, 
groups form, and this is what happened at Micrografx. I 
walked in from the outside, and I was an outsider in a lot 
of different ways. I was an outsider because I was an 
acquiree, therefore the perception of me was that I was 
just another company... I was a little guy. So to have 
gone from the little guy to replace the head guy, who was 
revered, notice my use of the term there...that is a 
religious term...Paul Grayson was revered in this 
organisation. He was what held it together. It was started 
by two brothers. One of the brothers was the bad boy and 
one of the brothers was the good boy. They had a very 
public falling out, but the company in its early years 
worked well with the good boy bad boy thing... that 
tension worked, and the bad boy went off. They had a big 
public falling out, and the good guys stayed behind and he 
was loved, and he certainly was trusted._______________
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Religious metaphor (casting bread upon the water)
What is it about this conversation that inspires this 
metaphor about casting your bread upon the water? If 
you want someone to trust you, or if you want to increase 
the level of trust they have in you, you must perform acts 
that are seen by the person that you’re aiming them 
toward, as to inspire in them a step up in their willingness 
to trust. I believe firmly that if I had walked into 
Micrografx... the day I joined, and the first thing I had 
done was gather the whole company around and said, “I 
don't know you, you don't know me. I don't know where 
this is going. But let me tell you something. I may or may 
not be the right leader for this company. Furthermore, I 
don't even know what all the problems are”. Start off 
where I should have - humble about the issues. I would 
have created huge terror and uncertainty in the company, 
but I also believe I would have created the basis for some 
of them to begin to trust.
Religious metaphor (turning the other cheek)
It’s not a matter of turning the other cheek and always 
being a trusting person even when messages come back 
to you that somebody is not to be trusted.
Religious metaphor (evangelists)
[A trusting company] is a happy company. People who 
are enjoying the hell out of themselves and getting 
enormous amounts done and visibly show their job 
satisfaction in their every movement and, are evangelists 
for the business whether they intend to be or not. 
Whenever they are asked “how’s it going”? “It’s going 
great”. Even when it’s going awful it’s going great 
because it’s very exciting. It’s not frightening. The only 
difference between frightening growth and exciting growth 
is the view you take to that. Fast growth is either exciting 
or frightening. Troubled times are either exciting or 
frightening depending upon whether or not you trust that 
everyone is there to catch you. You trust whether the 
business will survive, if you believe.
Religious metaphor (burdens of doctrine)
This is quite an interesting area. Theology in the church, 
moral philosophy around those. One of the burdens of 
doctrine, of course, is that the sin is in the intent, not in the 
execution. It seems to be the same is true with trust.
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Somebody is being untrustworthy. The trust does not 
exist at the moment when one person intends not to live 
by the commitment of trust.
Religious metaphor (sin)
Temptation to sin, and a sin is breach of trust, is out there.
Religious metaphor (business person as Saint)
The problem with trust - let me come back to entrepreneur 
trust because this is where I was going. If you are honest, 
there are two ways you can go. One is incredibly morally 
demanding which is to be the absolute - my word is my 
bond. If I said that I would buy this from you for X and 
even if it makes it personally bankrupt, I am going to 
because that is what I said. It's such a demanding 
standard to live by that you wonder if the person living by 
it isn't a saint. Maybe wants to be a saint.
Marriage metaphor (morality)
You can look at some large organisations where there is a 
behaviour pattern that is wrong and I'll site one. This is 
going back enough years, and I told you before, there's an 
organisation called "The Rank Organisation” - a very, very 
large company. It was headed by a man who is now dead 
who gained fame at the age of about 80 by taking on a 16 
year old wife. The Rank Organisation had an ethos that if 
you were one of the boys, you screwed about it. You had 
mistresses; you hired a new secretary; you hired one that 
was going to be available over the desk. Really a culture 
that if that....I could exaggerate this, but it was a perceived 
culture, if that wasn't the way you behaved, you were 
never going to really want to be one of the inner circle. 
Really family wasn’t one of the key cultures to this unit. 
The culture is you’re one of the boys, you are running a 
top rank business. I believe there became a point where 
that culture permeated right down through that business. 
There is an old stock broker who said "men who cheat on 
their wives cheat in business." Put another way around it 
is rare that you find a man who cheats on his wife who 
doesn't also cheat on his business. It's rather the two are 
connected because it is an approach, a behavioural 
approach. To say that every man who has ever cheated 
on his wife is a crook would be really rather a lot of crooks 
about. It is fairly fair to say that most people cheat in the 
running of their business, most men who cheat in the 
running of their businesses, also cheat on their wives. So,
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when you have a culture like in Rank, 1 think there was an 
aspect that morality culture which may have been 
insidious within the running of Rank as well.
Religious metaphor (crucifixion)
It's a fairly classic one within a business. If an employee 
makes a mistake, you put it right but you do not crucify an 
employee to regain your relationship with an external. You 
back them. The fault is the company's, not the 
employee’s.
Religious metaphor (crucifixion)
That's 1 think how trust happens here. Have an 
environment where, if a person admits a mistake, or 
comes to you and says they've made a mistake, you don't 
crucify them; you help them. That is the most critical.
Religious metaphor (Bible salesman)
Curiously one of the people who left this firm, 1 was 
meeting with about six months ago, 1 was discussing with 
him, 1 was with my son and he said "Michael, we are bible 
salesmen, we don't convert the heathens; just forget 
about the heathens - sell honest stuff yourself is what he 
was saying. Forget about the crooks, don't try and convert 
them. The trouble is, the number of heathens out there is 
growing. The portion of heathens in the city is higher than 
it’s been in the past.
Religious metaphor (faith)
You are also supposed to have faith and not question 
some of the work -  it depends. You can question, but at 
the end of the day you are supposed to believe. 
Corporations don’t get that. People don’t believe because 
they are told to believe. And faith is so personal that the 
loyalty to the Church and God may be completely 
unshakeable no matter what happens. Loyalty to the 
corporation is never unshakeable.
Religious metaphor (fervor)
There are people that will dislike you no matter what you 
do. The facts don’t matter. They have almost a religious 
fervor about that. It’s not going to move.
Financial Financial metaphor (balance sheet -  P&L)
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Metaphors 1 believe that there is only one type of trust and the only
difference between faith and trust is that one is a balance
sheet and one is a P&L. Faith is what you have at the
moment -- trust is what is moving back and forth.
Financial metaphor (trust account)
So, at any given moment in time, you have got to begin to
proactively...in all that you do...to start to act in a way,
that people begin to build an account with you - a process
with you - of trusting.
Financial metaphor (trust is base currency)
In my mind, credibility is a base currency. Trust gets
ratcheted... and it gets ratcheted on the back (of
credibility).
Financial metaphor (trust is a matter of coin)
The issue is that it is hierarchical and, therefore, trust has
to be established by being earned by a leader as to a
subordinate because a subordinate will trust a superior
only to the degree that they earn that trust so it is
essentially - it is a matter of coin that is exchanged
between them and what makes it unique is the total
amount of coin available can be increased by acts of trust.
Financial metaphor (trust bank)
Once a sufficient amount of trust is built up, you can make
a mistake and recover trust -  there is a bank of it.
Financial metaphor (endow -  accounts)
Why he doesn’t trust, why he doesn’t endow the people
around him with trust because there is no reason at the
moment of entry why he should trust or not trust, so that
he doesn’t trust, meaning he has already calculated a
negative account as it were and say ok no, in my case, 1
addressed it directly and said these people are doing a
series of activities, “you trust me...correct”? And he said
“yes” and 1 said “well 1 trust them, therefore, why don’t you
work on my credit account as it were.”
Financial metaphor (borrow against account)
They trusted me so they borrowed that trust on my
account for his benefit and he trusted me, so then he
borrowed on my account for their benefit. If anyone had
not acted in accord, my account would have diminished
considerably.
327
Financial metaphor (start with positive account)
I think trust is built in organisations by starting with an 
assumptive, positive account on all parties’ behalf. 
Therefore, everyone should start with a credit account, not 
with either a neutral or negative account, and then they 
either betray the trust or they can build on it. You have to 
assumptively put the entire organisation in a position 
where it is believed that everyone is trusted by each other 
and you act according to that. That is how trust begins. 
How trust is built is by ensuring that when people are 
taking every incident or every evidence of activity that 
does not support increasing trust and encouraging or 
teaching or communicating to people that that’s a 
behaviour that in fact doesn’t benefit themselves or the 
other person. So you put a lot of ground work in to what 
amounts to communication activities. Communication 
surrounds walking people through why other people do 
this and how that’s a good thing so you educate people 
how to let go, i.e., trust. In the instance of how do others 
build trust with me, people build trust with me by acting in 
a trustworthy manner so that I can see that there is a 
consonance between their activity and the trust I repose in 
them so that then what essentially is a loaning of trust 
becomes a credit account of trust.
Financial metaphor (investment)
So, what is interesting about that is the more you trust 
someone, the more you invest or handover to them coins 
of trust, the greater their account becomes, but the 
greater the potential for them to be viewed as 
untrustworthy, and the higher you build it, the higher the 
potential to fall, and therefore, the more you trust 
someone, the more...essentially the more exposed you 
are to them, I suppose, but conversely the more 
opportunities they have then to miss the beat and not to 
be trusted there is a slight challenge there. Having said 
that, I think the people also have an assumptive position. 
In other words, if somebody acts in a trustworthy fashion 
over and over and over again, if they were to then 
apparently act in a fashion that was untrustworthy, my first 
instinct is to actually assume that there is a 
miscommunication or misunderstanding rather than that 
they acted in an untrustworthy fashion. They have a 
credit account, and so it is amazing how useful that is if 
that is the case.
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Financial metaphor (flexible accounts with cushions)
What happens is the system builds a reservoir of trust, it 
builds up cushions between people so that as things 
happen that create tension, because businesses are full 
of moments of tension, if there is a lot of cushion of trust 
between people, then when those moments of tension 
happen, even though you are putting stress on those 
cushions, you are using up coins of trust with your people, 
you are still on a positive account. People will still forgive, 
they’ll understand, they’ll reach out and try to understand 
rather than moving into the negative, and so you want to 
have as much of that going on as possible before those 
moments of tension occur.
Financial metaphor (trust is exchanged -  transacted)
In other words trust is something to be earned and 
delivered, or gifted and expected and you hope for in 
return. But you have to be intelligent about the handing 
out of trust; the measurement of what constitutes 
trustworthy behaviour just because trust is very very 
useful and very very important does not mean you have to 
be naTve. To be trusting is not to be naive. They are 
separate things, and therefore, trust becomes a 
disadvantage when people misunderstand the notion of 
what trust is.
Financial metaphor (investment)
That is inherently a question of whether or not you have 
invested trust in the business and whether you trust the 
business - meaning whether you trust the individuals 
around you that this thing will come through.
Financial metaphor (handing over key to trust vault)
When you talk about trust between Corporation A and 
Corporation B, from a vendor and a customer, it’s really 
between people who manage the lead individuals who 
manage that relationship, and if one of those sets of 
individuals sets out to earn the trust of the individuals on 
the other side of that fence, so you are still back to 
individuals deciding to trust or not and in handing over the 
keys to trust.
Financial metaphor (investment)
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I believe, on some level, people will invest trust in brands.
Financial metaphor (trust is currency)
Trust is a currency between people is my basic premise, 
and that it can spread across a great number of people, 
and it can spread as a part of a culture of an organisation 
or a religion or a community or a club or a school -  any 
grouping of people, it doesn’t have to be a business. I 
think any grouping of people that enjoy a trust-based 
system rather than one that is not, are going to end up 
with a more productive, efficient, better outcome.
Financial metaphor (trust is transactional)
I think confidence is passive. There's no necessary 
reciprocity. It's inert, there’s no transaction - where trust 
is transactional. There is something coming back in 
return and they provided the trust. So then earning the 
trust, building the trust is important because then you’ve 
got confidence that the other side of the transaction is 
going to come back.
Financial metaphor (invest -  pool of trust)
We get to this point where we have this shared 
understanding of the business objectives, where it's trying 
to go, which is both practical in the sense that we do 
understand the operating plan, but it’s also cultural in the 
sense that we understand how the management will 
behave and what they will do, and we are confident that 
they will behave in what they do. That collectively allows 
us to undertake transactions with the management which 
are quick - to the point. I don't have any great legal 
underpinning in decision making so they can be done 
quickly and effectively and leave the bureaucracy to catch 
up later to the degree that it is necessary. Of course, the 
bureaucracy itself may be extra slim - an exchange of 
letters as opposed to being some form of legal 
agreement. That's all I'm trying to say is that, invest once 
using trust to understand and respect and then you can 
do a whole series of transactions on that pool of trust and 
understanding as opposed to having to do due diligence 
and negotiate a contract every time.
Value metaphor
That is one of the interesting ways of proving the value of 
trust - through that volatility reduction._________________
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Financial metaphor (cost of trust)
One of the examples I do in terms of the cost of trust 
where they think this is the cost of lack of trust is the 
transportation system here in Britain. One of my biggest 
problems in London, is, I don't know when I'm going to get 
anywhere. What happens is we could, at great expense, 
have a transportation system that was punctual in the 
extreme. It would cost us more than we could dream of. I 
can spend my whole life being a paranoid freak, but it's 
probably better to focus on the two or three percent of 
people who are really out to get me rather than spending 
my whole life worried about that paranoia, and that trust 
comes at a cost.
Financial metaphor (arbitrage)
We are in a position now where I think it is exceedingly 
difficult for organisations to get anything done. That will 
lead to things like trust arbitrage and in some ways is a 
way of the future.
Financial metaphor (trust is about future transactions)
I think, in a funny way, trust is not about the transaction at 
the moment. It’s likely about the future perceived ones. 
So, a lot of our suppliers have to be looking to “what are 
we going to do in the future with them”?
Financial metaphor (credit)
That was in partnership style of operating. Those in the 
Nigeria venture which I was really responsible for - I was 
given a lot of latitude to develop that. We emerged from it 
unscathed. In that case we earned credit with some of 
our corporate clients for being in Nigeria, like with 
Guinness.
Coin metaphor
Trust relates to retention. The ‘80’s was very interesting 
as companies got somewhat ruthless in the ‘80’s about 
cutting costs and downsizing and automating and pushing 
people out. Then there was a period when a company 
said employees are not loyal; they’ll jump for the next best 
dot com job. You can’t get anyone to stay. Those are 
different sides of the same coin. The fact is that they 
weren’t bonded anymore. So having trust with your 
employees creates an environment where they want to 
work here and that they feel good about working here.
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Finance metaphor (trust banks)
Doctors, for example, are trust banks.
War/Violence
Metaphors
Body blow metaphor
All businesses take body blows, and one of the body 
blows is that a lot of large corporations recently have 
acted in an untrustworthy fashion and positively felonious 
fashion -- people are breaking laws and stealing money. 
That would be about as untrustworthy as you can be.
Weapon metaphor
Trust is a weapon. 1 believe there is an absolute direct 
hard-core correlation between trusting and vulnerability, 
and that there is no way around it. The two are aligned 
perfectly. The more 1 trust you, the more 1 am vulnerable 
to you abusing that trust. Thus, being trusted is a 
weapon, trusting is not. Let me make it even more 
cynical. Acting in a trustworthy manner is a very powerful 
weapon. If you just took that statement in an unadorned 
fashion and said it to somebody, they would be hard- 
pressed to figure out what that meant. Notice 1 said the 
word “acting”, that's the hub of that sentence. 1 didn't say 
“being trustworthy”, 1 said “acting in a trustworthy 
manner”. It doesn’t mean you're not acting with the right 
motive... you might be. You might be acting in the wrong 
motive, motive is irrelevant.
Vulnerability metaphor
1 would also assert that the act of trusting is exposure... it 
is permitting the opportunity for the other to abuse you.
Big stick metaphor
To be honest with you a big issue in the world today is the 
power of the United States - the degree to which the 
United States can simply abrogate from treaty 
commitments. The rest of the world has no satisfactory 
sanction against the US. That is a worrying reflection of 
what you just talked about which is that the trust that is 
necessary in international relations is very hard to enforce 
against one party who has all the big sticks and is not 
afraid of the other party at all under any circumstances 
where there is no arbitrator.
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Military metaphor
[Trust] is economic efficiency. It allows speed and it 
allows....but don't forget what you've done, and again, I 
think this is a military thing. There's a very good example. 
I'm a great believer in the German general system which 
is best. If you have a well balanced army which is 
operating to a good structure and good passing of 
information and good operations and all of this is all the 
way done, then it is possible for somebody like a 
commanding general like Rummell to give a one 
paragraph instruction which is to say "Africa called - we'll 
take this line by this time in order to achieve this 
advantage over the enemy." This is a spectacularly 
complex thing. What the implication of that is that you've - 
just think about the complications of it. You are probably 
talking about a force of a half of a million men and there 
are going to be logistics and tank parts and forward based 
depots and bath units and the artillery and the artillery 
groups are going to have to do the artillery reserve grid 
squares and they are going to have to work out the mind 
field breaching routes and air reconnaissance - it's got to 
manifest itself as a million lines of instruction cascading 
down and yet it can be encapsulated and directed from 
these three sentences with absolute clarity. And a guy 
like Rummell can rely on the fact that this will cascade 
down the command structure of Africa called and the 
details are being filled out to achieve this objective. That's 
incredibly powerful if you can do it. I think that trust works 
is exactly - that is all about trust.
It's about the fact that the officers in the German general 
staff are bound by a single honour code or virtually by the 
loyalty to the German state or to Adolph Hitler. More 
importantly their shared culture that they all wear the 
same regimen. They went to the same staff college. The 
fact that they learned at the staff college and in operating 
together practically to interact in a reliable way where 
each can anticipate what the other is going to do under 
certain circumstances and say you get this incredibly 
economy of decision making which leads to a very 
complex sophisticated responses. The beauty of it - this is 
the thing that I can say about it because it frees up the 
commander's mind to concentrate which is absolutely 
critical the element of surprise defeating the enemy in 
detail. Not worrying about - how many tanks does he 
need over here because he's got plenty to rely on. This 
general to be in the right place at the right time. So you
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end up with a brain exploding with information as the 
supreme commander. You can't do that. No man can do 
it. You've got to have this wonderful system where the 
brain is the organisation. I think that what we are doing - 
when I go and have breakfast with Ray Anderson who is 
probably is a prime example of an entrepreneur in my 
portfolio that I absolutely trust and we have this two 
minute conversation which results in a decision which 
involves transfer of value or shares, the reason we can do 
this is because we have invested so much time in 
communication and understanding the business strategy 
and going to board meetings and having this little shared 
value system and having this sort of collected intelligence.
Fragile metaphor
But the trust was forever broken because I was rubbished 
for earnestly expressing view. A number of partners 
came up afterwards and said "I completely agree with 
you." I said "it might be quite nice if you had said "hear 
hear". It might have been quite nice if you had voiced it, 
but it was not very nice to have been made an object of 
derision when one was expressing a genuine concern. I 
will probably not trouble to express such a concern again. 
That is a lack of trust.
Fragile metaphor (breaking trust)
Well, once you have trust, just try not to break it. Try not 
to let people down. Try not to be unfair to people. If it's an 
employee, try not to be ruthless. Try not to be 
inconsiderate. There are times when you have to 
compromise.
Bodily harm metaphor
What you can't do is say oh yes we will scalp him, are you 
now happy as a customer? That is appalling. That is the 
most fundamental breach of trust. It may be, but on 
inquiry, you do need to scalp one of your people because 
they are no good.
Burning metaphor
If you are put in as the managing partner of any business 
- you are the boss of the business, it is very easy to 
produce short-term performance. Short-term performance 
is created by cutting costs, upping charges. Now you can 
do that in a professional office. Somebody could come 
into this office and over the next 12 months vastly
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increase the profitability. Freeze all salaries, unload one 
of your weaker members of staff, up the charges to the 
customers, downgrade the service, and this office will 
make more money next year, the year after, and probably 
the year after that. As the experts are brought in, “I want 
a bonus, based on the turnaround - I get a vast bonus 
because look what we have achieved”. What I have done 
has made money by burning trust, by burning good-will.
Burning metaphor
When you have a successful business, it can continue to 
make a lot of profits despite the fact that you’ve burnt and 
blown the trust, so I think what is beginning to emerge is 
that you have a better chance of small businesses having 
the correct morals, the correct integrity, and the correct 
level of trust than you do in big businesses.
Fragile metaphor (breaking trust)
They have blown trust. If you bought a Rover Car 30 
years ago, it was a superb car. Ten years later if you 
bought a Rover Car, it rusted apart before you got it off 
the showroom floor. For years nobody bought a Rover - 
this is probably the best name outside Bentley or Rolls 
Royce in the world. It became synonymous with rubbish. 
Trust had been broken. In the short term, of course, 
Rover made a lot of money because they built a 
generation of lousy, cheaply produced cars and could sell 
them at a good price because everybody knew they were 
getting a good car, but actually what they found was a bad 
car so they didn't buy another one.
Sexual assault metaphor
Improper behaviour isn't something that somebody 
suddenly does - it's a bit like people who carry out sexual 
assaults. There is always a pattern of minor offences 
progressing up over a period of ten or 20 years. Improper 
behaviour in the commercial world and untrustworthy and 
dishonourable and dishonest behaviour isn't something 
that somebody suddenly does. There have always been 
masses of signs on the way that it's coming. It's our 
facility to ignore those signs.
Fragile metaphor (shattering)
I think one of the sad things about business today is that 
trust between shareholders and its public company and 
management and boards is very much reduced.
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Everyone is happy as long as profits are increasing. As 
soon as the business hits a rough patch, there's an 
immediate inclination to blame somebody in the 
corporation. That's trust on a more macro level. It's in 
part brought on by management sometimes having them 
take advantage of their position and not putting the 
shareholder’s interests first. You get a combination of 
very high rewards in the short-term. That's a very fragile 
relationship which can shatter at any time.
Military metaphor (British in Southeast Asia)
1 haven't really thought of this before but one of the things 
that was said about the experience of the British in 
Southeast Asia in the '39, '45 war, was that Singapore 
was very heavily fortified but the guns were pointing in the 
wrong direction. They were pointing out to sea whereas 
the Japanese came down the Malaysian Peninsula. 1 
think we can say the same thing about the way in which -  
in a number of different ways - the Barings group was 
structured.
Mixed/Idiosyncratic
Metaphors
Permission metaphor
Trust is essential to our organisation because the 
efficiency of a business is in direct relationship to a) 
whether or not trust exists; and b) to the degree that trust 
exists. Trust permits independence. Trust permits the 
empowerment of the employee. Trust permits a flatter 
organisation of layers because people can have more 
people under their management. It permits a huge 
number of things that in its absence makes it more costly 
and less efficient.
Game metaphor (much like chutes and ladders)
People in a position of power have to give trust in order to 
get it back. Thus earn the trust of those below them. As 
a CEO, 1 have to show that 1 trust if 1 ever expect people 
to be empowered and to act in a way that makes them 
fully enabled to get things done. Equally so, trust has to 
be earned in that one has to act in a trustworthy fashion. 
That is to say if one does something and then lives by it, 
then you earn a point of trust. If one does something and 
doesn’t live by it, then you not only lose that point of trust 
you actually go into a position where it is binary, and it 
takes much less effort to create distrust than it does to 
create trust. And in fact the cost of creating trust is a
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consistency of activity that is rarely or never broken. 
Voyeur metaphor
I think confidence is a voyeuristic manifestation of trust. 
Do you know what I mean? I think that trust is about 
knowing that there is a mutual commitment which has got 
an obligation at the end of it and expecting that obligation 
to be fulfilled. I think confidence is merely your state of 
mind when you look at an individual, and the degree to 
which you anticipate that they will do what they said they 
were going to do or they were going to deliver on a 
performance plan, but where there was not necessarily 
any particular direct consequence to you in the sense of 
fulfilment of an obligation to pay you back money.
Tribal trust metaphor
Essex is a county to the east of London where a lot of the 
people who live there used to live in the east end. The 
east end got this very strong metropolitan city culture - a 
tribal culture. Not particularly law abiding but very strong 
traditions of honour and not breaking your word. We 
invested in a guy who was developing a series of coffee 
shops around the eastern fringe of London. For various 
reasons this went wrong. In particular because the 
landlord enforced a rent review which was six times the 
level of rent this business was having to pay. And that 
was unsustainable. The business was insolvency 
liquidated, and he -  although he didn't actually become a 
personal bankrupt, he went in to this sort of protection 
from creditor’s arrangement in the UK called an “individual 
voluntary arrangement." He couldn't own shares in nor be 
a director of any other business while he was in this 
individual voluntary arrangement. For him to, therefore, 
carry on and we had been working on a project for an 
alternative for him, he had to trust us that we would 
employ him as manager, the investor, and that when his 
voluntary arrangement ended, he would get his share of 
the equity and would be appointed a director, but there 
was no legal agreement for that to happen. Now that had 
to work on trust and we did fulfill our side of the bargain. 
Now he owns 55% of that business and he is the 
managing director and owns more of it than we do, even 
though for a period we owned 100% - and that's pretty 
potent stuff.
Colour metaphor________________________________
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It's not as black and white as that. We all know that these 
things aren't vibrant. You have to engage with other 
people even though you don't trust them completely.
Short hand metaphor
I think in that sense it's a really useful exercise in looking 
at trust because I think leveraged well, used well, and 
understood well, it can give a short-hand for business 
transactions which is incredibly impatient and fast.
Joint enterprise metaphor
We've got to have trust. We've got to have trust. We've 
got to have a sense of the joint enterprise. I do think that 
is what we are trying to get to. This idea of a joint 
enterprise and it is our company and we are working on it 
together. That isn’t going to happen unless we build trust, 
but equally, we've got to be professionals so trust is 
conditional. Trust has to be conditional. As long as you 
are a professional, and behave like a professional, we will 
be professionals and we will behave like professionals 
and we can trust each other and get on with it.
Exposure metaphor
Are you prepared to drop your trousers in front of 
somebody in a commercial term? If you trust dropping 
your trousers, are people going to laugh. That's the 
expression, will you drop your trousers and will they laugh 
at what they see. If you trust that they are not going to 
laugh, then you are prepared to drop your trousers and 
expose your views.
Cleaning-up metaphor
Quite often there is no trust at all. Quite often the 
response is "well, you know Mr. Smith has been lying to 
me for ages. When I asked him if there were difficulties, 
he always said that the check was in the post. It's the 
third time he's told me that." Of course it wasn't in the 
post, he may have said that, but it wasn't the post. “Are 
you saying he lied to me?” His back was to the wall, but 
now we are now doing what’s right. By cleaning up you 
can restore that trust.
Exposure and fragile metaphor
You end up finding there are people you've known for 30 
years, and trust has never been broken so the degree of 
trust is hugely greater and the extent to which you will
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drop your trousers or expose yourself becomes greater. 
Cooking metaphor
I think you can boil trust down to simple things. What has 
been the pattern of behaviour and what is the pattern of 
behaviour of a person? If a person steals from the petty 
cash, by and large they are probably not trustworthy. 
Terribly simple things indicate people aren't trustworthy.
Brand metaphor (Heinz)
The brand value of Heinz is that we know when we open 
a tin of Heinz or a can of whatever that the product is as 
we expect, is good -  it has a brand value. That's good­
will. We actually trust Heinz to produce a reasonable 
product. Probably, and we have significantly less trust 
that McDonalds will produce a good product, but as most 
of the people buying McDonalds are youngsters and 
wouldn't know the track record it is not so important. You 
or I might be more cautious. So, Heinz probably has a 
trust value. McDonalds has just a brand name, an 
advertising image. Maybe there is a trust there. You can 
trust you get the same beastly, greasy burger at 
McDonalds anywhere in the world - maybe there is a trust.
Feeling metaphor
At the end of the day trust is a feeling so its future 
perceived perceptions - its not just mathematical -  it’s 
about "how do you feel your relationship is going to be 
with this firm" that really what matters.
Brand metaphor (brands are trust)
If you look at trust in some ways, people like to play the 
brand angle on it. Brands are trust, and that's one way to 
value trust.
Herd metaphor
Japanese seem to have very interesting organisations 
where they have huge numbers of people who are 
involved in a single decision but they can still get it 
tremendously right or wrong. Usually the ones that get it 
right are the ones who have departed from that slightly 
herd-like mentality.
Relevance metaphor
Or maybe we could call it "related trust" which is: Is my 
relationship with Microsoft in my home computer actually
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linked to my relationship with Microsoft at work? So that I 
find it relevant. So the fact that my dishwasher went on 
the fritz and the GE call centre took forever to answer the 
phone, I don't link that to the same people in the airplane 
industry for a host of reasons. A different part of GE 
makes it, there's a lot of FFA oversight. There are airline 
mechanics. There's all sorts of stuff there. So I would say 
that my lack of trust in my dishwasher was not linked to 
my flying experience. On the other hand, if you are 
running XP at home and XP at the workplace, the product 
is so similar and the experience is so similar - the same 
desktop icons, that link might be high.
Brand metaphor (trust and company brand)
Let’s suppose you are a shareholder. So you have a 
problem with XP; you called the help centre; you get the 
runaround. You start telling your friends that Microsoft is 
not responsive. You are not impressed. You are also a 
shareholder. You send a letter of complaint to the CEO, 
and no one gets back to you. You’re probably inclined to 
say "Microsoft is just not responsive." They don't respond 
to my computer complaints. “They didn't respond to my 
shareholder letter.” “They have a corporate culture of just 
blowing us off.” Even though the shareholder relations' 
people might be very different than the technical support 
people, GE engines or not, the consumer might link that 
because the issue is the same - unresponsiveness to an 
inquiry by someone with a relationship with the company. 
Because they were looking for a response to an inquiry, 
it's similar enough in their own mind that they go "this is 
linked; they are just an unresponsive company." If I sent 
a letter to GE aircraft engines and GE dishwashers, and I 
didn't get a response from either, I probably wouldn't 
associate it with GE just because those products are so 
different. If they didn't have the label of GE on the engine,
I never would have known. My point is, I suppose, is that 
shareholders are also users and they might combine 
disparate communications to craft their visceral feeling 
about the brand as a whole, which is why to gain trust as 
a company brand we have to do the right things in every 
area - every area where the customer might link you.
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